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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a case involving the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (hereafter
"TEDRA"). The TEDRA statute permits parties to a trust dispute to enter into a
Nonjudicial Dispute Resolution Agreement ("TEDRA Agreement") to resolve their
disputes without court intervention. The case involves the ability of a party to enforce a
TEDRA Agreement when the other party breaches it.
B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

In October 2014, Edwin DeYoung ("Edwin") 1 and all the beneficiaries of the
Clifton and Majorie Frizzell Family Trust ("Frizzell Trust") entered into a Nonjudicial
Dispute Resolution Agreement ("TEDRA Agreement") pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-8302. (R. 8, 73 - 93). 2 Darlene DeYoung ("Darlene") and Donald C. Frizzell ("Frizzell")
were among those beneficiaries. (R. 8). On October 29, 2014, Edwin petitioned the
District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of
Kootenai to adopt the Agreement pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-8-304. (R. 95 - 117).
The Agreement modified certain provisions of the Frizzell Trust and directed
Edwin to transfer certain real and personal property, along with rental income (less
expenses) and management responsibilities to Frizzell by October 1, 2014. (R. 4-5). On
1 First names are being used where needed to avoid confusion.
2 A true and correct copy of the TEDRA Agreement is attached hereto as Appendix A.
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October 6, 2016, Frizzell filed a complaint seeking enforcement of that TEDRA
Agreement for Edwin's failure to perform under the precise terms of the TEDRA
Agreement. (R. 4). The case was assigned to the Honorable John T. Mitchell, District
Court Judge. (R. 4). The case was reassigned to the Honorable Cynthia K.C. Meyer on
November 10, 2016, after the DeYoungs moved to disqualify Judge Mitchell. (R. 4).
The DeYoungs filed a Motion to Dismiss ("Motion") for failure to state a claim on
November 9, 2016. (R. 4). The Motion was heard on December 13, 2016. Jd. On January
20, 2017, Judge Meyer issued her Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's (sic)
Motion to Dismiss ("Order"), granting a dismissal to the DeYoungs. (R. 15 8 - 176). 3 In
her ruling, Judge Meyer stated:
There were remedies available to [Frizzell] through the provisions of the
TEDRA Act and the failure to utilize those remedies is troubling to the
Court, particularly when all parties entered into the agreement knowingly,
voluntarily, and with the aid of counsel. It makes little sense to enter into an
agreement to resolve matters related the administration of a trust through a
prescribed course of conduct, only to argue that the agreement does not
apply to matters that originate after the agreement was signed. At that
point the agreement is of no utility and rather than creating efficiencies it
becomes burdensome to the courts.
(R. 164) (emphasis added). In granting the DeYoungs' Motion, the Court ruled that the
scope of the Release in the Agreement was not limited to just claims "up to the date [the]
Agreement is executed," but also "all future claims that might arise between [Frizzell]
----------3 A true and correct copy of that Order is attached hereto as Appendix B.
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and [Edwin]." (R. 170-171). In effect, the district court held the TEDRA Agreement itself
barred its own enforcement. (R. 164).
The Court further held that by signing the TEDRA Agreement, Frizzell "agreed to
non-judicial dispute resolution regarding matters related to the administration of the
Trust." (R. 172). The Court acknowledged that "[t]he Policy of the Act is to promote nonjudicial resolution of trust disputes, efficiency in trust administration, and judicial
resolution of disputes where non-judicial efforts fail." (R. 172) (italics in original).

The district court made clear, "The TEDRA Agreement is not a waiver of
Plaintiffs day in court." (R. 172). Further adding, "If the parties were unable to do so
[resolve disputes in a binding non-judicial manner] TEDRA provided judicial remedies
for those disputes." (R.174). The district court ultimately deemed Frizzell's suit to
enforce the TEDRA Agreement as "unreasonable, lacking foundation, and ... brought and
pursued frivolously." (R. 175).
The district court granted the DeYoungs' request for an award of attorney's fees
pursuant to the enforcement provision of the Agreement and the TEDRA statute. (R. 174175).
Final Judgment was entered on March 9, 2017. (R. 177). Frizzell filed his Notice
of Appeal on March 17, 2017. (R. 179). His Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on
March 20, 2017. (R. 183). Frizzell now submits this brief in support of his appeal.
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C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 30, 2009, Clifton G. and Majorie J. Frizzell created the Frizzell Trust. (R.

7). Clifton and Majorie were the grantors and original trustees of the trust. Id. Together,
Clifton and Majorie had one child, Frizzell. (R. 43). Both Clifton and Majorie had
children from prior marriages (R. 42-43). One of Majorie's children was Darlene,
Frizzell's half-sister. (R. 43). Clifton and Majorie also had a number of grandchildren. (R.
43). Clifton died on September 4, 2011. Id. Majorie died on October 24, 2011. Id.
Upon the death of Clifton and Majorie, Haley Baker was appointed as successor
trustee of the Trust. (R. 8). Baker declined to serve. Id. On October 29, 2011, Edwin was
appointed the successor Trustee. Id.
In 2013, Frizzell brought suit to enforce the Trust in Kootenai County Cause No.
CV-2013-3998. (R. 80). In October 2014, Edwin, Darlene, Frizzell, Baker, Tyler
De Young, Darryl DeYoung, Craig Frizzell, and Dean Frizzell, as vested remaindermen
beneficiaries of the Trust entered into a TEDRA Agreement pursuant to I.C. § 15-8-302.
(R. 74-75). Baker, Tyler, Darryl, Craig, and Dean were all Clifton and Majorie's
grandchildren. 4 (R. 43).
The TEDRA Agreement specifically states that it "is intended to be a binding
agreement to resolve certain issues that have arisen ... between the Parties." (R. 75).
4 Distributions to the grandchildren are included in the Agreement, but are not within the scope of this appeal. (R.
77).
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Pursuant to the TEDRA Agreement, among other changes to the Frizzell Trust, Darlene
and Frizzell were to receive "their equal residuary share of the trust estate from the
Survivor's Trust and the Bypass Trust outright rather than continue it in trust." (R. 76).
The Agreement provided that the following assets were to be distributed to
Frizzell "free of trust":
a.

39th Street Apartments, Phoenix, Arizona ["39th Street Property"]

b.

4828 Brayton Avenue, Long Beach, California ["Brayton Property"]

c.

265 Selmar Way, Sylva, North Carolina ["Selmar Property"]

d.
375
Property"]

Redondo

Avenue,

Long

Beach,

California

["Redondo

e.
All personal property and contacts located at all of the above listed
properties, including specifically the household goods at the 265 Selmar
Way, North Carolina property.
f.
Any and all vehicles in Don's possession, including specificially the
Model A, Chevroley pick up, and Rolls Royce.
(R. 78). As of October 1, 2014, "all income from the real properties [were] to be
distributed to" Frizzell, "less expenses relate to such properties." Id. Management of all
properties was to be distributed to Frizzell as of October 1, 2014 as well. Id.
Pursuant to the Agreement, Frizzell agreed to indemnify Edwin against "any
claims, lawsuits or other actions ... advanced against" Edwin by Frizzell or Frizzell' s
children related to Edwin's administration of the Trust up to the date of execution of the
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TEDRA Agreement. (R. 79). The Parties agreed to the binding nature of the TEDRA
Agreement. Id.
All beneficiaries to the Agreement agreed to a "Release and Hold Harmless,"
which provided:
The Beneficiaries ... release, discharge, and indemnify ED ... from any and
all actual or potential claims or causes of action, of whatsoever kind or
nature, whether at law or in equity, whether known or unknown, accrued or
yet to arise or accrue, including but not limited to any claims of negligence
or breach of fiduciary duty o breach of contract, which relate to or arise out
of any act, omission of conduct of ED in his capacity as Trustee that the
Releasors no have, ever had, may have had, or may thereafter have from the
inception of the [Trust] .. .up to the date this Agreement is executed. Such
release is limited to claims that were asserted or that could have been
asserted ... arising out of or related in any way to [the Trust].
(R. 80) (emphasis added). Edwin agreed to release Frizzell from any claims "as of the
date of execution of [the] Agreement." (R. 81). The Release explicitly does not include
any claims arising from the performance of obligations under or the enforcement of the
Agreement itself. (R. 81).
Among the Agreement's "General Provisions" was an enforcement clause, which
stated: "If any dispute between the Parties concerning this Agreement hereto results in
litigation, the prevailing Party shall be reimbursed and indemnified by the Party not
prevailing for all costs and expenses." (R. 82). The Agreement explicitly defined breach:
Each party agrees to do all acts and sign any and all documents necessary to
carry out the terms and provisions of this Agreement and acknowledges
that any failure to do so will be considered a breach of this Agreement.
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(R. 82) (emphasis added). All Parties executed the Agreement in October 2014. (R. 8).
The Agreement did not terminate the Trust. (R. 74-93).
After the parties executed the Agreement, Edwin petitioned the Court to adopt the
Agreement pursuant to LC. § 15-8-304. (R. 95).
Edwin provided Frizzell with an "accounting" of the net rental income for the
properties to be transferred to Frizzell for the time period of October 1, 2014 through
December 31, 2015. (R. 10). 5 The net rental income for that time period was $54,956, of
which Edwin paid to himself $49,303 as "Trustee management fees." Id. Frizzell only
received $6,123.28. Id.
Edwin relinquished all management rights in the Selmar Property in August 2015.
Id. On March 1, 2016, Edwin relinquished all management responsibilities in the

Redondo Property to Frizzell. Id. On that same date, March 1, 2016, Edwin relinquished
all management responsibility in the 39th Street Property to Frizzell. Id.
On September 13, 2016, Frizzell received a Notice of Delinquency for unpaid
property taxes incurred on the Brayton Property. (R. 11). A portion of the taxes listed on
the Notice were reported as paid on the "accounting" provided by Edwin for November
2015. (R. 11, 13 2). The Brayton Property was not an asset of the Trust as of October 6,

5 A true and correct copy of the "accounting" is attached hereto as Appendix C.
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2016. (R. 6, 11). An attempt to transfer the Brayton Property into the Trust via litigation
in California failed. (R. 11 ).

II. ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the district court err in granting the De Youngs' motion to dismiss

against Frizzell seeking enforcement of a TEDRA Agreement through the filing of a
complaint and initiation of a new lawsuit?
2.

Did the district court err in ruling that the terms of the TEDRA Agreement

barred Frizzell's action to enforce it?
3.

Is Frizzell entitled to his attorneys' fees m successfully bringing this

action?

ill. STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW
A district court's dismissal of a complaint under I.R.C.P 12(b)(6) shall be
reviewed de novo. Coalition for Agriculture's Future v. Canyon County, 160 Idaho 142,
369 P.3d 920, 923 (2016) (italics in original). The Court's standard of review for an order
of the district court dismissing a case pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is the same as the
summary judgment standard of review. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672-673,
183 P.3d 758, 760-761 (2008); relying on Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 667, 115
P.3d 756, 758 (2005).
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In addition, the Court "exercises free review over the issues of law decided by the
district court to determine whether it correctly stated and applied the applicable law."
State v. Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Slane, 155 Idaho 274, 277, 311 P. 3d 286, 289

(2013) ("Slane"). The interpretation of unambiguous contracts or statues is a question of
law subject to free review by the Court. Idaho Wool Growers Ass 'n, Inc. v. State, 154
Idaho 716, 302 P.3d 341,345 (2012).

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

INTRODUCTION: THE RELEVANT IDAHO LAW REGARDING TRUST
AND ESTATE DISPUTES (TEDRA)

In Idaho, disputes arising from trust and estates are governed by the Trust and Estate
Dispute Resolution Act ("TEDRA"), codified at LC. 15-8-101, et seq. LC.§ 15-8-101(1).
The statute explicitly provides that its purpose is to "set forth generally applicable
statutory provisions for the resolution of disputes and other matters involving trusts and
estates." LC.§ 15-8-101(2). The chapter also provides judicial resolution of disputes, and
clearly states that "the provisions of [TEDRA] shall not supersede, but shall supplement,
any otherwise applicable provisions and procedures contained in title 15, Idaho Code, or
other Idaho law." Id.
TEDRA overtly acknowledges the "plenary power of the court," stating: "It is the
intent of the legislature that the courts shall have full and ample power and authority
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under this chapter to administer and settle ... all trusts and trust matters." I.C. § 15-8102(1 )(b ). Importantly, the statue makes clear that
[I]fthis title 15, Idaho Code, should in any case or under any circumstances
be inapplicable, insufficient or doubtful with reference to the administration
and settlement of matters [related to trusts and trust matters] ... the court
nevertheless has full power and authority to proceed with such
administration and settlement in any manner and way that to the court
seems right and proper, all to the end that the matters be expeditiously
administered and settled by the court.
LC.§ 15-8-102(2).
TEDRA provides that any "party" may have a judicial proceeding with relation to
any case or controversy arising under the Idaho Code "under this chapter." LC. § 15-8201 (b ). The definition of party in the statutory scheme is broad, and it includes heirs and
beneficiaries. LC. § 15-8-103(3)(d) & (e). Under LC. § 15-8-202, a judicial proceeding
under TEDRA may be commenced as a new action or "as an action incidental to an
existing judicial proceeding related to the same trust." All judicial proceedings under
TEDRA are governed by the Idaho rules of civil procedure. LC.§ 15-8-203.
TEDRA includes provisions for parties to enter into "binding nonjudicial" "written
agreements among the parties." LC. § 15-8-301. The nonjudicial resolution process is a
supplement to, not a derogation from, the provisions authorized by statute or common
law. Id. If all parties agree to the nonjudicial resolution, it must be in writing and signed
by all parties. I.C. § 15-8-302. Upon signing, it shall be binding and conclusive upon
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those parties for the subject matter of the dispute. Id. Parties to such an agreement have
the option to file the same with the court, but filing is not required. LC. § 15-8-303. Upon
filing, the agreement is deemed approved by the court and is equivalent to a final order.
Id.

TEDRA is silent as to specific enforcement of a nonjudicial agreement should a
party believe such agreement has been breached. LC. § 15-8-101, et seq. Nor is there
direction regarding the enforcement of filed or unfiled TEDRA Agreements, both of
which are binding on the parties. Id. No Idaho case has yet addressed that issue, so it is
one of first impression for this Court.
The Frizzell Trust's TEDRA Agreement arose from issues related to both the
administration of the trust, as well as a desire to modify the terms of the trust to benefit
certain heirs and beneficiaries. (R. 100-104). The TEDRA Agreement is silent as to
required enforcement mechanisms, other than defining breach: "Each party agrees to do
all acts and sign any and all documents necessary to carry out the terms and provisions of
this Agreement and acknowledges that any failure to do so will be considered a breach of
this Agreement." (R. 107). In addition, disputes or enforcement actions shall result in
reimbursement and indemnification by the prevailing party for all costs and reasonable
expenses "including without limitation court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees." (R.
I 07). The TEDRA Agreement does not dictate or require additional "nonjudicial"
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resolution attempts to seek enforcement, nor does it prescribe a specific means of
enforcement for breach. (R. 106-107). The district court admitted that by entering into the
TEDRA Agreement, Donald and the DeYoungs agreed to "subject resolution of Trust
disputes to the provisions of Idaho Code § 15-8-101 et seq." (R.163). Not just to a sole
provision of the TEDRA statute, i.e. nonjudicial resolution.
Frizzell, a party to the TEDRA Agreement (and the Trust), sought enforcement via
a civil suit initiated in the First Judicial District in Kootenai County, by filing and serving
a Complaint alleging various breaches of duties owed by Edwin under the Trust, the
TEDRA Agreement, and relevant statutes. The De Youngs filed a successful Motion to
Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which the Court granted on January 20, 2017. (R. 158). For
the reasons stated herein, the district court erred in granting that motion.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEYOUNGS'
MOTION TO DISMISS.
The district court granted the De Youngs' Motion to Dismiss based on the position

that once Frizzell signed the TEDRA Agreement, he was bound to continue to "submit
disputes related to the administration of the Trust to non-judicial dispute resolution" -not
the filing of a Complaint. (R. 163, 172). The district court reached this conclusion by
assuming facts, or lack thereof, about Frizzell's pre-suit conduct related to the TEDRA
Agreement, stating "it is not clear what efforts, if any, were made to utilize non-judicial
dispute resolution to resolve the issues that are now before the Court." (R. 163). The
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district court assumed that Frizzell did not take steps to enforce the Agreement, viewing
the allegations in a light that is not most favorable to the non-moving party.
A court ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim must treat all
allegations in the complaint as true. Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 278, 796 P.2d
150, 155 (App. 1990). "After viewing all facts and inferences from the record in favor of
the non-moving party, the Court will ask whether a claim for relief has been
stated." Losser, 145 Idaho at 672-673, 183 P.3d at 760-761; citing Coghlan v. Beta Theta
Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 398, 987 P.2d 300, 310 (1999). The issue for the Court is

not whether the plaintiff "will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is 'entitled to
offer evidence to support the claims."' Id.; quoting Sumpter v. Holland Realty, Inc., 140
Idaho 349, 351, 93 P.2d 680, 682 (2004).
A complaint challenged by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss "does not need
detailed factual allegations." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127
S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007)6; criticized on other grounds, Starr v. BACA, 652 F. 3d 1202,
1213 (9th Cir. 2011) 7 • To survive the motion, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
allegations, which accepted as true "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id.
at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the trial court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleg,ed conduct. Id. at
6 Attached hereto as Appendix D.
7 Attached hereto as Appendix E.
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556. The standard is not one of "probability," but more than a sheer possibility of the
defendant's liability. Id. "Every doubt must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor." Gardner
v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609,611,533 P.2d 730, 731-732 (1975).
Frizzell's complaint outlined the origins of the Frizzell Trust and the subsequent
TEDRA Agreement. It included a number of exhibits, including the original Trust and the
full Agreement. (R. 36 - 157). It described in detail a pattern of conduct by Edwin
alleging breaches of not only the TEDRA Agreement entered, but also underlying laws
related to trust administration. If all the allegations to the complaint were viewed as true,
it is certainly plausible that Edwin is liable for the alleged conduct for which Frizzell, a

party to a binding TEDRA Agreement, would be entitled to relief.
1.

The District Court arbitrarily limited the remedies available under the
TEDRA Statute.
The district court repeatedly stated in its Memorandum Decision that once Frizzell

entered into the TEDRA Agreement, then he was bound to continue to seek nonjudicial
remedies to handle disputes arising from the TEDRA Agreement or from the trust itself.
(R. 163, 174). Rather than being permitted to seek a judicial remedy, the district court
asserted that Frizzell "agreed to non-judicial dispute resolution" relating to the trust- not
just at the time of the TEDRA Agreement, but at all times moving forward. (R. 172).
Reluctantly, the district court contended that the TEDRA statute does "allow for parties
to seek enforcement of the TEDRA agreement by petition," referencing both the entire
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statutory scheme and specifically I. C. §§ 15-8-301-03. (R. 163). The district court held
this up as the sole remedy available after continued nonjudicial efforts. (R. 174). The
district court concluded that by filing a complaint to enforce the TEDRA Agreement,
Frizzell "slept on his right to bring his claims" and "attempt[ ed] to circumnavigate the
agreement and continue litigating issues related to [Edwin's] administration of the trust."
(R. 173).
Despite repeated vague references to the statutory scheme by the district court,
none of the provisions in LC. §§ 15-8-301-03 identify any process by which a party can
seek enforcement of a TEDRA Agreement. Nor are there any Idaho cases addressing the
same. I.C. § 15-8-303 permits parties to petition the court to file the agreement with the
effect that "the agreement will be deemed approved by the court and is equivalent to a
final court order binding on all persons interest in the estate or trust." I.C. § 15-8-303(2).
Filing the agreement with the Court is permissive- the language in the statute is "may"
and not "shall." The TEDRA Agreement is binding on all parties upon signing, however,
regardless of filing it with the district court. I.C. § 15-8-302. That provision does not
discuss or direct petitioning the Court to enforce a TEDRA Agreement. Id.
The TEDRA statute contains no such limitations on remedies to enforce TEDRA
Agreements or any other matters related to the administration of trusts. I.C. § 15-8-101, et
seq. Quite the contrary, the TEDRA statute provides multiple remedies to parties seeking
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trust enforcement, including but not limited to filing a new lawsuit. I.C. § 15-8-202. The
language of the statute is incredibly broad, and as the district court noted, "TEDRA goes
so far to give courts 'full power and authority to proceed with such administration and

settlement in any manner and way that to the court seems right and proper. '" (R.162),
quoting I.C. § 15-8-102(2) (italics in original; emphasis added).
Despite the breadth in the statute, the district court gave Frizzell two options continue to seek nonjudicial resolution of a failed nonjudicial resolution or "petition" the
court. Frizzell did petition the court via a new lawsuit permitted by I.C. § 15-8-202, but
the district court with all of its plenary power, deemed that option "burdensome" on the
Court. (R. 164). The district court erred in giving Donald no option to enforce the
directives of the TEDRA Agreement and underlying trust.

2. The District Court should have permitted Frizzell to amend his
complaint.
Dismissing a complaint pursuant to a 12(b)(6) Motion is a severe remedy that
should be sparingly applied. The district court was particularly harsh on Frizzell in
bringing this complaint, calling it "burdensome," "unreasonable," "lacking foundation,"
and "brought and pursued frivolously" (R. 164, 175). The crux of this frivolity is the
court's assumption that Frizzell did not seek to resolve matters through nonjudicial
resolution prior to filing the complaint at issue. (R. 175). This repeated assumption is not
in the complaint, and instead of drawing inference in favor of Frizzell as required in
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ruling on a motion to dismiss, the district court drew this inference in opposition to
Frizzell.
This Court has expressed a "preference for interpreting the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure in conformance with the interpretation placed upon the same language in the
federal rules. Obendorf v. Terra Hug Spray Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 897, 188 P.3d 834,
839 (2008). The Idaho rule 12(b)(6) and the federal rule 12(b)(6) are identical. I.R.C.P.
12(b)(6); F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Under analysis of the federal rule, a dismissal without leave
to amend is improper unless it is beyond doubt that the complaint "could not be saved by
amendment." Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728, 737 (9th Cir. 2009), 8 criticized, but

upheld by Sadid v. ISO, 837 F.Supp.2d 1168 (D.Idaho 2011). 9 The Ninth Circuit has
consistently held that a district court should grant leave to amend "even if no request to
amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly
be cured by allegation of other facts." Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern

California Collection Service, Inc., 911 F .2d 242, 24 7 (9th Cir. 1990). 10
If the district court's major concern was the assumption that Frizzell did not seek a
nonjudicial remedy to enforce the TEDRA Agreement, the district court should have
assumed that he did. In fact, under the district court's plenary authority under the TEDRA

8 Attached hereto as Appendix F.
9 Attached hereto as Appendix G.
1OAttached hereto as Appendix H.
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statute and common law, the district court could have and should have permitted Frizzell
to amend his complaint to include factual allegations regarding the same. Instead, the
district court viewed the missing facts in the case in a light favoring the DeYoungs and
dismissed the case entirely. The district court assumed that in the two years that passed
between the TEDRA Agreement and the filing of the complaint, that no self-help
communications occurred between the parties or their counsel.
Frizzell did not have an affirmative obligation to plead every single fact to support
his complaint. Frizzell did not have a duty to request an opportunity to amend the
pleadings to add additional facts that would appease the district court's misplaced focus
on a nonjudicial resolution of this matter. The district court had an obligation to draw all
inferences in Frizzell's favor or to permit him to amend his complaint to cure any
presumed deficiency in the complaint.
The district court erred by not granting Frizzell leave to amend his complaint.
3. The district court could have sought contempt against the DeYoung for
breaches of the TEDRA Agreement.

In its ruling, the district court repeatedly referenced the broad plenary authority
granted courts under the TEDRA statute. (R. 162); I.C. § 15-8-102(2). The district court
also referenced the ability of a party to "petition" the court to enforce a TEDRA
Agreement, but did not point to a specific part of the statutory scheme that defines such
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petition beyond petition a court for filing of a nonjudicial agreement pursuant to LC. §
15-8-302; (R. 163).
The district may have meant contempt proceedings, which are not explicitly
defined in TEDRA. LC.§ 15-8-101, et seq. Because the issue of breach of a settlement
agreement governed by Idaho's TEDRA is a case of first impression, a Washington State
dispute arising under identical TEDRA provisions is instructive. See In re Guardianship
of Wells, 150 Wash. App. 491, 208 P.3d 1126 (2009). 11 There, the appellate court ruled

that a trial court's order issued in a guardianship proceeding governed by TEDRA could
support a contempt order against a claimed interest holder in a subsequent proceeding. Id.
at 494, 208 P.3d at 1128. In that matter, the interest holder in the guardianship estate had
failed to abide by the settlement agreement directing payment to the ward's estate. Id. at
495-496, 208 P.3d at 1129. The estate beneficiaries did not receive funds from the
interest holder as ordered. Id. Accordingly the lower court sua sponte invoked its inherent
powers to order contempt for breach of the settlement agreement. Id. at 497, 208 P.3d at
1130. The appellate court upheld the lower court's invocation of its inherent powers and
ruled that "[a] judge or commissioner of the supreme court, the court of appeals, or the
superior court, a judge of a court of limited jurisdiction, and a commissioner of a court of

11 Attached hereto as Appendix I.
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limited jurisdiction may impose a sanction for contempt of court under this chapter
(RCW 7.21.020]." Id. at 501, fn. 17,208 P.3d at 1131-1132.
Contempt in Idaho is either of a civil or criminal nature and can arise from different
authorities. Idaho Code § 7-601, et seq., provides statutory authority, addressing certain
acts or omissions which rise to the level of contempt of court. This includes
"[ d]isobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the Court." § 7-601

,rs.

The

statute fails to embrace the separate judicial contempt power which arises from the Idaho
Constitution. Idaho Const. Art. V, § 2. Further, contempt in Idaho can also arise from the
common law. Marks v. Vehlow, 105 Idaho 560, 566, 671 P .2d 473, 479 (1983). TEDRA
explicitly states that "the provisions of [TEDRA] shall not supersede, but shall
supplement, any otherwise applicable provisions and procedures contained in title 15,
Idaho Code, or other Idaho law." I.C. § 15-8-101(2)
The district court failed to address the obvious inchoate issue which, is whether a
party to a TEDRA Agreement can be summarily denied his right to enforce the
provisions of the TEDRA Agreement without first being extended further resolution
recourse. Effectively, the Order served as ratification of Edwin's breach of his fiduciary
and contractual duties. The district court ad full plenary authority under TEDRA, statute,
and common law to enforce the TEDRA Agreement using its contempt powers, it if

20

believed such "petition" was required. Instead, the district court rejected Frizzell's
attempt to enforce the TEDRA Agreement in its entirety.
C.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TEDRA
AGREEMENT BARRED FRIZZELL'S COMPLAINT.

This district court ruled that the TEDRA Agreement barred Frizzell from seeking
judicial enforcement of the trust. (R. 164). Inexplicably, this district court took that bar to
include Frizzell's attempt to enforce the provisions of the TEDRA Agreement itself. (R.
164). In a confusing position, the district court commented, "It makes little sense to enter
into an agreement to resolve matters related to the administration of a trust through a
prescribed course of conduct, only to argue that the agreement does not apply to matters
that originate after the agreement was signed." (R. 64). What makes little sense is barring
a party from enforcing an agreement when the other party to the agreement intentionally
fails to follow through with that "prescribed course of conduct." Frizzell did not file a
lawsuit to revisit actions occurring prior to execution of the TEDRA Agreement. He filed
suit to address actions following the execution of the TEDRA Agreement; specifically,
actions dictated by the TEDRA Agreement itself.
1.

The district court inferred contractual intent unsupported by the
express language of TEDRA Agreement.

The district court correctly noted that "[t]he parties executed the TEDRA
agreement to resolve certain issues between the parties that had arisen prior to the
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execution of the TEDRA agreement, modify the trust, and subject resolution of Trust
disputes to the provisions of Idaho Code § 15-8-101 et seq." (R. 163). Despite that, the
district court incorrectly ruled that "[t]he TEDRA Agreement serves as a bar to
[Frizzell's] claims in the present case." (R. 164).
This Court "exercises free review over the issues of law decided by the district
court to determine whether it correctly stated and applied the applicable law." Slane, 155
Idaho at 277, 311 P. 3d at 289. The interpretation of unambiguous contracts or statues is a
question of law subject to free review by the Court. Idaho Wool Growers Ass 'n, Inc., 154
Idaho at 716, 302 P.3d at 345. A TEDRA Agreement is merely a settlement contract,
which a court must construe by "considering all parts in light of the entire instrument."

Salfeety v. Seidman (In re Estate of Kirk), 127 Idaho 817,827,907 P.2d 794, 804 (1995);
Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, 150 Idaho 664, 672, 249 P.3d 857, 865 (2011) (a settlement
agreement "stands on the same footing as any other contract and is governed by the same
rules and principles as are applicable to contracts generally").
Contractual intent is inferred by "viewing the document in its entirety." Bondy v.

Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 996, 829 P.2d 1342, 1345 (1992). A contract is ambiguous if it is
"reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation." Bondy, 121 Idaho at 997, 829 P.2d at
1326. A contract must be construed from the plain meaning of the contract's own words."

McCallum v. Campbell-Simpson Motor Co., 82 Idaho 160, 166, 349 P.2d 986, 990
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(1960). The Court should construe the agreement "so as to give force and effect to every
part of the agreement." Palomo v. JR. Simplot Co., 131 Idaho 314, 317, 955 P.2d 1093,
1096 (1998).
Frizzell and the DeYoungs agree that paragraph nine of the TEDRA Agreement is
dispositive of the issue. (R. 169). The paragraph explicitly states that the beneficiaries to
the Trust will release Edwin and hold him harmless
[F]rom any and all actual or potential claims or causes of action, of
whatsoever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, accrued or yet to
arise or accrue, including by not limited to any claims of negligence or
breach of fiduciary duty or breach of contract, which relate to or arise out of
any act, omission or conduct of [Edwin] in his capacity as Truste that the
Releasors now have, ever had, may have had, or may there after have from
the inception of the Family Trust, Survivor's Trust, Bypass Trust and
the OTIP Trust up to the date this Agreement is executed. Such release
is limited to claims that were asserted or could have been asserted ...

(R. 80) (emphasis added). The express release not only includes a temporal limitation "up
to the date this Agreement is executed," but also a limitation on claims "that were
asserted or could have been asserted." Id. "Were asserted" and "could have been
asserted," in their plain meaning, are events occurring in the past or that could have
occurred in the past. Reading this limitation is consistent with the inclusion of an express
end date for the release "up to the date the Agreement is executed."
The same end date for release is applied to Edwin's release of claims against
Frizzell contained in the same paragraph. (R. 80-81). Specifically, Edwin agreed to
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"release and hold [Frizzell] harmless from any and all claims that [Edwin] brought or
could have brought in the litigation .... and any and all claims [Edwin] has against
[Frizzell] related to the Family Trust. ..as of the date of execution of this Agreement."
(R. 80-81) (emphasis added).
The TEDRA Agreement also includes a precise definition of breach of the
agreement as "failure" to "do all acts and sign any and all documents necessary to carry
out the terms and provisions of this Agreement." (R. 82). Ironically, the word "breach" is
directly above Edwin's signature on the TEDRA Agreement (R. 82).

Immediately

preceding the breach paragraph, the TEDRA agreement includes enforcement language
for "any dispute arising between or among the Parties" that results in "litigation." (R. 81).
The prevailing party to such a dispute is entitled to costs, expenses, and reasonable
attorneys' fees. (R. 81-82). The inclusion of the word "litigation" cannot be rendered
meaningless by a ruling precluding litigation.
And yet, the district court chose to render the temporal limitation of the release
and deem the TEDRA Agreement a carte blanche approval of any action that Edwin
wished to take as the Trustee, including breaches of fiduciary duties after the date of
execution of the TEDRA Agreement and breach of the TEDRA Agreement itself. (R.
175). The district court held that the temporal language was "not dispositive" and
completely ignored the enforcement provision and breach language. (R. 170). The district
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court correctly noted that Edwin's failure to administer the Trust based on the express
provisions of the TEDRA Agreement as the basis for Frizzell' s claim, but then held that
the TEDRA Agreement itself bars enforcement of the terms of the Agreement. (R. 175)
("The TEDRA Agreement at issue released [Edwin] from all liability in the
administration of the Trust.")
The district court's view of TEDRA Agreements certainly is not "burdensome" on
courts- because once a TEDRA Agreement is executed, a party can never enforce its
terms. The TEDRA Agreement signed by Frizzell would be entirely meaningless if this
were true, and Frizzell would have no recourse for Edwin's failure to properly transfer
real and personal property as dictated by the express terms of the TEDRA Agreement.
The district court's interpretation of the TEDRA Agreement effectively "whites out" the
enforcement and breach clauses that immediately precede the parties' signatures, as if
they were never included. (R. 82).
The district court erred in ruling that the TEDRA Agreement barred Frizzell's
action to enforce the TEDRA Agreement.
2.

If the TEDRA Agreement's release did prohibit enforcement, it would
be void as against public policy.

The district court asserted that the TEDRA Agreement waived Frizzell's right to
ever seek enforcement of the TEDRA Agreement or the underlying Trust that it modified.
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Were that to be true, that provision of the TEDRA Agreement would be void as against
public policy.
Idaho, and the majority of jurisdiction, permit parties to a contract to release
themselves form "certain duties and liabilities subject to certain limitations." Anderson &
Nafziger v. G.T Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 178, 595 P.2d 709, 712 (1979).

Reviewing courts disfavor such waivers and will construe such provisions against the
party relying on them. Id.
Idaho Code §29-110 provides that "every stipulation or condition in a contract, by
which any party thereto is restricted from enforcing his rights under the contract in Idaho
tribunals .. .is void as it is against the public policy of Idaho." Idaho amended the TEDRA
statute in 2009 to permit parties to seek non-judicial, binding resolutions pursuant to
Idaho Code § 15-8-302. However, a contract that is void cannot be binding on the parties
regardless of the parties' compliance with I.C. §15-8-302.
While a party may bargain for exemption from liability for negligence, a bargain
for exemption from liability for the consequences of a willful breach of duty is illegal.
Rawlings v. Layne Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496, 500, 465 P.2d 107, 111 (1970);

Restatement of Contracts §§574 & 575. Whether a contract violates public policy is a
question of law for the court to determine from all the facts and circumstances of each
case. Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 189, 108 P.3d 332, 336
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(2005). Idaho courts have regularly found that all-encompassing exculpatory clauses are
too broad and unenforceable. Jesse v. Lindsley, 149 Idaho 70, 77, 233 P.3d 1, 8 (2008).
At first read, the "indemnification" provisions of the TEDRA Agreement appear to
be just that. The Idaho Supreme Court has identified the prima facie elements of
indemnity as: (1) an indemnity relationship; (2) actual liability of an indemnitee to a third
party; and (3) a reasonable settlement amount. R. W Beck and Assocs., Inc. v. Job Line

Constr., Inc., 122 Idaho 92, 95, 831 P.2d 560, 563 (1992). The obligation to indemnify is
to be strictly construed, and the status of the indemnitee is interpreted narrowly. Id. at 96,
831 P.2d at 564. The indemnification clause in the Frizzell Trust purports to have both
first party and third-party indemnification. The lack of a third-party relationship between
Frizzell and DeYoung makes the indemnification provision unenforceable as to Frizzell's
claims against Edwin.
The indemnification provision is clearly an exculpatory clause encompassing such
affirmative duties as the Trustee's breach of his fiduciary duties to the Trust. An
indemnity provision requires one party to compensate another party for losses that may
occur as the result of a suit from a third-party- it does not function to relieve blame or
liability arising out of another party's wrongdoing. The latter is an exculpatory clause,
which includes all of Edwin's conduct in his capacity as Trustee. This clause seeks to
exclude not only negligent acts, or those acts which do not inure liability under the trust
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code, but also breaches of fiduciary duty. If the district court's position is accepted, then
even Edwin's intentional breaches of the TEDRA Agreement would be free from
liability. Such an interpretation would make binding agreements under TEDRA the get
out of jail free card for whatever breaches a Trustee makes in his or her fiduciary role.
If the indemnification or exculpatory clause is construed against Edwin, the clause

1s unenforceable to the extent it absolves liability for acts other than the trustee's
negligence or those that accrued or could have accrued prior to the execution of the
TEDRA Agreement. A TEDRA Agreement cannot make enforcement of itself
unenforceable, as would happen if the district court's ruling is upheld.

D.

FRIZZELL IS ENTITLED TO HIS ATTORNEYS' FEES IN
SUCCESSFULLY BRINGING THIS APPEAL.
The district court granted the DeYoungs an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to

Idaho Code§ 12-201, I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l) & (e), and Idaho Code§ 15-8-208. (R. 204-205).
The district court erred in granting both the motion to dismiss and the attorneys' fees
request.
This Court has held that parties bringing a cause of action under the TEDRA
statute are entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-8-208. Quemada v.

Arizmendez, 153 Idaho 609, 288 P.3d 826 (2009). Not only are Frizzell's claims routed in
enforcement of a TEDRA Agreement (under the TEDRA statute), but the TEDRA
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Agreement itself provides for an award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in any
enforcement action. LC.§ 15-8-301; (R. 81-82); I.A.R. 41.
Frizzell is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees in successfully bringing this
appeal of the district court's ruling.

V. CONCLUSION
The district court, when given the broad powers under the TEDRA statute,
declined to exercise even the narrowest powers to enforce a contract-any contractwhen presented with factual allegations, if accepted as true- would infer a breach of that
contract. With a narrow view of a broad statute and a broad view of a narrow release, the
district court dismissed Frizzell's case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted and ordered Frizzell to pay attorneys' fees and costs to the breaching party. The
district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss, and this Court must reverse the
district court's decision and remand this matter for further proceedings below. In
reversing the decision, this Court should also grant Frizzell his reasonable attorneys' fees
in conjunction with this appeal.
DATED this /#1 ay of July, 2017.
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Attor-ney for Defendcmt Edw;n De Youni, Trustee

9

of the Clifton qnd Marjorie Frizzell Family Trus1
IN THE· DT:STRICT COURT OF THE 'FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

l,l

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FO~ THE COUNTY OF KOOtBNAI

12 .

DONALD CRAIG =FR.IZZELL,

13

P:I aintiff.
NONJUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
AGREEMENT

rs v.
'16

EDWLN DEYOUNG, Tttt$te~ of the Clifton
:and Marjorie Frizzell F.amily Trust of June
S:0;.2009,

:1 7

(1.C. § 15-8~302)

Defendant.
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I.
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Parties.

The Pa1ties to this Noajuclic:ial Dispute ResQiut.i,0:0 A:gre.ement

(the ''Agreement") are EDWIN J. DEYOUNG (he11ei:nafter "ED") as Trustee oHhe CLIFTON
AND MARJORIE FRIZZELL FAMfLY !RUST U/A 06/30/09 (he:reinaftet the '"Family

22

· .T.r.us.t11).; ED as Tnist.ee of the SURVIVOR'·S TRUST of the CLIFTON ANO MARlOlUE

·21

-

FRIZZELL FAMiLY TRUST U/A 06/30/09 (het!ei:nafter the "S·urvi'Vot\~ Tmst'1}; l3D ·as

?4:

. Trustee of the BY-PASS TRUST of the CtIFTON AND MARJORlB FRIZZELL FAMILY

~

TRUST ULA 061301@9 (heYeinafter the ttBypas-s Trust")i .ED as Trustee of the· QTIP '.tRUST :of

Z.6.•

theCLLFTON AND MARJORlE FR1ZZELL

·
FAMILY
TRUST U/A Q~/)(}/09 (l.1-ereinafterthe

Q'.1"JP Trust 11 ); DARLENE D. (FELTY) DEYOUNG (he1'einafter "DARLENE"), a ve,st¢.d

27-

11

.Z8 ·

r!,}rrtah:rderman beneficiary and virtual reptesentative of her issue of the S:uwsivor's Trust).

·· .

~;Y.PMS Tr:ust and QTIP Trust; DONALD C. FRIZZELL (hereinafter ''DON") a

v.estoo.
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.l

5,6

DON and DARLENE'S r.esp.eotive <,ounsel shaH prepare the de.eds t0

2

·co)1vey the real property assets to be distributed to DARLENE and DON pursuant to See.tions

3

5.2 and 5.3 above. DON and DARLENE shall each pay the fees and other c;osts associaterl

4

with 11ecording the respective deeds and any other Fe<quired documents te distribute the r\!31

5

property assets to DARLENE and DON pursuant to Se.ctions 5.2 and 5.3 ab0fe.

5.7

6

ED s:hall he responsible fot pr-eparation of the trust tax rep0r.ting due

September 30, 2014 and th~ preparation fee shatl be paid by DARLENE.

7

5.8
.8

This Agreement reflects the ft)ll agreement of the Parties- and mayn~ be

m©i:ii.fied unless done in writing signeq by all the Parties. In all other respects 1 the family

9

!rust, the Survivst"'s Trust, the Bypass Trust and the QTIP Trust of the CLIFTON and
MARJORIE FRJZZEt.L FAMILY TRUSTU/A 06/30/09 are hereby ratified andconfimv:d,

11

6.

12

Donald C. Fri1.zell's Indemnification of :Kdwin J. De Young.

t:>dN, on·h~h~lf

of hims~Lf and as custodian for CRAIG J. FRIZZELL and DEAN J. FRIZZELL agrees to

i114emnify, defend and hold ED harmless ag~inst any clain1s, lawsuits or pthe-r actions,

including all costs and attorney foes incurred in defonse of such claims, lawsuits or other
15

actiQns, advanced against ED by DON or DONS children or heirs relating to EI)'S
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administration of the Family Trust, Survivor!s Trust, Bypass Trnst and QTLP Trust.;
7.

l7

F!Ung of and Binding Nature of Agreement.

The Parties agre~ Jhat this

A.gr~em~n'l: may he file'd with the Kooterlai County Disttict Court a$ provided by I.C. § 15~8~

18

303

py MY Party to the Agreement.

19;

acknowl-e<:lge that if this
2('l

All Parties to this

Agreenient understand and

Agreement is filed With the co:urt then its terms wHJ b.eGome. finaiand

bindfog and the equivalent of a fh1al court oid'e.r hin.ding on all 0-f the Parties who have :.ii.gn~d
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the same pursuant to LC. § 15-8-303; Furthermore, this Agreement shall be bipdjng tlpon 1:µ1d

inure to the benefit of the Pm-ties; th~ir heitf$;, a,s&lgns; ~ue.cessors in .intere;;t, .and any otl::ier.s that
may claim through them, and shall have the et'fect .0f a final court ol'der pursuant to LC. c§ l5A~-

30_3. However, even if none of the Partte:s dec.i<de to fifo the Agreement, the Agreement shall

be ·effective· immediately upon its execution by a.Jl the Parties and shall rernaLn· h1 :effect
notwithstanding that i.t has not been :filed with any court.
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Furthe1~more, the B.eneJ:i~i:f,~ries

27 ,,. spriiflcally ·agree that this Agreement shall ~e fuHr blading up0.n them even jf

it may he

,

18 ·

d{}:tern.:tined l:aterthat this Agreement is not an Agreement under I.C. § 15-8-.303 and/i:>r that.any

11e.ces.sary Party for such an Agreement was o·mitted or not virtually r.epres~nted .
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8.

Beneficiary Reuresentation. This document was prepar1$d by M. GREOdRY

2

EMBREY of the firm of Witherspoon Kel.l~y at the request of ED..

j

Agreem~nt, as shown by their respectt\Je signatures, the Parties hereto cio hereby acknowledge

4

~eipt of a copy of this entire Agreement, state that the. provisions contarned herein ba:v-e been

5

read by ihem in thefr entirety, and ackra<:rwl~dge that they understand the sam~ qnd th1'.t said

6

By executing l.bfa

Agreemei:tt and each of its provision& h~ve by them been fully and entirely ap-cepte.d.

IN ADDITION EACH. BENEFICIARY ACKNOWLEDGES AND AGREES

7

THAT BEFORE EXECUTING THIS AGREEMENT HE OR SHE HAS HAD THE
8

OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT W.ITll H1S Otl HER OWN ATTORNEY.

9

w

9..

Release and Hold Harndess. The Bitne:ffoiarie~ on behalf ofthemsetves, thett

heirs an9, s1;1coe~sors-rn-iuterest (including unborn and unaseer:tained descendants), .~ir agents

n

and assigns (hereinafter collectively refotted. to in this Section as the "Releasorst'j rele€!;.se;

12

discharge, and indemnify ED, and ED1S heirs, sticcessors-in-interest, agents. and e§iigns.

1J

(hereinafter oollective}y referred to in this paragraph as the "Releasees"),

14

actual or potential clai1ns or causes of action, of whatsoever kind or nature, whether-at taw or·

15,

in ;equity, whether known or unknown, acct11ed or yet to arise or acctue,i iI1cludiag but ruit

16

· limite.d to. 1;my cl&ims of ne.gtigenee or breach. of :fidqciary duty or breach of contrract, whioh

frort1

ruzy

and all

relate to or arise out of any act, omission or conduct of ED in his. capacity as Tnµitee that the

i1

Rel.easers now have,. ever bad, may ha.ve had,- or may thereafter have frm.11 th~ inc~p;tion-;p,f the

Jg

FamHy Trust, Survivor's Trust, Bypass Trust an.d the QTIP Trust tip to the da,t!;) tllis Agreement
l9

i.s ~x.eQ.ut~o. Such r~hmse is limited to claims tha;t were asserted or that cotild have ocet1

20

as$erted by the Releasors a.gainst the R.eleasees aris5ng out of or related in arty

Zl

way to the

administration of the Family Trust, Sw·vivor's Trust, Bypass Tmst and the QTJP Trusti the

Z2
the QTIP Trust, and aU liability relating to the Family Trust, Stirvi,vor's Trust; .I3ypa.si Trt1s.t

23:

; aI'id the: QTIP Trust mat might afrse between th~ Releasqrs and the Releas~~;s now

44;

~\l;tui:e,

is

Additiona.Jly •. by this Agreement ED agre·es to releas.e and hold DON hamnl:ess:.:tfuowi·.any

Z6

and alt elm.ms that ED br.augbt o.r could .have brought in the Httg.atio11 captioned ,as Donald

2)7

..

--

.28'
...,

ot il'l th~

Craig Frizzell v. Edwin De. Young, Trustee of the C1ifton and Marjorie fai~ell :F1llITily -ot J'ulle:
30, 2.009, Ko0ter.1.ai Cou.n:ty Case Nwiiber cv.:2013.39:(l8 and any ijtrd all ¢lah11s .Eb has:.
N9.NHJ9JCML DJS.PUTS RESOLUTION -- Page 7
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against DON -relating to th.e Fam.Uy Trust; Survivoris Trust, B·.ypass Trust l:tnd QTIP Trust as.of
2 ·

the date of execution of this Agreement.
10.

3

Virtual Representation. All Parties to thi:s Agreement aolmowledg~ that each

Beneficiary is signing on behalf of the entire class of per-sl\ms who woiild lake tey, or th.rough

4

them if Chey were t-o predecease the Beneficiary and that each Beneficiary has, lli,e power·to

5

~ind th.eir respective descendants under the com.mun law doctri'ne of virtual r~presentatlo:r.i. .am:l

to Idaho Code § 15-8-205, E.acb. Sli.Ch Beneficiary acknowledges and affinns that he
or she is unaware of aoy actual o:r threatenerl .conflict of interest between.. the named
pqt~uant

8

Benefi.ciaties and the persons whom they virtually represent.
11.

General Provisions. The terms, provisions, und conditions. of thi~ Ag:i:-eemept

l'O

shall be binding u,pon, and inure to the benefit of e.ach of the Parties hereto and b.iS;, her or its

n

respective legal represeJ:1t~tives, heirs, successors and assigns.

n.

a.

This Agreen'l.ent sha11 be c0nstrued in acoordanee with and :governed by

'the laws of the State of Idaho.

13

b.

14

The captions and headings of various SeGtions of this Agreemeut are for

convel)ience only, apd are not to be coMidered as defining or limiting in nny way the -scepe or

15

rn '1nt"'nt
... of the. p··r.ovisio.ns hereof.
c.

J7

To expedite the exec.ution of this Agreement, this Agreement may· b~

e~eimted thrtnrgh the use of multiple or#ginal c;oun~erp~rts. The signature on one,J~t mote~ but

1:8

less than all, of the. original counterparts shal.t be: suffici-ent to oincl a Party to thtsAgi'eement~
19·

'and the Parties :a_gree that copies of the original signature pug.es from eaGh original e.ounter.part

'20

,ma.y be attacb~d to the other ot-iginaJ counterparts so that each of the original co.unt.erpa:rts will

21

have signature pages bearing either original sigpatutes or a Gopy of original signatures for all@f

22 .

the Parties.
d.

23

A signed copy of this Agreement may be transmitt~d by facsimil¢' i;ttid

2:4

$hall ·be cfoemed" an executed original of this Agre1;1nent for a.11 purposes h.ereo-t: and the P.ru.:ty

is

so: providing such signed copy shall, thereafter, promptly deliver t0 the other Party actual

26:

od.ginal oopies, of this Agre.ement or such other document.
e.

27

If any -dispute be.tween m

.PR . her.eto r-esults in litigation, the prevailing

a:m01_1g

the Parties concerning this ,Agreem~nt

Pai.:ty shalJ be reimbursed and inden1nifr~cl by the

F!:frty· a:ot prevailing for all costs and expenses· tea:sonably incurred by th.e prevailing Party in
NONJUDJClAL DISPUTE RES0LUT10N ~ Page'.8
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r

enfotdng or .e-stabli&'hing his or her rights hereunder, u1cluding without lim1E&tion, court costs
1

2

and<r:easonable attorney~' fees.

J

[

Each Ptirty agrees to

do all .c~cts

and 8-ign any ~d all docmnents

.4

i~oe*sary ·to car.cy 0_ut the tea'ns antl pra:visiep.s, of l'his Agteement aiia, aekfiowte4g.es thaf$y

s

fa.Htwe t~ de so wi fJ be cons:kl.er.ed a b1·each of this Agreement.

67
8

~J~

Date of Signature:

EDWIN J. D~OUNG;~~
F.amtly Tru~ Survivor, s Trust. Bypass

10/
·wlf 1.#JLY
l

Trust and the QTTP Ttust
g
I

'

10

Date of Sign~tµre:. _________

t 1 .DONALD C. FRIZZELL,
;::vi.1'&ted R¢n1ainderrri'an· Beneficiary S1.J.d
12,

Vir.tuaLRepresenta.tive of his: lssµe of'the

11

F~mily Trustf Survivqr's TrU$t·; Bypt\ss Tnist
:and :QTIP Trust

14
l·.$

•, .luu)

/1,

Date 0f Signature:

I.of :io_b~

J'l ..

!.:2

ID u_ / JLJ
Date of Signature: _ __,_l-..i._.:...J..r........._

DAlltENE Q. (FELtY) DEYO~G,

Vested Remainderm~n Sene.tici&'Y and
2:i

·Virtual Repi;esentative of her is,~ue 0f
the Family Trust, Survivor's T11.1st; Bypass
Trust and QTIP Trust

:24

Date of Signa:ture;. _ _ _--'------

15 . ; J"'.>ON_ALD

C. FRizZELL as custodian
· ror CRAIG l FRIZfl£LLi under the
26 · California Vnifom1 Transfers to Minors
.Aet. Specifre Di~trlbutee of the Survivor's
2-r · Trust

:--.

28
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Date ofSignatute: _ _ _ _ __
DONALD C. FRIZZELL as custodian for

2

DEAN J. FRlZZELL, under the California
Dnif6nn Transfers to Minors Act, Specific
Distrlbutee of the Survivor's Trust

3
4

5

Date of Signature: ________

HALEY (WARR) BAKER) Specific
· Distributee of the Survivor's Trust

6 .

1

B

Date of Signature:
stributee

9.

\0-4>\:%

1.0
ll

12

STATEOFIDAHO

)
) ss.

13

County of Kootenai

)

14

On this ,,l/J!!:__ day of {dtdokr
, 2014, before me~ the
undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said State, person.atty ap.peared EDWJN J.
ngYQIJNG, known or identified to me to be the person who name is s~bscribed to the. wi.tA.itl
instmment as Trustee of the Family Trust, the Survivor's Trust, the Bypass Trost and the QTIP·

f5
16

Trust of the CLIFTON AND MARJORIE FRIZZELL FAMILY TRUST U/A 06/30/09, and
Mkf1t.1wledged to me that he executed the same as Trustee.

17

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have heI!@.Unto set my hand Md sea:1 the day and year in

19

this· certificate first above written.

10

~u..
Notary PubHc in and for the State of ldl\ho

21

Residing at: UJJud_~
Comm. Exp.:
Ji/~

22

Jd.411a _

23
24

27

18
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,·

· S1'ATEOFCALIFORNIA )

) ss.

2

Co.1.U1fy of

)

On the ___ day of
before m~, tft~
1 20·14,
·Hndersignecl Notary Public, personally appeared DONALD C. FIUZZ.BI,;:L, -a Y.est~d
,5 · Rernai:nd(trman Bene:flciary and Virtual Representative of his issne of tire Fa:n1ily Trost, flle.
. S~tvivofs Trust, the Bypass Trust and the QTlP Trust of the CLIFTON AND .MARJORIE
6. ]{RlttELL FAMILY TRUST U/A 06/30/09,.known or-identified oo me tobJ:th-ep~nwb."1se
... · '.name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me tht1t he. e*eeuted the
·4

$ill'll~.

I.

8

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, r have hereunto s~t my hand and seal the day and year in

9 · tthkcertificate :first above

written.

·

10

·

·----·--------

Notary P1.1blic in and for the State of
California
Residing at: --------"------

11 '

12: •

Comm. E x p - . = - - ~ - - - - )

) ss.

14

:Co\:mty of Kootenai

)

15

.
JG

PT
;ls ·

Hl
20

.

On the 21),µ..

day of t2c.trJ6'er:

.

,

20l4i before me, the

µn.d~r~ign~d Notacy Public, p·e:r,sonaHy appeared DARLENE D, (FEL'fY) DBYOUNO as
:c.tistgdim1 fw DARRYL DEYOUNG under the Idaho Uniform Transfots, to M.lnors-Act, a
.s¢cifie :distrftjutee of the S.urvi vor' s Trust of tne CLIFTON AND MA.FU(?Rl.B. F.RI~ZBL'L
FAMILY TRUST U/ A 06130/09, known 01, identHled to me to be the pe.i;sqit wbo~ ,Q~e is.
·sabscr.ibed to-tli.e Within instrument, .and acknowhidgeG to .me that s-fle executed the: same,. ··
•IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereitnto set my hand and seal the dSIY and year
.tl#s certificate first above written.

in.

·21

rkh1&14~

Notary Public in and for- the State ofidaho
Residing at: ~ ,

Comm. Exp.:

Tl>l

~Q~JJi9JCJ~ DISPUTE RES.OLtJTli:;)N -
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STATEOFIDAHO
2
j

4
5
6

County ofKo.otenai

)
) ss.
)

On the tlJ+':'_ day of
2014~ !Jefore me, the
undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared DARLENE D. (FELTY) DEYOUNG, a
Vested Rema.inderman Beneficiary and Virtual Representative of her issue of the Family Trust,
the Survivor's Trust, the Bypass Trust and the QTTP Trust of th~ CLIFTON AND M,.i\RJOJUE
FRIZZELL FAMILY TRUST U/ A 06/30/09, knoV1n or identi.fied to me to be th~ person WhQse

Ocm~

,

. nrune is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that she execut~d the
7

same.

8

reunto set my hand and seal
this certificate first above

f1ch1ndlt

the day and year in

m~

Notary Public )n and tor the State 9fldaho

Ii

Residing at:

{g_~-4..=~~ L~

Comm. Exp.;-----¥-"""-"""~"""·"'""~=·e-..·
______

14

County of _ _ _ __

ts

On the
day of
___, 2014, before m~, the
: .und~ji,:ned .No.tary Public, personaJl.y appeared DONALD C. FRIZZELL as etlst0dian for
16:,
~
CRAI§J J. FRIZZELL under the California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, a specific
qistributee of .the Survivor's Ttust of the CLIFTON AND MARJORfE FRIZZELL FAMlLY
17
'J'RU.ST U/A 06/30/09, known or identified t0 me to be the person whose narn~ is subscribed te
I& the withininstrilmetit, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
!9
10

IN W!TNESS WHEREOF, J have hereunto set 111y hand and seal the day and year in
this certificate first above written.

21

22

Notary Public in a111<l for the ·State. of
California

23

Residing a t - - - - - - - - Conun.. E x p . : - - - - - - - - -

24
25

26
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2

:STATE O.F CALIFORNIA

)

·CO.Unty of _ _ _ __

)

On the

day of

) ss.
, 2014, b¢fere m.e, tile

4 . ~de.rs.igned Notary Pub1ic, p.ersonally appe.ared DONALD C. FRIZZELL as: custodian for
-s: D.EAN J. FRIZZELL under the California Unifonn Transfers to Minors AGtr a specific
ii

di$tpbute.e of the Survivor>s Trust of the CLIFTON AND MARJORIE FRWmL FAM1L Y
TRUST U/A 06/30/09, kaown or identified to m.e tQ be the person whose (la{ll~ is ~bscd~li;,
the within.instrumentt artd aek.nowledged to· me that he executed the same.

7

.8'

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have h~r-eunta i{et my hand and seal the: day an.tt year in
this certificate flrst;above written. ·

9.

ib

Notary P"Ublic i:n and fo:r the State of
Calif~mia

n

Jle·~iding at: - - - - - - - - -

Comm. E x p . : - - - - - - - - - ' -

1:$:

·ot, . STATE OF
15·

:county of_____

)
) ss-.
)

1'6.

-...

On, the
clay o.f
• 2.Q14, before me, the
1.mderstg11ed
Notary
P\t.blic)
personally
ap~a1:.~,d
HALEY
(WARR)
BAU:R, a specific
11·
distributee ,of the Surviv.or's Trust of the CLlFTQN AND MARJORIE FRIZZHLL FAM!L:Y
18 TRUST U/A 06/3-0/0~1 knewn or identified to me to 'Be thtt, perse:n whes~ na.m~·:$. £1:fb~cribe.dcJ,t}
.the within instrument., an:d acknowledged: to m1 that she executed the same.

19-

20
·z:1

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hexeimto -set 111,y hand aµd seal the <;lay and.year in
thLs-,.certiifoate :tlrst above written.

21

Notary Public in and for the Star~,

23

of!

ill-

Residing at: -------------Comm. Exp..:~-------------

25

2:6
27
2"8

r-

[ i.
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ST ATE OF IDAHO
2

)
)

. County of Ko0tenai

3

On the

J.. /5+ day

ss .

)
of

{X)b)J;>lf

, 2014, before m~, th~

unclers\gned Notary Public, personally appeared TYLER DEYOUNG, a specme dist-riWt~e of
..
the
Survivor's Trnst of the CLIFTON AND MARJORIE FRIZZELL FAM1LY TRUST lJ!A
:i
('}6/3'0/09, ki1own or identified to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the Within
6 instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
4

7
8

.in

LN WITNESS WHEREOF, 1 have hereunto set my !land and seal the day and
~his c~11ifiGate first above ;.:vritten.

l1111iL yt{. t ~

Not?r~' Publl1b1 and for the State of Id.aho

NICHOLE M. CANSINO
NOTARY PUBUC
STATE OF IDAHO

ro
Ii

Res1d1ngat:
Comm. Exp.:

~ -

Y- n - c?bn

14
IS

17
18

19

2-0.

rt

24

21
28
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~~l~-...PJOiJNO,
liurvlv.or'1
QllP TnJlt

8onoffciaey
1.

ftoprMonta1ivo of hi•
of the
hmHy Trns&. Survivor•• Trust, Bypu,
Ind QTiP Trust

t,

r"

PARU!Ne o. (Pm.TY) DHY'
~U.tndhm for DARRY:L DEYO 0,
th• J:~ah~ Urdform 'fram,·ler1 to Mlnon Aet.
it**'c Qhnntnuoo of th~ turviv.:M'1. Trust

Pl

.D··

,UC · · ZZ. ..

as custodian

ft1r CRAl<l J. · lZZEl.L. und.er tho

,;, . CAiifornia lln.i:fonn Tr~1fera kl Minors
31 A1,1l, S~Hlc -0:istribuloo or tho SutVivor's
\

Tr"1n

L,

,
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/

,_.

\

i·
l

+

·

l)EI\N t FRl

"~E

custodian

tw

, ~lh~ Ca!H'om\u

U~il~fln T~~~ to Mi001'$.At~ S~Ulg
Di:ftnbu~ ofthe Surviv.of's Trust

S·
·6

.,

BALEY ( WARR) BAKER.. Speoltk
Dis\ri-but~ ofthi: Survivor's Tr~

t
9· _1'¥'U~

to
ll

DEYOUNG, Specific Distrihu\ee
oi"the Survi-v.or's T~l

STATE OF IDAHO

)

) ss.
)

l:S
-~

n

this _
day of
_
•. 2.0\4. tklforo. _me, the
undersigned, a Notary Pl.Ablic in and for said State~ pc!fSOttully at,~ared snwtN J.
pS¥0U'NO, kno,vn or tdcntH1ed to me to be the person who mm1c is subscrihed to tho wlthin
as Tru.~ of lhe Family Trust\ the Survivor's Trust. tho 'B!f'pn&S Trust and4h, QTIP
Trust of the CLIFTON AND MARJORIE FRIZZELL FAMILY TRUST U/A 06130/tl9t end

:ans~•

ac~owredged to me that

executed the sru.11e as Trusti,,.

l8

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I

this. <;ertifieate first .above written.

Notary Public in and t'br the State ot' Idaho

ll

Residing

Comm. Exp,:

l6
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STATE Of CAUfOR.NlA )

}ss.
)

Oft the _J;J_ day of

"
s.
to

20t<t, before me, the
FRIZZELL, a V~
~im:y Ind Virtual Representative of his issue of the Family Trust, the
&lin'"'8f's TmS.t, d'f¢ . ~ Trust and the QTTP Trust of the CLir!ON AND MARJOR.UZ.
FIUZZFil fAM.U.Y TRUST UIA 0600/09, known or identified to m(:c to be the person. whose
~ is ~bed ro the \\<ithin instrument, and acknowledged to me that ne executetl the
QG'f~

~ ~ , Poblic.. personally a p ~ DONALD C.

a~

"'·~

·IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto ffl mY h~d \\lld' seat the day and'year tn
'

dus~nrstabo\;ewritten.
Notary Public in and for the State of
California
Residing at: f4 111, ,.,.r-h1.{ if,t.~
Comm. Exp., _:1iJ J
f<t', '«ii S'

t

,STATE OF IDAHO
~

County ofK00teoai
On me

1~

n
if
ii

)

)•
)

day of

20'14, before mi,, the

~ . Not.u}' Public, personally appeared DARLENE D. (FELTY) D'EY01Jr,{O as
~ fur DARRYL DEYOUNG under the Idaho Uniform Transfers to Mino{$ Act, a

~ilk: dism~ of Survivor's Trust of the CUFTON AND MARJOIUE FRIZZELL
FAMlLY TR\JST U/A 06/30/09, knowp or identified to me to be the person whose name ls
~·cott1e·\ltitmn instrument. and·acknowl'edged tome that she executed the same.
IN ~lTNESS WHEREOF, l have h~reunto s.et mr hand and seal the day tmij year ~
oerlifi(::aie first above written.

Notary Public in and for the State'ofldaho
Residing at:- _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Comm~ Exp.:--------

1

STATE OF 1DAHO

·1 .

Cou;nty of Kootenai

}
) II.

)

IN WITNESS WHFJ(BQ.P~ I
writt.n.

~~tlttty liuhlfi,

H

imJ',~if

or hi.thtt

tt,11ltHf1~ Htl ____.:_......_ ........ ·- .
t\nuni, lfaJM ___ . -·- -- . _"., ....

V.·

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

)

day

-

~<.,14~r

-~------r·' 2011 hllltN

pi.t:t'IOM.Uy appearod l)ON Au, t!. 1t~,11,i'.I r, ,I, tit uu1HlU1HJlft
dw Catlft,mta Uniform lrnn1f\m1 itJ MitmtM /Wt,
Ow tUYl'ON ANU MAKJOlt!n J1JU1,/JHl,L
lo mt to Uw r,cr1n.tt1 whijMf mutt• ~ 11uki11ii1rlbild·
ml that
41~t'1UtOJ Ihi
hand

1ettt

,_),;~

""""'"'" Puhlh..i In tunl: tbr HU1··lilllltt"2

•.. ·.

ur

C.tHrornht
Rt1ldtn1i& at!
0.1mm. H14t,.!

. · :NO.M .. ·. J(;.tAt.t'ftSPU.TE f\EffOtUlfON .. ¥qt ll

.a,.,.,
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:STATE O:F.-CALtFORNlA l
:c-0uncy nr . ofM.N 6 I'

) Mli,

>

..On .the
?. '7 day ar
c,e:td~-(r, 2014, hffbro n11t, lht
-~~der_slgno·d Notary PubUtl, pert1t111iii1i u1111~irti,r if<)NAtfi 'c\" flJC-11./.t(Lf, "" I.IUIHlldlftn fi1r
'S D.~ J. F.RIZZELL un.d,r the CulU'ornht Unlihrm 'l'fdtutf¥rlf IO MIUt-tni Aut, ·M
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APPENDIXB

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

DONALD CRAIG FRIZZELL,
individually and as beneficiary of the
CLIFTON AND MARJORIE FRIZZELL
FAMILY TRUST,
Plaintiff,
vs.

1/,- 735D
CASE NO•.CR li 9425 ,,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

EDWIN DEYOUNG, individually and in
his capacity as TRUSTEE OF THE
CLIFTON AND MARJORIE FRIZZELL
FAMILY TRUST; and DARLENE
DEYOUNG, individually and in her
capacity as beneficiary of the CLIFTON
AND MARJORIE FRIZZELL FAMILY
TRUST; and. on behalf of the marital
community of EDWIN DEYOUNG and
DARLENE DEYOUNG, husband and
wife,
Defendants.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing before the Honorable Cynthia K.C.
Meyer on December 13, 2016. Defendant was represented by Scot D. Nass, Lake City Law
Group, PLLC, and Plaintiff was represented by Robin L. Haynes, McNeice Wheeler, PLLC.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted.
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I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL IDSTORY

Clifton G. Frizzell and Marjorie J. Frizzell created the Clifton and Marjorie Frizzell
Family Trust ("Trust") on June 30, 2009, which included a Bypass Trust, a Survivor's Trust and
a QTIP Trust. Clifton and Marjorie were the grantors and original trustees of the Trust. Clifton
died on September 4, 2011, and Marjorie died on October 24, 2011. The Trust named Haley
Baker as successor trustee of the Trust. However, Ms. Baker declined the appointment and
Edwin DeYoung ("Defendant") was appointed successor trustee of the Trust on October 29,
2011.
Donald Frizzell ("Plaintiff') commenced litigation regarding the Trust in 2013, 1 and
pursuant to that litigation, Plaintiff and Defendant (along with Darlene DeYoung) entered into a
Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act ("TEDRA") agreement to resolve disputes related to the
administration of the Trust. The TEDRA agreement was filed in District Court on October 31,
2014. The TEDRA agreement contains a release and hold harmless clause as well as a clause
purporting to indemnify Defendant against any claims, lawsuits or other actions.
Plaintiff filed the present Complaint alleging thirteen causes of action relating to the
administration of the Trust: 1) Breach of Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty for failing to provide
infonnation, 2) Breach of Fiduciary Duty to Distribute Assets, 3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty for
directly competing with Plaintiff, 4) Breach of Fiduciary Duty based on negligent supervision of
the Trust, 5) Breach of Fiduciary Duty for failing to make Trust property productive, 6) Breach
of Fiduciary Duty for failure to protect Trust property, 7) Breach of Fiduciary Duty for failure to

1 This

Court has declined Defendant's request to take judicial notice of the underlying case (Kootenai County Case
No. CV 2013-3998) based on Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(bX6) and the holding in Taylor v. McNichols, 149
Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010) (holding the only facts a Court may consider in ruling on a 12(bX6) motion for
failure to state a claim are those appearing in the complaint and it would not be proper to take judicial notice of an
underlying case that lies outside of the pleadings). There is no reference to Kootenai County Case No. CV 20133998 in the complaint, therefore, this Court will not take judicial notice, nor consider the underlying case in this
decision.
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protect Trust property, 8) Breach of Fiduciary Duty for failure to provide infonnation, 9) Breach
of Fiduciary Duty for engaging in self-dealing, 10) Breach of Fiduciary Duty for failing to
remain impartial, 11) Breach of the Duty of Loyalty for failure to file insurance claims, 12)
Claim for Punitive Damages, and 13) a Claim for Damages for Lost Income. Plaintiff filed the
Complaint on October 6, 2016. Defendant filed this motion to dismiss arguing the TEDRA
agreement shields Defendant from liability for his administration of the Trust.
This Court is asked to determine if the language contained in the TEDRA agreement
serves as a bar to Plaintiff's present claims, and if so, whether Defendant is entitled to attorney
fees and costs associated with defending Plaintiff's claims.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim must be read in
conjunction with Rule 8(a), which sets forth the requirements for pleading a claim and calls for
'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' and a
demand for relief." Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 536, 835 P.2d 1346, 1347 (Ct. App. 1992)
(citing Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(l), (2)). A court may only consider matters within the
pleadings as part of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273,276, 796 P.2d
150, 153 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)). If matters outside the
pleadings are "[p)resented to and considered by the court it is the duty of the court to treat such
motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment." Id. (citing Boesiger v. DeModena, 88
Idaho 337,399 P.2d 635 (1965)) (emphasis in original).
A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b) "[u]nless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts which would entitle them to relief." Dumas v. Ropp,
98 Idaho 61, 62, 558 P.2d 632, 633 (1977) (citing Wackerli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho 400, 353
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Defendant argues the clauses contained in the TEDRA agreement preclude any action
against Defendant arising out of the administration of the Trust. Defendant argues the language
is plain and unambiguous and, based upon the plain language of the TEDRA agreement, Plaintiff
has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
It is important to note that a TEDRA agreement is a non-judicial dispute resolution tool
governed by Idalia Code § 15-8-101 et seq. It is not clear what efforts, if any, were made to
utilize non-judicial dispute resolution to resolve the issues that are now before the Court.
However, it is clear from a reading of the statutes that a TEDRA agreement is binding on the
parties to such an agreement and a party seeking to enforce a provision of a TEDRA agreement
may do so in much the same manner as one would petition a court to enforce a court order. See
Idaho Code§§ 15-8-301-03. A judge hearing a TEDRA dispute has plenary power to facilitate
the resolution of any dispute regarding all matters related to a trust "in any manner and way that
to the court seems right and proper, all to the end that the matters be expeditiously administered
and settled by the court." Idaho Code § 15-8-102.
The parties executed the TEDRA agreement to resolve certain issues between the parties
that had arisen prior to the execution of the TEDRA agreement, modify the Trust, and subject the
resolution of Trust disputes to the provisions ofldaho Code§ 15-8-101 et seq. All parties to the
TEDRA agreement were represented by counsel and signed the agreement. Complaint, Exhibit
B, p. 7. The TEDRA agreement was filed with the court on October 31, 2014. Id at 1. The clear
import of the parties' entering into the TEDRA agreement was to submit disputes related to the
administration of the Trust to non-judicial dispute resolution. Further, the TEDRA provisions
under Idaho Code 15-8-101 et seq. allow for parties to seek enforcement of the TEDRA
agreement by petition. None of that was done here.
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It appears counterintuitive that the parties are before this Court seeking resolution of
disputes relating to the administration of the Trust when the parties entered into a binding
TEDRA agreement, the proper and efficient resolution of which could have (and likely should
have) been resolved pursuant to the provisions of the Act. Having read the Complaint in this
matter it is clear the present claims originate from the administration of the Trust. The path
chosen by the parties is neither expeditious nor efficient and renders the TEDRA agreement itself
relatively meaningless.
There were remedies available to Plaintiff through the provisions of the Act and the
failure to utilize those remedies is troubling to the Court, particularly when all parties entered
into the agreement knowingly, voluntarily, and with the aid of counsel. It makes little sense to
enter into an agreement to resolve matters related to the administration of a trust through a
prescribed course of conduct, only to argue that the agreement does not apply to matters that
originate after the agreement was signed. All conduct arising after execution would be exempted
from the provisions of the agreement. At that point the agreement is of no utility and rather than
creating efficiencies it becomes burdensome on the courts.

However, as the parties have

presented this issue to the Court, the merits of Defendant's motion to dismiss will be addressed.

B. The TEDRA Agreement Serves as a Bar to Plaintiff's Claims in the Present Case.
1.

Viewing the TEDRA Agreement in its entirety there is no ambiguity in the
language ofthe Agreement.

The court construes a trust instrument, a TEDRA agreement, and all other contracts as a
whole, considering all parts in light of the entire instrument. See Salfeety v. Seideman (In re

Estate of Kirk), 127 Idaho 817,827,907 P.2d 794, 804 (1995). The Court's primary objective is
to discover the intent of the parties through viewing the document in its entirety. See Bondy v.

Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 996, 829 P.2d 1342, 1345 (1992).

When a document is clear and
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unambiguous, interpretation of its meaning is a question of law. See id at 996, 829 P.2d at 1345;

see also Allen v. Dennie (In re Inter Vivos Trust by Turner), 116 Idaho 913, 916, 782 P.2d 36, 39
(Ct.App.1989).
"The legal effect of an unambiguous written document must be decided by the trial court
as a question of law." Latham v. Garner, 105 Idaho 854, 858, 673 P .2d 1048, 1052 (1983). "If,
however, the instrument of conveyance is ambiguous, interpretation of the instrument is a matter
of fact for the trier of fact." Id.

In .JR. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 614, 167 P.3d 748, 751 (2006), the Idaho
Supreme Court enunciated the process by which a court will evaluate the language of a contract:
A party's subjective, undisclosed intent is immaterial to the
interpretation of a contract, as under the objective law of contract
interpretation, the court will give force and effect to the words of
the contract without regard to what the parties to the contract
thought it meant or what they actually intended for it to mean. The
court will not attempt to ascertain the actual mental processes of
the parties in entering into the particular contract; rather the law
presumes that the parties understood the import of their contract
and that they had the intention which its terms manifest.
JR. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 614, 167 P.3d 748, 751 (2006). Similarly, when a

court attempts to determine the intent behind a trust agreement, it must construe the trust
agreement as a whole, considering all parts in light of the entire instrument. See In re Estate of

Kirk, 127 Idaho 817, 907 P.2d 794 (1994). The court's primary objective is to discover the intent
of the parties through viewing a document in its entirety. See Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993,
996, 829 P.2d 1342, 1345 (1992). When a document is clear and unambiguous, interpretation of
its meaning is a question of law. See id at 996, 829 P.2d at 1345. In determining whether a
document is ambiguous, the Court seeks to determine whether it is "reasonably subject to
conflicting interpretation." Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho at 997, 829 P.2d at 1346. While a patent
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ambiguity is apparent on the face of the trust, a latent ambiguity is not evident until there is an
attempt to apply the trust's provisions to the existing facts. Kirk, 127 Idaho at 824, 907 P .2d at
801.
Defendant asserts the following provisions of the TEDRA agreement provide evidence of

the indemnity, hold-harmless, and release clauses demonstrating the intent of the parties to
release Defendant from all liability in perpetuity regarding his administration of the trust.
i.

Paragraph two of the TEDRA agreement.

Nature of this Agreement. This Agreement is intended to
be a binding agreement to resolve certain issues that have arisen
or could arise in the future between the Parties in a manner that
will avoid the necessity offurther litigation or court proceedings in
this matter to resolve such issues and further will serve as written
documentation to third Parties of the Parties Agreement.
TEDRA Agreement p. 2, ,r2 (emphasis added). Paragraph two of the agreement purports to
define the nature of the agreement and the intent of Plaintiff and Defendant to resolve certain
issues that have arisen, and those issues that could arise in the future. The plain reading of this
clause supports Defendant's position that the TEDRA agreement is not merely a resolution of
those issues that were being contested at the time, but also issues that may arise related to the
administration of the trust in the future. "Arise," as that term is commonly understood, means to
come about, or originate. "Could," as that word is commonly used, denotes something that may,
or may not, come to :fruition. "Issue" is used to denote a dispute between parties. The plain
reading of the provision demonstrates an intent to encompass disputes related to the Trust that
may come about at any point in the future.
The express statement regarding the nature of the agreement is not ambiguous. It clearly
denotes that the parties intended the agreement to address not only those issues that were the
basis of the prior litigation, but those issues that may arise at a future point in time. The nature
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of this provision does not contain operative language, but the language does demonstrate the
TEDRA agreement envisioned a scenario where a dispute could arise in the future related to the
administration of the trust. The Court certainly agrees that it addresses those issues that existed
prior to the execution of the agreement. However, if that was all that was intended the remaining
language identified above would be unnecessary. The Court's determination is also predicated
on a reading of the agreement as a whole.
ii.

Paragraph 5.5 of the TEDRA agreement.

Paragraph 5.5 reads in pertinent part:

DON shall indemnijy, defend, and hold harmless ED as Trustee
against any claims, lawsuits or other actions, including all costs of
attorney fees incurred in defense of such claims, lawsuits, or other
actions, arising as a result of DON" S management of the real
During such
properties described in Section 5. 3 above.
management and before distribution of the properties to DON,
DON is prohibited from terminating and unreasonably interfering
with the existing manager of the real property 39th St. in Phoenix,
Arizona.
TEDRA Agreement p. 5, 11f5.5. The real property listed in section 5.3 of the TEDRA agreement
was to remain in the Trust until it was distributed to Plaintiff at a later date. However, paragraph
5.5 specifically holds Defendant, as the trustee, harmless for any actions taken by Plaintiff after
the execution of the TEDRA agreement. The paragraph contemplates that the distribution of all
trust assets has not taken place as of the date of the execution of the agreement. This provision
contains operative language dealing with specific assets of the Trust. Specifically, it obligates
Plaintiff and Defendant to waive certain rights pursuant to actions that may, or may not, occur in
the future. It does not restrict a cause of action to only matters that arose prior to the execution
of the agreement and it acknowledges that certain assets of the Trust have not been distributed at
the time of the execution of the TEDRA agreement.
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The operative language indicates that Plaintiff shall indemnify, defend, and hold
Defendant harmless. The Court determines that the plain language of this paragraph is clear and
unambiguous and demonstrates the obligation of the parties, at least relating to certain real
property, to indemnify and hold Defendant harmless for future claims arising out of Defendant's
administration of the Trust.
iii.

Paragraph six of the TEDRA agreement.

Paragraph six of the TEDRA agreement reads:
Donald C. F:rizzell's Indemnification of Edwin J. DeYoung.
DON, on behalf of himself and as custodian for CRAIG J.
FRIZZELL and DEAN J. FRIZZELL agrees to indemnify, defend
and hold ED harmless against any claims, lawsuits or other
actions, including all costs and attorney fees incurred in defense of
such claims, lawsuits or other actions, advanced against ED by
DON or DON's children or heirs relating to ED'S administration
of the Family Trust, Survivor's Trust, Bypass Trust and QTIP
Trust.
TEDRA Agreement p. 6, ,-r6. It is clear from paragraph six that Plaintiff intended to indemnify,
defend, and hold Defendant harmless against any "claims, lawsuits or other actions ... relating
to [Defendant's] administration of the [Trust]." Id. Whereas paragraph 5.5 obligates Plaintiff to
hold Defendant harmless regarding specific real property held in the Trust, paragraph six
specifically obligates Plaintiff to indemnify, defend and hold Defendant harmless against any
acts related to Defendant's administration of the Trust.
The language is clear and unambiguous. A plain reading of the language demonstrates
that Plaintiff is agreeing to hold Defendant harmless from any claim relating to Defendant's
administration of the Trust. Plaintiff's argument that the TEDRA agreement only applied to
actions taken prior to the execution of the agreement withers when confronted with the language
of paragraph six. Specifically, it is clear that at the time of the execution of the agreement there
were still assets to be distributed from the Tmst and Defendant was still acting as the Trust
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2. Defendant is released from all liability from the point of the
execution of the TEDRA agreement until he is no longer
serving as the trust administrator based on the following:

and all liability relating to the Family Trust, Survivor's
Trust, Bypass Trust and the QTIP Trust that might arise
between the Releasors and the Releasees now or in the
future.
TEDRA Agreement p. 7, if9 (emphasis added). The conjunction "and" located at the end of the
provision is clear and unambiguous. The plain meaning provides that: in addition to a release for
all prior claims related to Defendant's administration of the Trust, all future claims that might
arise between Plaintiff and Defendant are encompassed by the release.

Specifically, the

language states that Defendant is released from liability from any claims that were, or could have
been, asserted from the inception of the Trust until the execution of the TEDRA agreement.
Then the provision states Defendant is released from liability from claims related to Defendant's
administration of the Trust that might arise now or in the future. Moreover, when the language
of the provision obligates Plaintiff to release Defendant from liability for potential claims and
claims that have yet to accrue it appears from the plain language of the document that it
necessarily includes future actions related to the administration of the Trust.
If Plaintiffs argument were correct the language at the end of the provision would be
repetitive and unnecessary. The Court cannot subscribe to Plaintiff's position when the entirety
of the TEDRA agreement is read.

The language is clear and unambiguous and the Court

determines the TEDRA agreement releases Defendant from all liability arising from Defendant's
administration of the Trust.

v.

Paragraph seven of the TEDRA agreement.

Paragraph seven of the TEDRA agreement provides:
All Parties to this Agreement understand and acknowledge that if
this Agreement is filed with the court then its terms will become
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final and binding and the equivalent of a final court order binding
on all of the Parties who have signed the same pursuant to LC. §
15-8-303 .... Furthermore, the Beneficiaries specifically agree that
this Agreement shall be fully binding upon them even if it may be
determined later that this Agreement is not an Agreement under
LC. § 15-8-303 and/or that any necessary Party for such an
Agreement was omitted or not virtually represented.
TEDRA Agreement p. 6, 17. The Plaintiff was a party to the TEDRA agreement and is bound by
its terms regardless of Plaintiff's subjective intent. See .Justad v. Ward, 147 Idaho 509,512,211
P.3d 118, 121 (2009) (quoting 17A Am. Jur. 2d. Contracts§ 91 (2d ed. 2008)).
It is the general rule of this state and the majority of jurisdictions that parties may
contract to release themselves from "certain duties and liabilities under a contract subject to
certain limitations/' Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175,595 P.2d 709
(1979). Courts generally disfavor such waivers and will construe such provisions against the
party relying on them. Id. "Clauses which exclude liability must speak clearly and directly to
the particular conduct of the defendant which caused the harm at issue." Id.
At oral argument on Defendant's motion Plaintiff remarked that the TEDRA agreement,
as interpreted by Defendant, would be void as against public policy because a contract cannot
waive someone's day in court.

However, this statement ignores the nature of the TEDRA

statutes. Plaintiff did not waive his day in court, rather, Plaintiff agreed to non-judicial dispute
resolution regarding matters related to the administration of the Trust. Further, Plaintiff had
every opportunity to seek enforcement of the TEDRA agreement through the plenary power of
the court to resolve disputes related to the agreement. That cannot be considered a waiver of
Plaintiffs day in court. The policy behind the Act is to promote non-judicial resolution of trust
disputes, efficiency in trust administration, and judicial resolution of disputes where non-judicial
efforts fail. Idaho Code§ 15-8-101. The TEDRA agreement is not a waiver of Plaintiff's day in
court.
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As this Court noted above, Plaintiff had a vehicle to assert his rights under the TEDRA
agreement and the administration of the Trust. Plaintiff could have filed a petition with the
Court to execute the terms of the TEDRA agreement. See Idaho Code § 15-8-101 et seq.
Plaintiff did not waive his rights, rather, Plaintiff contracted to have his rights administered
pursuant to the TEDRA statutes. That is something different than an absolute waiver of a right
to assert a claim in court. Plaintiff slept on his right to bring his claims under the TEDRA statute
and here is attempting to circumvent the agreement and continue litigating issues related to
Defendant's administration of the Trust. This is precisely the action that TEDRA was designed
to avoid. The provisions of the TEDRA holding Defendant harmless from actions taken as the
Trust administrator speak clearly, directly, and release Defendant from all liability related to the
administration of the Trust.
This Court determines there is no ambiguity in the provisions contained within the
TEDRA agreement, and the intent of the parties was to release, indemnify, and hold Defendant
harmless from any and all claims arising from Defendant's administration of the Trust.

C. Defendant's Request for Attorney Fees.
Defendant has requested attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l), and 54(e). Idaho Code§ 12-121 provides: "In any civil action, the
judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties ...." Idaho Code§
12-121. "Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs are allowed as a matter of right to
the prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court.'' Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(d)(l)(A). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e) instructs:
(1) Pursuant to Contract or Statute. In any civil action the
court may award reasonable attorney fees, including paralegal fees,
to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l )(B),
when provided for by any statute or contract.
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(2) Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121. Attorney fees
under Idaho Code Section 12-121 may be awarded by the court
only when it finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation, which finding
must be in writing and include the basis and reasons for the award.
No attorney fees may be awarded pursuant to Idaho Code Section
12-121 on a default judgment.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l-2). TEDRA does provide a statute for the recovery of
attorney fees at Idaho Code§ 15-8-208. Idaho Code§ 15-8-208 reads:
(1) Either the district court or the court on appeal may, in its
discretion, order costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to be
awarded to any party:
(a) From any party to the proceedings;
(b) From the assets of the estate or trust involved in the
proceedings; or
(c) From any nonprobate asset that is the subject of the
proceedings. The court may order the costs to be paid in
such amount and in such manner as the court
determines to be equitable.
(2) This section applies to all proceedings governed by this chapter
including, but not limited to, proceedings involving trusts,
decedent's estates and properties, and guardianship matters. Except
as provided in section 12-117, Idaho Code, this section shall not be
construed as being limited by any other specific statutory provision
providing for the payment of costs, unless such statute specifically
provides otherwise.
Idaho Code § 15-8-208. In Quemada v. Arizmendez, 153 Idaho 609, 288 P.3d 826 (2012), the
Idaho Supreme Court held that attorney fees were appropriate under Idaho Code § 15-8-208
where a plaintiff had asserted TEDRA as a basis for the claim. Id.
In the present case the parties executed the TEDRA agreement for the express purpose of
resolving all disputes relating to the administration of the Trust in a binding non-judicial manner.
If the parties were unable to do so TEDRA provided judicial remedies for those disputes.
Plaintiff filed this cause of action seeking relief related to alleged impropriety in the
administration of the Trust.

This is precisely the type of matter addressed by the TEDRA

agreement. Plaintiff cites to the TEDRA agreement and the failure to Defendant to administer the
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Trust as modified by the TEDRA agreement as the basis for the claim. The TEDRA agreement
at issue released Defendant from all liability in the administration of the Trust. Plaintiff entered
into a binding agreement to resolve matters related to the administration of the Trust through the
TEDRA statutes and neglected to do so.

Bringing this cause of action in this manner

circumvents and defeats the purpose of the TEDRA agreement. Therefore, the Court determines
Plaintiffs claim is unreasonable, lacking foundation, and was brought and pursued frivolously.
Defendant is awarded reasonable attorney fees.

IV.

CONCLUSION

This Court determines the TEDRA agreement is clear and unambiguous.

The Court

determines the TEDRA agreement indemnifies, releases, and holds Defendant harmless from all
claims from the inception of the Trust to the execution of the TEDRA agreement and from all
claims whatsoever in his position as trust administrator.

Defendant is awarded reasonable

attorney fees.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

DATED this.20 ~of January, 2017.
BY THE COURT:
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Plaintifs portion of Cliff & Marge Frizzell Family Trust
For Period Ending August 31, 2015
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Plaintifs portion of Cllff & Marge Frizzell Family Trust
For Period Ending October 31, 2015

39th Street Apartment
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Plaintif's portion of Cliff & Marge Frizzell Family Trust
For Period Ending November 30, 2015
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Total Operating Expenses
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Plaintif's portion of Cliff & Marge Frizzell Family Trust
For Period Ending December 31, 2015

OPERATING EXPENSES
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Total Operating expenses
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4,480.00
$6,971.32
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550 U.S. 544 (2007)
127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929
BELL ATLANTIC CORPORATION et al., Petitioners,
v.
William TWOMBLY et al.
No. 05-1126.
United States Supreme Court

service areas to inhibit the growth of upstart CLECs; and
(2) by agreeing to refrain from competing against one
another, as indicated by their common failure to pursue
attractive business opportunities in contiguous markets and
by a statement by one ILEC's chief executive officer that
competing in another ILEC's territory did not seem right
The District Court dismissed the complaint, concluding that
parallel business conduct allegations, taken alone, do not
state a claim under § l; plaintiffs must allege additional facts
tending to exclude independent self-interested conduct as an
explanation for the parallel actions. Reversing, the Second
Circuit held that plaintiffs' parallel conduct allegations were
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss because the
ILECs failed to show that there is no set of facts that would
permit plaintiffs to demonstrate that the particular
parallelism asserted was the product of collusion rather than
coincidence.

May 21, 2007
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Argued Nov. 27, 2006.
Held:
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[127 S.Ct 1958] SYLLABUS
The 1984 divestiture of the American Telephone &
Telegraph Company's (AT&T) local telephone business left
a system of regional service monopolies, sometimes called
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs), and a separate
long-distance market from which the ILECs were excluded.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 withdrew approval of
the ILECs' monopolies, "fundamentally restructur[ing] local
telephone markets" and "subject[ing] [ILECs] to a host of
duties intended to facilitate market entry." AT&T Corp. v.
IowaUtilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371, 119 S.Ct. 721, 142
L.Ed.2d 835. It also authorized them to enter the
long-distance market. "Central to the [new] scheme [was
each ILEC's] obligation . . . to share its network with
competitive
local
exchange
carriers
(CLECs)."
VerizonCommunications Inc.v. law Offices of Curtis v.
Trinka, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,402, 124 S.Ct. 872, 157 L.Ed.2d
823.
Respondents (hereinafter plaintiffs) represent a class of
subscribers of local telephone and/or high speed Internet
services in this action against petitioner ILECs for claimed
violations of § l of the Sherman Act, which prohibits
"[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations." The
complaint alleges that the ILECs conspired to restrain trade
(1) by engaging in parallel conduct in their respective

I. Stating a § l claim requires a complaint with enough
factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement
was made. An allegation of parallel conduct and a bare
assertion of conspiracy will not suffice. Pp. 553-563.
(a) Because § l prohibits "only restraints effected by a
contract, combination, or conspiracy," CopperweldCorp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 775, 104 S.Ct.
2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 628, "[t]he crucial question" is whether
the challenged anticompetitive conduct "stem[s] from
independent decision or from an agreement," Theatre
Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.,
346 U.S. 537, 540, 74 S.Ct. 257, 98 L.Ed. 273. While a
showing of parallel "business behavior is admissible
circumstantial evidence from which" agreement may be
inferred, it falls short of "conclusively establish[ing]
agreement or . . . itself constitut[ing] a Sherman Act
offense." Id., at 540-541, 74 S.Ct 257. The inadequacy of
showing parallel conduct or interdependence, without more,

[127 S.Ct. 1959] mirrors the behavior's ambiguity:
consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a
wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy
unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the
market. Thus, this Court has hedged against false inferences
from identical behavior at a number of points in the trial
sequence, e.g., at the summary judgment stage, see
Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538. Pp. 553-554.
(b) This case presents the antecedent question of what a

plaintiff must plead in order to state a § l claim. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief," in order to "give the defendant fair notice
of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests," Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2
L.Ed.2d 80. While a complaint attacked by a Rule l2(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations,
ibid., a plaintiff's obligation to provide the "grounds" of his
"entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's
elements will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true.
Applying these general standards to a § l claim, stating a
claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter to
suggest an agreement. Asking for plausible grounds does
not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage;
it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
agreement. The need at the pleading stage for allegations
plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement
reflects Rule 8(a)(2)'s threshold requirement that the "plain
statement" possess enough heft to "sho[w] that the pleader
is entitled to relief." A parallel
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conduct allegation gets the § l complaint close to stating a
claim, but without further factual enhancement it stops short
of the line between possibility and plausibility. The
requirement of allegations suggesting an agreement serves
the practical purpose of preventing a plaintiff with " 'a
largely groundless claim' " from " 'tak[ing] up the time of a
number of other people, with the right to do so representing
an in terrorem increment of the settlement value.' "
DuraPharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347,
125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577. It is one thing to be
cautious before dismissing an antitrust complaint in
advance of discovery, but quite another to forget that
proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive. That
potential expense is obvious here, where plaintiffs represent
a putative class of at least 90 percent of subscribers to local
telephone or high-speed Internet service in an action against
America's largest telecommunications firms for unspecified
instances of antitrust violations that allegedly occurred over
a 7-year period. It is no answer to say that a claim just shy
of plausible entitlement can be weeded out early in the
discovery process, given the common lament that the
success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse
has been modest. Plaintiffs' main argument against the
plausibility standard at the pleading stage is its ostensible
conflict with a literal reading of Conley's statement
construing Rule 8: "a complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief." 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78
S.Ct. 99. The "no set of facts" language has been
questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough by
courts and commentators,

[127 S.Ct. 1960) and is best forgotten as an incomplete,
negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a
claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by
showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in
the complaint. Conley described the breadth of opportunity
to prove what an adequate complaint claims, not the
minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a
complaint's survival. Pp. 554-563.
2. Under the plausibility standard, plaintiffs' claim of
conspiracy in restraint of trade comes up short. First, the
complaint leaves no doubt that plaintiffs rest their § I claim
on descriptions of parallel conduct, not on any independent
allegation of actual agreement among the ILECs. The nub
of the complaint is the ILECs' parallel behavior, and its
sufficiency turns on the suggestions raised by this conduct
when viewed in light of common economic experience.
Nothing in the complaint invests either the action or
inaction alleged with a plausible conspiracy suggestion. As
to the ILECs' supposed agreement to disobey the 1996 Act
and thwart the CLECs' attempts to comp..:.te, the District
Court correctly found that nothing in the complaint
intimates that resisting the upstarts was anything more than
the natural, unilateral reaction of each
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ILEC intent on preserving its regional dominance. The
complaint's general collusion premise fails to answer the
point that there was no need for joint encouragement to
resist the 1996 Act, since each ILEC had reason to try and
avoid dealing with CLECs and would have tried to keep
them out, regardless of the other ILECs' actions. Plaintiffs'
second conspiracy theory rests on the competitive reticence
among the ILECs themselves in the wake of the 1996 Act to
enter into their competitors' territories, leaving the relevant
market highly compartmentalized geographically, with
minimal competition. This parallel conduct did not suggest
conspiracy, not if history teaches anything. Monopoly was
the norm in telecommunications, not the exception. Because
the ILECs were born in that world, doubtless liked it, and
surely knew the adage about him who lives by the sword, a
natural explanation for the noncompetition is that the
former Government-sanctioned monopolists were sitting
tight, expecting their neighbors to do the same. Antitrust
conspiracy was not suggested by the facts adduced under
either theory of the complaint, which thus fails to state a
valid § l claim. This analysis does not run counter to
Swierkiewicz v. SoremaN. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, 122 S.Ct.
992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1, which held that "a complaint in an
employment discrimination lawsuit [need] not contain

specific facts establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination." Here, the Court is not requiring heightened
fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Because the
plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line
from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be
dismissed. Pp. 1970-1974.
425 F.3d 99, reversed and remanded.
SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS,
BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined, except
as to Part IV, post, p. 570.
(127 S.Ct. 1961] COUNSEL
Michael K. Kellogg argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Mark C. Hansen, Aaron M. Banner,
Richard G. Taranto, Stephen M. Shapiro, Kenneth S.
Geller, Richard J. Favretto, Timothy Beyer, J. Henry
Walker, Marc W. F. Galonsky, John Thome, Paul J. Larkin,
Jr., David E. Wheeler,, Dan K. Wehh, Cynthia P. Delaney,
Javier Aguilar, and William M. Schur.
Assistant Attorney General Barnett argued the cause for
the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With
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him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Deputy
Solicitor General Hungar, Deanne E. Maynard, Catherine
G. O'Sullivan, James J. O'Connell, Jr., and Hill B. Wellford.
J Douglas Richards argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief was Michael M. Buchman.[*]

Telephone & Telegraph Company's (AT&T) local
telephone business was a system of regional service
monopolies (variously called "Regional Bell Operating
Companies," "Baby Bells," or "Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers" (ILECs)), and a separate, competitive market for
long-distance service from which the ILECs were excluded.
More than a decade later, Congress withdrew approval of
the
ILECs'
monopolies
by
enacting
the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act), 110 Stat. 56,
which "fundamentally restructure[d] local telephone
markets" and "subject[ed] [ILECs] to a host of duties
intended to facilitate market entry." AT&T Corp. v.
IowaUti/ities Bd, 525 U.S. 366, 371, 119 S.Ct. 721, 142
L.Ed.2d 835 (1999). In recompense, the 1996 Act set
conditions for authorizing ILECs to enter the long-distance
market. See 47 U. S. C. §271.
"Central to the [new] scheme [was each ILEC's] obligation
. . . to share its network with competitors," Verizon
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko,
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 402, 124 S.Ct. 872, 157 L.Ed.2d 823
(2004), which came to be known as "competitive local
exchange carriers" (CLECs), Pet. for Cert. 6, n. I. A CLEC
could make use ofan ILEC's network in any of three ways:
by (1) "purchas[ing] local telephone services at wholesale
rates for resale to end users," (2) "leas[ing] elements of the
[ILEC's] network 'on an unbundled basis,' " or (3)
"interconnect[ing] its own facilities with the [ILEC's]
network." Iowa Utilities Bd., supra, at 371, 119 S.Ct. 72 l
(quoting 47 U. S. C. §251(c)). Owing to the "considerable
expense and effort" required to make unbundled network
elements available to rivals at wholesale prices, Trinko,
supra, at 410, 124 S.Ct. 872, the ILECs vigorously litigated
the scope of the sharing obligation imposed by the 1996
Act, with the result that the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) three times
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Souter, Justice.
revised its
Liability under §1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. §1,
requires a "contract, combination . . ., or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce." The question in this
putative class action is whether a §I complaint can survive
a motion to dismiss when it alleges that major
telecommunications providers engaged in certain parallel
conduct unfavorable to
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competition, absent some factual context suggesting
agreement, as distinct from identical, independent action.
We hold that such a complaint should be dismissed.

The upshot of the 1984 divestiture of the American

[127 S.Ct. 1962] regulations to narrow the range of network
elements to be shared with the CLECs. See
CovadCommunications Co. v. FCC. 450 F.3d 528, 533-534
(CA.D.C.2006) (summarizing the IO-year-long regulatory
struggle between the ILECs and CLECs ).

Respondents William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus
(hereinafter plaintiffs) represent a putative class consisting
of all "subscribers of local telephone and/or high speed
internet services ... from February 8, 19% to present."
Amended Complaint in No. 02 CIV. 10220 (GEL) (SDNY)
1 53, App. 28 (hereinafter Complaint). In this action against
petitioners, a group of ILECs, [l] plaintiffs seek treble
damages and declaratory and injunctive relief for claimed
violations of §1 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209,

as amended, 15 U. S. C. §1, which prohibits "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations."
The complaint alleges that the ILECs conspired to restrain
tra<;ie in two ways, each supposedly inflating charges for
local telephone and high-speed Internet services. Plaintiffs
say, first, that the ILECs "engaged in parallel conduct" in
their respective service areas to inhibit the growth of upstart
CLECs. Complaint 1f 47, App. 23-26. Their actions
allegedly included making unfair agreements with the
CLECs for access to ILEC networks, providing inferior
connections to the networks, overcharging, and billing in
ways designed to sabotage the CLECs' relations with their
own customers. Ibid. According to the complaint, the
ILECs'
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"compelling common motivatio[n]" to thwart the CLECs'
competitive efforts naturally led them to form a conspiracy;
"[h]ad any one [ILEC] not sought to prevent CLECs ... from
competing effectively ... , the resulting greater competitive
inroads into that [ILEC's] territory would have revealed the
degree to which competitive entry by CLECs would have
been successful in the other territories in the absence of
such conduct." Id., 1f 50, App. 26-27.
Second, the complaint charges agreements by the ILECs to
refrain from competing against one another. These are to be
inferred from the ILECs' common failure "meaningfully
[to] pursu[e]" "attractive business opportunit[ies]" in
contiguous markets where they possessed "substantial
competitive advantages," id., ff 40-41, App. 21-22, and
from a statement of Richard Notebaert, chief executive
officer (CEO) of the ILEC Qwest, that competing in the
territory of another ILEC " 'might be a good way to turn a
quick dollar but that doesn't make it right,' " id., 1f 42, App.
22.
The complaint couches its ultimate allegations this way:
"In the absence of any meaningful competition between
the [ILECs] in one another's markets, and in light of the
parallel course of conduct that each engaged in to prevent
competition from CLECs within their respective local
telephone and/or high speed internet services markets and
the other facts and market circumstances alleged above,
Plaintiffs allege upon information
(127 S.Ct. 1963) and belief that [the ILECs] have entered
into a contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent
competitive entry in their respective local telephone and/or
high speed internet services markets and have agreed not to
compete with one another and otherwise allocated
customers and markets to one another." Id., 'I[ 51, App. 27.

[2]
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The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. The District Court
acknowledged that "plaintiffs may allege a conspiracy by
citing instances of parallel business behavior that suggest an
agreement," but emphasized that "while '[c]ircumstantial
evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made
heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward
conspiracy[, ... ] "conscious parallelism" has not yet read
conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.' " 313
F.Supp.2d 174, 179 (2003) (quoting Theatre Enterprises,
Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537,
541, 74 S.Ct. 257, 98 L.Ed. 273 (1954); alterations in
original). Thus, the District Court understood that
allegations of parallel business conduct, taken alone, do not
state a claim under § l; plaintiffs must allege additional facts
that "ten[d] to exclude independent self-interested conduct
as an explanation for defendants' parallel behavior.'' 313
F.Supp.2d, at 179. The District Court found plaintiffs'
allegations of parallel ILEC actions to discourage
competition inadequate because "the behavior of each ILEC
in resisting the incursion ofCLECs is fully explained by the
ILEC's own interests in defending its individual territory."
Id., at 183. As to the ILECs' supposed agreement against
competing with each other, the District Court found that the
complaint does not "alleg[e] facts . . . suggesting that
refraining from competing in other territories as CLECs was
contrary to [the ILECs'] apparent economic interests, and
consequently [does] not rais[e] an inference that [the
ILECs'] actions were the result of a conspiracy." Id., at 188.
Page 553

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
holding that the District Court tested the complaint by the
wrong standard. It held that "plus factors are not required to
be pleaded to permit an antitrust claim based on parallel
conduct to survive dismissal." 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2005)
(emphasis in original). Although the Court of Appeals took
the view that plaintiffs must plead facts that "include
conspiracy among the realm of 'plausible' possibilities in
order to survive a motion to dismiss," it then said that "to
rule that allegations of parallel anticompetitive conduct fail
to support a plausible conspiracy claim, a court would have
to conclude that there is no set of facts that would permit a
plaintiff to demonstrate that the particular parallelism
asserted was the product of collusion rather than
coincidence." Ibid.
We granted certiorari to address the proper standard for
pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of
parallel conduct, 547 U.S. 903, 126 S.Ct. 2965, 165

L.Ed.2d 949 (2006), and now reverse.
[127 S.Ct 1964] II
A
&cause §1 of the Sherman Act "does not prohibit [all]
unreasonable restraints of trade . . . but only restraints
effected by a contract, combination, or conspiracy,"
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S.
752, 775, 104 S.Ct. 2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984), "[t]he
crucial question" is whether the challenged anticompetitive
conduct "stem[s] from independent decision or from an
agreement, tacit or express," Theatre Enterprises, 346 U.S.
at 540, 74 S.Ct. 257. While a showing of parallel "business
behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence from which
the fact finder may infer agreement," it falls short of
"conclusively establish[ing] agreement or . . . itself
constitut[ing] a Sherman Act offense." Id., at 540-541, 74
S.Ct. 257. Even "conscious parallelism," a common
reaction of "firms in a concentrated market [that]
recogniz[ e] their shared economic interests and their
interdependence with respect to price and output decisions

Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 104 S.Ct. 1464, 79 L.Ed.2d 775
(1984); and at the summary judgment stage a §1 plaintiff's
offer of conspiracy evidence must tend to rule out the
possibility that the defendants were acting independently,
see Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
B
This case presents the antecedent question of what a
plaintiff must plead in order to state a claim under § l of the

Page555
Sherman Act. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)
requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," in order to
"give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests," Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). While a
complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
does not need detailed factual allegations, ibid.; Saryuan v.
American Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d
247, 251 (C.A.7 1994), a plaintiffs obligation to provide the
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is "not in itself unlawful." Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227, 113 S.Ct
2578, 125 L.Ed.2d 168 (1993); see 6 P. Areeda & H.
Hovenkarnp, Antitrust Law ,r 1433a, p. 236 (2d ed. 2003)
(hereinafter Areeda & Hovenkamp) ("The courts are nearly
unanimous in saying that mere interdependent parallelism
does not establish the contract, combination, or conspiracy
required by Sherman Act § l "); Turner, The Definition of
Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism
and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 672 (l %2)
("[M]ere interdependence of basic price decisions is not
conspiracy").
The inadequacy of showing parallel conduct or
interdependence, without more, mirrors the ambiguity of
the behavior: consistent with conspiracy, but just as much
in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive
business strategy unilaterally prompted by common
perceptions of the market. See, e.g., AEI-Brookings Joint
Center for Regulatory Studies, Epstein, Motions to Dismiss
Antitrust Cases: Separating Fact from Fantasy, Related
Publication 06-08, pp. 3-4 (2006) (discussing problem of
"false positives" in §1 suits). Accordingly, we have
previously hedged against false inferences from identical
behavior at a number of points in the trial sequence. An
antitrust conspiracy plaintiff with evidence showing nothing
beyond parallel conduct is not entitled to a directed verdict,
see Theatre Enterprises, supra; proof of a § l conspiracy
must include evidence tending to exclude the possibility of
independent action, see Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service

[127 S.Ct. 1965) "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief'
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,
see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932,
92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts "are
not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation"). Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level, see 5 C.
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §1216,
pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004) (hereinafter Wright & Miller)
("[T]he pleading must contain something more ... than ...
a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a
legally cognizable right of action"), [3] on the assumption
that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if
doubtful in fact), see, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.,
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534 U.S. 506, 508, n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1
(2002); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct.
1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) ("Rule I2(b)(6) does not
countenance ... dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a
complaint's factual allegations"); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (a
well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it appears "that
a recovery is very remote and unlikely").
In applying these general standards to a § I claim, we hold
that stating such a claim requires a complaint with enough
factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement
was made. Asking for plausible grounds to infer an
agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the

pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence
of illegal agreement. [4] And, of course, a well-pleaded
complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that
actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable, and "that a
recovery is very remote and unlikely." Ibid. In identifying
facts that are suggestive enough to render a §1 conspiracy
plausible, we have the benefit

[127 S.Ct. 1%6] of the prior rulings and considered views
of leading commentators, already quoted, that lawful
parallel conduct fails to be- speak unlawful agreement. It
makes sense to say, therefore, that an allegation of parallel
conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice.
Without
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more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and a
conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified
point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality.
Hence, when allegations of parallel conduct are set out in
order to make a §l claim, they must be placed in a context
that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not
merely parallel conduct that could just as well be
independent action.
The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly
suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement reflects
the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the "plain
statement" possess enough heft to "sho[w] that the pleader
is entitled to relief." A statement of parallel conduct, even
conduct consciously undertaken, needs some setting
suggesting the agreement necessary to make out a § l claim;
without that further circumstance pointing toward a meeting
of the minds, an account of a defendant's commercial
efforts stays in neutral territory. An allegation of parallel
conduct is thus much like a naked assertion of conspiracy in
a §1 complaint: it gets the complaint close to stating a
claim, but without some further factual enhancement it
stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
"entitle[ment] to relief." Cf. DM Research, Inc.v.College of
Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 56 (C.A. l 1999) ("[T]erms
like 'conspiracy,' or even 'agreement,' are border-line: they
might well be sufficient in conjunction with a more specific
allegation-for example, identifying a written agreement or
even a basis for inferring a tacit agreement, ... but a court
is not required to accept such terms as a sufficient basis for
a complaint''.) .. [5]
We alluded to the practical significance of the Rule 8
entitlement requirement in DuraPharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577
(2005), when we explained that something beyond the mere
possibility ofloss causation must be
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alleged, lest a plaintiff with " 'a largely groundless claim' "
be allowed to " 'take up the time of a number of other
people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem
increment of the settlement value.' " Id., at 347, 125 S.Ct.
1627 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 741, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975)). So,
when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could
not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, " 'this basic
deficiency should ... be exposed at the point of minimum
expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.'
" 5 Wright & Miller §1216, at 233-234 (quoting Daves v.
Hawaiian Dredging Co., 114 F.Supp. 643, 645
(D.Hawail953)); see also Dura, supra, at 346, 125 S.Ct.
1627;Asahi Glass Co. v. PentechPharmaceuticals, Inc., 289
F.Supp.2d 986, 995 (N.D.Ill. 2003) (Posner, J., sitting by
designation) ("[S]ome threshold of plausibility must be
crossed at the outset before a patent antitrust case should be
permitted to go into its inevitably costly and protracted
discovery phase").
Thus, it is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an
antitrust complaint in advance of discovery, cf. Poller v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82
S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d458 (1962)

[127 S.Ct. 1967) , but quite another to forget that
proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive. As we
indicated over 20 years ago in Associated Gen. Contractors
of Cal., Inc.v.Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528, n. 17, 103
S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983), "a district court must
retain the power to insist upon some specificity in pleading
before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to
proceed." See also Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (C.A.7 1984) ("[11he costs of modern
federal antitrust litigation and the increasing caseload of the
federal courts counsel against sending the parties into
discovery when there is no reasonable likelihood that the
plaintiffs can construct a claim from the events related in
the complaint"); Note, Modeling the Effect of One-Way Fee
Shifting on Discovery Abuse in Private Antitrust Litigation,
78 N. Y. & U. L. Rev. 1887, 1898-1899 (2003) (discussing
the unusually high cost of discovery in antitrust cases);
Manual for Complex Litigation
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, Fourth, §30, p. 519 (2004) (describing extensive scope of
discovery in antitrust cases); Memorandum from Paul V.
Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to
Hon. Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure (May 11, 1999), 192 F. R. D. 354,
357 (2000) (reporting that discovery accounts for as much
as 90 percent of litigation costs when discovery is actively
employed). That potential expense is obvious enough in the

present case: plaintiffs represent a putative class of at least
90 percent of all subscribers to local telephone or
high-speed Internet service in the continental United States,
in an action against America's largest telecommunications
firms (with many thousands of employees generating reams
and gigabytes of business records) for unspecified (if any)
instances of antitrust violations that allegedly occurred over
a period of seven years.

It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible
entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early
in the discovery process through "careful case
management," post at 573, given the common lament that
the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery
abuse has been on the modest side. See, e.g., Easterbrook,
Discovery as Abuse, 69 B. U. L. Rev. 635, 638 (1989)
("Judges can do little about impositional discovery when
parties control the legal claims to be presented and conduct
the discovery themselves"). And it is self-evident that the
problem of discovery abuse cannot be solved by "careful
scrutiny of evidence at the summary judgment stage," much
less "lucid instructions to juries," post, at 573; the threat of
discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to
settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings.
Probably, then, it is only by taking care to require
allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that
we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of
discover; in cases with no " 'reasonably founded hope that
the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence' " to
support a § I claim. Dura,
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supra, at 347, 125 S.Ct 1627 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps,
supra, at 741, 95 S.Ct. 1917; alteration in Dura). [61
[127 S.Ct. 1968] Plaintiffs do not, of course, dispute the
requirement of plausibility and the need for something more
than merely parallel behavior explained in Theatre
Enterprises, Monsanto, and Matsushita, and their main
argument against the plausibility standard at the pleading
stage is its ostensible
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conflict with an early statement of ours construing Rule 8.
Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Conley v. Gibson
spoke not only of the need for fair notice of the grounds for
entitlement to relief but of "the accepted rule that a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief." 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99. This
"no set of facts" language can be read in isolation as saying
that any statement revealing the theory of the claim will
suffice unless its factual impossibility may be shown from

the face of the pleadings; and the Court of Appeals appears
to have read Conley in some such way when formulating its
understanding of the proper pleading standard, see 425
F.3d, at 106, 114 (invoking Conley's "no set of facts"
language in describing the standard for dismissal). (7]
On such a focused and literal reading of Conley's "no set of
facts," a wholly conclusory statement of claim would
survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left
open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish
some "set of [undisclosed] facts" to support recovery. So
here, the Court of Appeals specifically found the prospect
of unearthing direct evidence of conspiracy sufficient to
preclude dismissal, even though the complaint

(127 S.Ct 1969) does not set forth a single
Page 562
fact in a context that suggests an agreement. 425 F.3d, at
106, 114. It seems fair to say that this approach to pleading
would dispense with any showing of a " 'reasonably
founded hope' " that a plaintiff would be able to make a
case, see Dura, 544 U.S. at 347, 125 S.Ct. 1627 (quoting
Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 741, 95 S.Ct. 1917); Mr.
Micawber's optimism would be enough.
Seeing this, a good many judges and commentators have
balked at taking the literal terms of the Conley passage as a
pleading standard. See, e.g., Car Carriers, 745 F.2d, at
1106 ("Conley has never been interpreted literally" and,
"[i]n practice, a complaint ... must contain either direct or
inferential allegations respecting all the material elements
necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal
theory" (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis and
omission in original); AsconProperties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil
Co., 866 F.2d ll49, ll55 (C.A.9 1989) (tension between
Conley's "no set of facts" language and its acknowledgment
that a plaintiff must provide the "grounds" on which his
claim rests); O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546, n. 3
(C.A. l 1976) ("(W]hen a plaintiff . . . supplies facts to
support his claim, we do not think that Conley imposes a
duty on the courts to conjure up unpleaded facts that might
tum a frivolous claim of unconstitutional . . . action into a
substantial one"); McGregor v. Industrial Excess Landfill,
Inc., 856 F.2d 39, 42-43 (C.A.6 1988) (quoting O'Brien's
analysis); Hazard, From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76
Tex. L. Rev. 1665, 1685 (1998) (describing Conley as
having "turned Rule 8 on its head"); Marcus, The Revival
of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 433, 463-465 (1986) (noting
tension between Conley and subsequent understandings of
Rule 8).
We could go on, but there is no need to pile up further
citations to show that Conley's "no set of facts" language

has been questioned, criticized, and explained away long
enough. To be fair to the Conley Court, the passage should
be understood in light of the opinion's preceding summary
of the complaint
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's concrete allegations, which the Court quite reasonably
understood as amply stating a claim for relief. But the
passage so often quoted fails to mention this understanding
on the part of the Court, and after puzzling the profession
for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its
retirement. The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete,
negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a
claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by
showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in
the complaint. See Sanjuan, 40 F.3d, at 251 (once a claim
for relief has been stated, a plaintiff "receives the benefit of
imagination, so long as the hypotheses are consistent with
the complaint"); accord, Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514, 122
S.Ct. 992; National Organization for Women, Inc. v.
Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256, 114 S.Ct. 798, 127 L.Ed.2d
99 (1994); H J. Jnc.v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
492 U.S. 229, 249-250, 109 S.ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195
(1989); Hishon v. King &Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104
S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). Conley, then, described
the breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate
complaint claims, not the minimum standard of adequate
pleading to govern a complaint's survival. [8]
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markets and have agreed not to compete with one another."
Complaint ,i 51, App. 27.(10] The nub of the
(127 S.Ct. 1971] complaint, then, is the ILECs' parallel
behavior, consisting of steps to keep the CLECs out and
manifest disinterest in becoming CLECs themselves, and its
sufficiency turns on the suggestions raised by this conduct
when viewed in light of common economic experience. [ 11]
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We think that nothing contained in the complaint invests
either the action or inaction alleged with a plausible
suggestion of conspiracy. As to the ILECs' supposed
agreement to disobey the 1996 Act and thwart the CLECs'
attempts to compete, we agree with the District Court that
nothing in the complaint intimates that the resistance to the
upstarts was anything more than the natural, unilateral
reaction of each ILEC intent on keeping its regional
dominance. The 1996 Act did more than just subject the
ILECs to competition; it obliged them to subsidize their
competitors with their own equipment at wholesale rates.
The economic incentive to resist was powerful, but resisting
competition is routine market conduct, and even if the
ILECs flouted the 1996 Act in all the ways the plaintiffs
allege, see id, ,i 47, App. 23-24, there is no reason to infer
that the companies had agreed among themselves to do
what was only natural anyway; so natural, in fact, that if
alleging parallel decisions to resist competition were
enough to imply an antitrust conspiracy, pleading a §1
violation against almost any group of competing businesses
would be a sure thing.

III
(127 S.Ct. 1970)

When we look for plausibility in this complaint, we agree
with the District Court that plaintiffs' claim of conspiracy in
restraint of trade comes up short. To begin with, the
complaint leaves no doubt that plaintiffs rest their §1 claim
on descriptions of parallel conduct and not on any
independent allegation of actual agreement among the
ILECs. Supra, at 550-551. Although in form a few stray
statements speak directly of agreement,[9]on fair reading
these are merely legal conclusions resting on the prior
allegations. Thus, the complaint
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first takes account of the alleged "absence of any
meaningful competition between [the ILECs] in one
another's markets," "the parallel course of conduct that each
[ILEC] engaged in to prevent competition from CLECs,"
"and the other facts and market circumstances alleged
[earlier]"; "in light of' these, the complaint concludes "that
[the ILECs] have entered into a contract, combination or
conspiracy to prevent competitive entry into their . . .

The complaint makes its closest pass at a predicate for
conspiracy with the claim that collusion was necessary
because success by even one CLEC in an ILEC's territory
"would have revealed the degree to which competitive entry
by CLECs would have been successful in the other
territories." Id, ,i 50, App. 26-27. But, its logic aside, this
general premise still fails to answer the point that there was
just no need for joint encouragement to resist the 1996 Act;
as the District Court said, "each ILEC has reason to want to
avoid dealing with CLECs" and "each ILEC would attempt
to keep CLECs out, regardless of the actions of the other
ILECs." 313 F.Supp.2d, at 184; cf. Kramer v.
Pollock-Krasner Foundation, 890 F.Supp. 250, 256
(S.D.N.Y.1995) (while the plaintiff "may believe the
defendants conspired . . ., the defendants' allegedly
conspiratorial actions
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could equally have been prompted by lawful, independent
goals which do not constitute a conspiracy").[12]
[127 S.Ct. 1972] Plaintiffs' second conspiracy theory rests
on the competitive reticence among the ILECs themselves

in the wake of the 1996 Act, which was supposedly passed
in the " 'hop[e] that the large incumbent local monopoly
companies ... might attack their neighbors' service areas,
as they are the best situated to do so.' " Complaint ,r 38,
App. 20 ( quoting Consumer Federation of America,
Lessons from 1996 Telecommunications Act: Deregulation
Before Meaningful Competition Spells Consumer Disaster,
p. 12 (Feb. 2000)). Contrary to hope, the ILECs declined "
'to enter each other's service territories in any significant
way,' " Complaint ,r 38, App. 20, and the local telephone
and high speed Internet market remains highly
compartmentalized
geographically,
with
minimal
competition. Based on this state of affairs, and perceiving
the ILECs to be blessed with "especially attractive business
opportunities" in surrounding markets dominated by other
ILECs, the plaintiffs assert that the ILECs' parallel conduct
was "strongly suggestive of conspiracy." Id., ,r 40, App. 21.
But it was not suggestive of conspiracy, not if history
teaches anything. In a traditionally unregulated industry
with low barriers to entry, sparse competition among large
firms dominating separate geographical segments of the
market could very well signify illegal agreement, but here
we have an obvious alternative explanation. In the decade
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preceding the 1996 Act and well before that, monopoly
was the norm in telecommunications, not the exception. See
VerizonCornrnunications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467,
477-478, 122 S.Ct. 1646, 152 L.Ed.2d 701 (2002)
(describing telephone service providers as traditional public
monopolies). The ILECs were born in that world, doubtless
liked the world the way it was, and surely knew the adage
about him who lives by the sword. Hence, a natural
explanation for the noncompetition alleged is that the
former Government-sanctioned monopolists were sitting
tight, expecting their neighbors to do the same thing.
In fact, the complaint itself gives reasons to believe that
the ILECs would see their best interests in keeping to their
old turf. Although the complaint says generally that the
ILECs passed up "especially attractive business
opportunit[ies]" by declining to compete as CLECs against
other ILECs, Complaint ,r 40, App. 21, it does not allege
that competition as CLECs was potentially any more
lucrative than other opportunities being pursued by the
ILECs during the same period,[13]and
[127 S.Ct. 1973) the complaint is replete with indications
that any CLEC faced nearly insurmountable barriers to
profitability owing to the ILECs' flagrant resistance to the
network sharing requirements of the 1996 Act, id., ,r 47;
App.
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23-26. Not only that, but even without a monopolistic
tradition and the peculiar difficulty of mandating shared
networks, "[t]irrns do not expand without limit and none of
them enters every market that an outside observer might
regard as profitable, or even a small portion of such
markets." Areeda & Hovenkamp ,r 307d, at 155 (Supp.
2006) (commenting on the case at bar). The upshot is that
Congress may have expected some ILECs to become
CLECs in the legacy territories of other ILECs, but the
disappointment does not make conspiracy plausible. We
agree with the District Court's assessment that antitrust
conspiracy was not suggested by the facts adduced under
either theory of the complaint, which thus fails to state a
valid §1 clairn.[14]
Plaintiffs say that our analysis runs counter to
Swierkiewicz v. SorernaN. A., 534 U.S. at 508, 122 S.Ct.
992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002), which held that "a complaint in
an employment discrimination lawsuit [need] not contain
specific facts establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination under the framework set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792[, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36
L.Ed.2d 668] (1973)." They argue that just as the prima
facie case is a "flexible evidentiary standard" that "should
not be transposed into a rigid pleading standard for
discrimination cases," Swierkiewicz, supra, at 512, 122
S.Ct. 992, "transpos[ing] 'plus factor' summary judgment
analysis woodenly into a rigid Rule 12(b)(6) pleading
standard ... would be unwise," Brief for Respondents 39.
As the District Court
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correctly understood, however, "Swierkiewicz did not
· change the law of pleading, but simply re-emphasized ...
that the Second Circuit's use of a heightened pleading
standard for Title VII cases was contrary to the Federal
Rules' structure of liberal pleading requirements." 313
F.Supp.2d, at 181 (citation and footnote omitted). Even
though Swierkiewicz's pleadings "detailed the events
leading to his termination, provided relevant dates, and
included the ages and nationalities of at least some of the
relevant persons involved with his termination," the Court
of Appeals dismissed his complaint for failing to allege
certain additional facts that Swierkiewicz would need at the
trial stage to support his claim in the absence of direct
evidence of discrimination. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514,
122 S.Ct. 992. We reversed on the ground that the Court of
Appeals had impermissibly applied what amounted to a
heightened pleading requirement by insisting that
Swierkiewicz allege "specific facts" beyond [127 S.Ct.
1974] those necessary to state his claim and the grounds
showing entitlement to relief. Id., at 508, 122 S.Ct. 992.
Here, in contrast, we do not require heightened fact
pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face. Because the plaintiffs
here have not nudged their claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed

petitioner Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs)
have assiduously avoided infringing upon each other's
markets and have

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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It is so ordered.

Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice GINSBURG joins
except as to Part IV, dissenting.
In the first paragraph of its 23-page opinion the Court
states that the question to be decided is whether allegations
that "major telecommunications providers engaged in
certain
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parallel conduct unfavorable to competition" suffice to
state a violation of§ l of the Sherman Act. Ante, at 548-549.
The answer to that question has been settled for more than
50 years. If that were indeed the issue, a summary reversal
citing Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film
Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 74 S.Ct. 257, 98 L.Ed.
273 (1954), would adequately resolve this case. As Theatre
Enterprises held, parallel conduct is circumstantial evidence
admissible on the issue of conspiracy, but it is not itself
illegal. Id., at 540-542, 74 S.Ct. 257.
Thus, this is a case in which there is no dispute about the
substantive law. If the defendants acted independently, their
conduct was perfectly lawful. If, however, that conduct is
the product of a horizontal agreement among potential
competitors, it was unlawful. Plaintiffs have alleged such an
agreement and, because the complaint was dismissed in
advance of answer, the allegation has not even been denied.
Why, then, does the case not proceed? Does a judicial
opinion that the charge is not "plausible" provide a legally
acceptable reason for dismissing the complaint? I think not.
Respondents' amended complaint describes a variety of
circumstantial evidence and makes the straightforward
allegation that petitioners
"entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy to
prevent competitive entry in their respective local telephone
and/or high speed internet services markets and have agreed
not to compete with one another and otherwise allocated
customers and markets to one another." Amended
Complaint in No. 02 CIV. 10220 (GEL) (SDNY) i! 51, App.
27 (hereinafter Complaint).
The complaint explains that, contrary to Congress'
expectation when it enacted the 1996 Telecommunications
Act, and consistent with their own economic self-interests,

refused to permit nonincumbent competitors to access their
networks. The complaint quotes Richard Notebaert, the
former CEO of one such ILEC, as saying that competing in
a neighboring ILEC's territory "might be a good way to turn
a quick dollar but that doesn't make it right." Id., ,i 42, App.
22. Moreover, respondents allege that petitioners
"communicate amongst themselves" through numerous
industry associations. Id., ,i 46, App. 23. In sum,
respondents allege that petitioners entered into an
agreement that has long been recognized as a classic per se
violation of the Sherman Act. See Report
(127 S.Ct. 1975) of the Attorney General's National
Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 26 ( 1955).
Under rules of procedure that have been well settled since
well before our decision in Theatre Enterprises, a judge
ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss a complaint,
"must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained
in the complaint." Swierkiewicz v. SoremaN. A., 534 U.S.
506, 508, n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); see
Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 127, 63
S.Ct. 494, 87 L.Ed. 656 (1943). But instead of requiring
knowledgeable executives such as Notebaert to respond to
these allegations by way of sworn depositions or other
limited discovery--and indeed without so much as requiring
petitioners to file an answer denying that they entered into
any agreement--the majority permits immediate dismissal
based on the assurances of company lawyers that nothing
untoward was afoot. The Court embraces the argument of
those lawyers that "there is no reason to infer that the
companies had agreed among themselves to do what was
only natural anyway," ante, at 566; that "there was just no
need for joint encouragement to resist the 1996 Act," Ibid.;
and that the "natural explanation for the noncompetition
alleged is that the former Government-sanctioned
monopolists were sitting tight, expecting their neighbors to
do the same thing," ante, at 568.
The Court and petitioners' legal team are no doubt correct
that the parallel conduct alleged is consistent with the
absence
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of any contract, combination, or conspiracy. But that
conduct is also entirely consistent with the presence of the
illegal agreement alleged in the complaint. And the charge
that petitioners "agreed not to compete with one another" is
not just one of"a few stray statements," ante, at 564; it is an
allegation describing unlawful conduct. As such, the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, our longstanding
precedent, and sound practice mandate that the District
Court at least require some sort of response from petitioners
before dismissing the case.
Two practical concerns presumably explain the Court's
dramatic departure from settled procedural law. Private
antitrust litigation can be enormously expensive, and there
is a risk that jurors may mistakenly conclude that evidence
of parallel conduct has proved that the parties acted
pursuant to an agreement when they in fact merely made
similar independent decisions. Those concerns merit careful
case management, including strict control of discovery,
careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary judgment stage,
and lucid instructions to juries; they do not, however, justify
the dismissal of an adequately pleaded complaint without
even requiring the defendants to file answers denying a
charge that they in fact engaged in collective
decisionmaking. More importantly, they do not justify an
interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
that seems to be driven by the majority's appraisal of the
plausibility of the ultimate factual allegation rather than its
legal sufficiency.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules requires that a complaint
contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief." The rule did not come
about by happenstance and its language is not inadvertent.
The English experience with Byzantine special pleading
rules--illustrated by the hypertechnical Hilary rules of

"conclusions," a distinction that proved far easier to say
than to apply. As commentators have noted,
"it is virtually impossible logically to distinguish among
'ultimate facts,' 'evidence,' and 'conclusions.' Essentially any
allegation in a pleading must be an assertion that certain
occurrences took place. The pleading spectrum, passing
from evidence through ultimate facts to conclusions, is
largely a continuum varying only in the degree of
particularity with which the occurrences are described."
Weinstein & Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform:
Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 518, 520-521
(1957).
See also Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the
Codes, 21 Colum. L. Rev. 416, 417 (1921) (hereinafter
Cook) ("[T]here is no logical distinction between statements
which are grouped by the courts under the phrases
'statements of
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fact' and 'conclusions of law' "). Rule 8 was directly
responsive to this difficulty. Its drafters intentionally
avoided any reference to "facts" or "evidence" or
"conclusions.'' See 5 C. Wright & A Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure §1216, p. 207 (3d ed. 2004)
(hereinafter Wright & Miller) ("The substitution of 'claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief for the code
formulation of the 'facts' constituting a 'cause of action' was
intended to avoid the distinctions drawn under the codes
among 'evidentiary facts,' 'ultimate facts,' and 'conclusions' .
.. ").
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1834[l]made obvious

[127 S.Ct. 1976) the appeal of a pleading standard that was
easy for the common litigant to understand and sufficed to
put the defendant on notice as to the nature of the claim
against him and the relief sought. Stateside, David Dudley
Field developed the highly influential New York Code of
1848, which required "[a] statement of the facts constituting
the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language,
without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a
person of common understanding to know what is
intended." An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice,
Pleadings and Proceedings of the Courts of this State, ch.
379, §120(2), 1848 N. Y. Laws pp. 497, 521. Substantially
similar language appeared in the Federal Equity Rules
adopted in 1912. See Fed. Equity Rule 25 (requiring "a
short and simple statement of the ultimate facts upon which
the plaintiff asks relief, omitting any mere statement of
evidence").
A difficulty arose, however, in that the Field Code and its
progeny required a plaintiff to plead "facts" rather than

Under the relaxed pleading standards of the Federal Rules,
the idea was not to keep litigants out of court but rather to
keep them in. The merits of a claim would be sorted out
during a flexible pretrial process and, as appropriate,
through the crucible of trial. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at
514, 122 S.Ct. 992 ("The liberal notice pleading of Rule
8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system,
which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a
claim"). Charles E. Clark, the "principal draftsman" of the
Federal Rules,[2]put it thus:
"Experience has shown ... that we cannot expect the proof
of the case to be made through the pleadings, and that such
proof is really not their function. We can expect a general
statement distinguishing the case from all others, so that the
manner and form of trial and remedy expected are clear,
and so that a permanent judgment will result." The

[127 S.Ct. 1977] New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
The Last Phase-Underlying Philosophy Embodied in Some
of the Basic Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 A. B. A.
J. 976, 977 (1937) (hereinafter Clark, New Federal Rules).

The pleading paradigm under the new Federal Rules was
well illustrated by the inclusion in the appendix of Form 9,
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a complaint for negligence. As relevant, the Form 9
complaint states only: "On June 1, 1936, in a public
highway called Boylston Street in Boston, Massachusetts,
defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against
plaintiff who was then crossing said highway." Form 9,
Complaint for Negligence, Forms App., Fed. Rules Civ.
Proc., 28 U. S. C. App., p. 829 (hereinafter Form 9). The
complaint then describes the plaintiff's injuries and
demands judgment. The asserted ground for relief-namely,
the defendant's negligent driving-would have been called a
" 'conclusion of law' " under the code pleading of old. See,
e.g., Cook 419. But that bare allegation suffices under a
system that "restrict[s] the pleadings to the task of general
notice-giving and invest[s] the deposition-discovery process
with a vital role in the preparation for trial."[3]Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451
(1947); see also Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513, n. 4, 122
S.Ct. 992 (citing Form 9 as an example of " 'the simplicity
and brevity of statement which the rules contemplate' ");
Thomson v. Washington, 362 F.3d 969, 970 (C.A.7 2004)
(Posner, J.) ("The federal rules replaced fact pleading with
notice pleading").

true, would entitle him to relief, matters of proof are
appropriately relegated to other stages of the trial process.
Today, however, in its explanation of a decision to dismiss
a complaint that it regards as a fishing expedition, the Court
scraps Conley's "no set of facts" language. Concluding that
the phrase has been "questioned, criticized, and explained
away long enough," ante, at 562, the Court dismisses it as
careless composition.
[127 S.Ct. 1978] If Conleys "no set offacts" language is to
be interred, let it not be without a eulogy. That exact
language, which the majority says has "puzzl[ed] the
profession for 50 years," ante, at 563. has been cited as
authority in a dozen opinions of this Court and four separate
writings.[4]In not one of
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those 16 opinions was the language "questioned,"
"criticized," or "explained away." Indeed, today's opinion is
the first by any Member of this Court to express any doubt
as to the adequacy of the Conley formulation. Taking their
cues from the federal courts, 26 States and the District of
Columbia utilize as their standard for dismissal of a
complaint the very language the majority repudiates:
whether it appears "beyond doubt" that "no set of facts" in
support of the claim would entitle the plaintiff to relief.[5]

II
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It is in the context of this history that Conley v. Gibson,

[127 S.Ct. 1979] Petitioners have not requested that the
Conley formulation be retired, nor have any of the six amici
who filed briefs in support of petitioners. I would not
rewrite the Nation's civil procedure textbooks and call into
doubt the pleading rules of most of its States without far
more informed deliberation as to the costs of doing so.
Congress has established a process--a rulemaking
process-for revisions of that order. See 28 U. S. C.
§§2072-2074 (2000 ed. and Supp. IV).

355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), must be
understood. The Conley plaintiffs were black railroad
workers who alleged that their union local had refused to
protect them against discriminatory discharges, in violation
of the National Railway Labor Act. The union sought to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that its general
allegations of discriminatory treatment by the defendants
lacked sufficient specificity. Writing
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for a unanimous Court, Justice Black rejected the union's
claim as foreclosed by the language of Rule 8. Id, at 47-48,
78 S.Ct. 99. 1n the course of doing so, he articulated the
formulation the Court rejects today: "In appraising the
sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the
accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief." Id.. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct.
99.
Consistent with the design of the Federal Rules, Conley's
"no set of facts" formulation permits outright dismissal only
when proceeding to discovery or beyond would be futile.
Once it is clear that a plaintiff has stated a claim that, if

Today's majority calls Conley's " 'no set of facts' "
language "an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted
pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately,
it may
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be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with
the allegations in the complaint" Ante, at 563. This is not
and cannot be what the Conley Court meant. First, as I have
explained, and as the Conley Court well knew, the pleading
standard the Federal Rules meant to codify does not require,
or even invite, the pleading of facts.[6]The "pleading
standard" label the majority gives to what it reads into the
Conley opinion--a statement of the permissible factual
support for an adequately pleaded complaint--would not,
therefore, have impressed the Conley Court itself. Rather,

that Court would have understood the majority's remodeling
of its language to express an evidentiary standard, which the
Conley Court had neither need nor want to explicate.
Second, it is pellucidly clear that the Conley Court was
interested in what a complaint must contain, not what it may
contain. In fact, the Court said without qualification that it
was "appraising the sufficiency of the complaint" 355 U.S.
at 45, 78 S.Ct. 99

[127 S.Ct. 1980] (emphasis added). It was, to paraphrase
today's majority, describing "the minimum standard of
adequate pleading to govern a complaint's survival," ante, at
563.
We can be triply sure as to Conley's meaning by examining
the three Court of Appeals cases the Conley Court cited as
support for the "accepted rule" that "a complaint should not
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be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." 3 55
U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99. In the first case, Leimer v. State
Mut.Life Assur. Co. of Worcester, Mass., 108 F.2d 302
(C.A.8 1940), the plaintiff alleged that she was the
beneficiary of a life insurance plan and that the insurance
company was wrongfully withholding proceeds from her. In
reversing the District Court's grant of the defendant's
motion to dismiss, the Eighth Circuit noted that court's own
longstanding rule that, to warrant dismissal, " 'it should
appear from the allegations that a cause of action does not
exist, rather than that a cause of action has been defectively
stated.' "Id., at 305 (quoting Winget v. Rockwood, 69 F.2d
326, 329 (C.A.8 1934)).
The Leimer court viewed the Federal Rules--specifically
Rules 8(a)(2), 12(b)(6), I2(e) (motion for a more definite
statement), and 56 (motion for summary judgment)--as
reinforcing the notion that "there is no justification for
dismissing a complaint for insufficiency of statement,
except where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff
would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which
could be proved in support of the claim." 108 F.2d, at 306.
The court refuted in the strongest terms any suggestion that
the unlikelihood of recovery should determine the fate of a
complaint: "No matter how improbable it may be that she
can prove her claim, she is entitled to an opportunity to
make the attempt, and is not required to accept as final a
determination of her rights based upon inferences drawn in
favor of the defendant from her amended complaint." Ibid.
The Third Circuit relied
Continental Collieries, Inc. v.
which the Conley Court also
of facts" formulation. In a

on Leimer's admonition in
Shober, 130 F.2d 631 (1942),
cited in support of its "no set
diversity action the plaintiff

alleged breach of contract, but the District Court dismissed
the complaint on the ground that the contract appeared to be
unenforceable under state law. The Court of Appeals
reversed,
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concluding that there were facts in dispute that went to the
enforceability of the contract, and that the rule at the
pleading stage was as in Leimer: "No matter how likely it
may seem that the pleader will be unable to prove his case,
he is entitled, upon averring a claim, to an opportunity to try
to prove it." 130 F.3d, at 635.
The third case the Conley Court cited approvingly was
written by Judge Clark himself. In Dioguardi v. Durning,
139 F.2d 774 (C.A.2 1944), the prose plaintiff, an importer
of "tonics," charged the customs inspector with auctioning
off the plaintiffs former merchandise for less than was bid
for it--and indeed for an amount equal to the plaintiffs own
bid--and complained that two cases of tonics went missing
three weeks before the sale. The inference, hinted at by the
averments but never stated in so many words, was that the
defendant fraudulently denied the plaintiff his rightful claim
to the tonics, which, if true, would have violated federal
law. Writing six years after the adoption of the Federal
Rules he held the lead rein in drafting, Judge Clark said that
the defendant
"could have disclosed the facts from his point of view, in
advance of a trial if he

[127 S.Ct. 1981] chose, by asking for a pre-trial hearing or
by moving for a summary judgment with supporting
affidavits. But, as it stands, we do not see how the plaintiff
may properly be deprived of his day in court to show what
he obviously so firmly believes and what for present
purposes defendant must be taken as admitting." Id., at 775.
As any civil procedure student knows, Judge Clark's
opinion disquieted the defense bar and gave rise to a
movement to revise Rule 8 to require a plaintiff to plead a "
'cause of action.' " See 5 Wright & Miller §120 I, at 86-87.
The movement failed, see ibid.;Dioguardi was explicitly
approved in Conley; and "[i]n retrospect the case itself
seems to be a
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routine application of principles that are universally
accepted," 5 Wright & Miller § 1220, at 284- 285.
In light of Leimer, Continental Collieries, and Dioguardi,
Conley's statement that a complaint is not to be dismissed
unless "no set of facts" in support thereof would entitle the
plaintiff to relief is hardly "puzzling," ante, at 562-563. It
reflects a philosophy that, unlike in the days of code

can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants
have violated the antitrust laws in ways that have not been
alleged"); Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 383 (1961)
("ln the absence of ... an allegation [that the arrest was
made without probable cause] the courts below could not,
nor can we, assume that respondents arrested petitioner
without probable cause to believe that he had committed ...
a narcotics offense"). Nor are we reaching out to decide this
issue in a case where the matter was not raised by the
parties, see post, at 579, since both the ILECs and the
Government highlight the problems stemming from a literal
interpretation of Conley's "no set of facts" language and
seek clarification of the standard. Brief for Petitioners
27-28; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22-25; see
also Brief for Respondents 17 (describing "[p]etitioners and
their amici" as mounting an "attack on Conley's 'no set of
facts' standard").
The dissent finds relevance in Court of Appeals precedents
from the 1940s, which allegedly gave rise to Conley's "no
set of facts" language. See post, at 580-583. Even indulging
this line of analysis, these cases do not challenge the
understanding that, before proceeding to discovery, a
complaint must allege facts suggestive of illegal conduct.
See, e.g., Leimer v. State Mut.Life Assur. Co., l 08 F.2d 302,
305 (CA8 1940) (" '[I]f, in view of what is alleged, it can
reasonably be conceived that the plaintiffs ... could, upon a
trial, establish a case which would entitle them to ... relief,
the motion to dismiss should not have been granted' ");
Continental Collieries, Inc. v. Shober, 130 F.2d 631, 635
(CA3 1942) ("No matter how likely it may seem that the
pleader will be unable to prove his case, he is entitled, upon
averring a claim, to an opportunity to try to prove it").
Rather, these cases stand for the unobjectionable
proposition that, when a complaint adequately states a
claim, it may not be dismissed based on a district court's
assessment that the plaintiff will fail to find evidentiary
support for his allegations or prove his claim to the
satisfaction of the factfinder. Cf. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (a district court weighing a motion to
dismiss asks "not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail
but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to
support the claims").

mentioned no specific time, place, or person involved in the
alleged conspiracies. This lack of notice contrasts sharply
with the model form for pleading negligence, Form 9,
which the dissent says exemplifies the kind of "bare
allegation" that survives a motion to dismiss. Post, at 576.
Whereas the model form alleges that the defendant struck
the plaintiff with his car while plaintiff was crossing a
particular highway at a specified date and time, the
complaint here furnishes no clue as to which of the four
· ILECs (much less which of their employees) supposedly
agreed, or when and where the illicit agreement took place.
A defendant wishing to prepare an answer in the simple fact
pattern laid out in Form 9 would know what to answer; a
defendant seeking to respond to plaintiffs' conclusory
allegations in the § l context would have little idea where to
begin.
[I !]The dissent's quotations from the complaint leave the
impression that plaintiffs directly allege illegal agreement;
in fact, they proceed exclusively via allegations of parallel
conduct, as both the District Court and Court of Appeals
recognized. See 313 F.Supp.2d 174, 182 (SONY 2003); 425
F.3d 99, 102-104 (CA 2005).
[12]From the allegation that the ILECs belong to various
trade associations, see Complaint ,r 46, App. 23, the dissent
playfully suggests that they conspired to restrain trade, an
inference said to be "buttressed by the common sense of
Adam Smith." Post, at 591, 594. If Adam Smith is peering
down today, he may be surprised to learn that his
tongue-in-cheek remark would be authority to force his
famous pinmaker to devote financial and human capital to
hire lawyers, prepare for depositions, and otherwise fend off
allegations of conspiracy; all this just because he belonged
to the same trade guild as one of his competitors when their
pins carried the same price tag.

[9]See Complaint ,r ,r 51, 64, App. 27, 30-31 (alleging that
ILECs engaged in a "contract, combination or conspiracy"
and agreed not to compete with one another).

[13]The complaint quoted a reported statement of Qwest's
CEO, Richard Notebaert, to suggest that the ILECs declined
to compete against each other despite recognizing that it "
'might be a good way to tum a quick dollar.' " ,r 42, App. 22
(quoting Chicago Tribune, October 31, 2002, Business
Section, p. 1). This was only part of what he reportedly
said, however, and the District Court was entitled to take
notice of the full contents of the published articles
referenced in the complaint, from which the truncated
quotations were drawn. See Fed. Rule Evid. 201.

[IO]If the complaint had not explained that the claim of
agreement rested on the parallel conduct described, we
doubt that the complaint's references to an agreement
among the ILECs would have given the notice required by
Rule 8. Apart from identifying a seven-year span in which
the § 1 violations were supposed to have occurred (i.e.,
"[b]eginning at least as early as February 6, 1996, and
continuing to the present," id., ,r 64, App. 30), the pleadings

Notebaert was also quoted as saying that entering new
markets as a CLEC would not be "a sustainable economic
model" because the CLEC pricing model is "just ... nuts."
Chicago Tribune, October 31, 2002, Business Section, p. l
(cited at Complaint ,r 42, App. 22). Another source cited in
the complaint quotes Notebaert as saying he thought it
"unwise" to "base a business plan" on the privileges
accorded to CLECs under the 1996 Act because the

regulatory environment was too unstable. Chicago Tribune,
December 19, 2002, Business Section, p. 2 (cited at
Complaint ,r 45, App. 23).
[14]In reaching this conclusion, we do not apply any
"heightened" pleading standard, nor do we seek to broaden
the scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9, which can
only be accomplished " 'by the process of amending the
Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.' "
Swierkiewicz v. SoremaN A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002)
(quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168
(1993)). On certain subjects understood to raise a high risk
of abusive litigation, a plaintiff must state factual
allegations with greater particularity than Rule 8 requires.
Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 9(b)-(c). Here, our concern is not that
the allegations in the complaint were insufficiently
"particular[ized]", ibid.; rather, the complaint warranted
dismissal because it failed in toto to render plaintiffs'
entitlement to relief plausible.
[1] See 9 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 324-327
(1926).
[2] GulfstreamAerospace Corp. v. MayacamasCorp., 485
U.S. 271,283 (1988).
[3]The Federal Rules do impose a "particularity"
requirement on "all averments of fraud or mistake," Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 9(b ), neither of which has been alleged in
this case. We have recognized that the canon of
expresiounius est exclusio alterius applies to Rule 9(b). See
Leather-man v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence and
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
[4]SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 818 (2002); Davis v.
MonroeCountyBd.of Ed., 526 U.S. 629, 654 (1999);
HartfordFire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 811
(1993); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598
(1989); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980) {per
curiam); McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc.,
444 U.S. 232, 246 (1980); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
Hospital Building Co.v.
Trustees
106
(1976);
ofRexHospital, 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S.
319, 322 (1972) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 521 (1972) (per curiam); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395
U.S. 411, 422 (1969) (plurality opinion); see also Cleveland
Bd. of Ed.v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 554 (1985)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 587 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); United Air Lines, Inc.v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553,
561, n. I (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Simon v. Eastern
Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 55, n. 6
(1976) (Brennan, J., concurring injudgment).

(5]See, e.g., EB Invs., LLC v. Atlantis Development, Inc.,
930 So.2d 502, 507 (Ala 2005); Department of Health &
Social Servs.v. NativeVillageofCuryung, 151 P.3d 388, 396
(Alaska 2006); Newman v. Maricopa Cty., 167 Ariz. 501,
503, 808 P.2d 1253, 1255 (App. 1991); Public Serv. Co. of
Colo.v. Van Wyk, 27 P.3d 377, 385-386 (Colo. 2001) (en
bane); Clawson v. St. LouisPost-Dispatch, LLC, 906 A.2d
308, 312 (D. C. 2006); Hillman Constr. Corp.v. Wainer,
636 So.2d 576, 578 (Fla. App. 1994); Kaplan v. Kaplan,
266 Ga 612, 613, 469 S.E.2d 198, 199 (1996); Wright v.
HomeDepotUS. A., 111 Haw. 401, 406, 142 P.3d 265, 270
(2006); Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 257, 127 P.3d 156,
160 (2005); Fink v. Bryant, 2001-CC-0987, p. 4 (La.
11/28/01), 801 So.2d 346, 349; Gagne v. CianbroCorp.,
431 A.2d 1313, 1318-1319 (Me. 1981); Gasior v.
Massachusetts Gen. Hospital, 446 Mass. 645, 647, 846
N.E.2d 1133, 1135 (2006); Ralph Walker, Inc.v. Gallagher,
926 So.2d 890, 893 (Miss. 2006); Jones v.
MontanaUniv.System, 337 Mont I, 7, 155 P.3d 1247, _ _
(2007); Johnston v. NebraskaDept. of Correctional Servs.,
270 Neb. 987,989, 709 N.W.2d 321,324 (2006); Blackjack
Bonding v. Las Vegas Munic.Ct., 116 Nev. 1213, 1217, 14
P.3d 1275, 1278 (2000); Shepard v. OcwenFed.Bank, 361
N.C. 137, 139, 638 S.E.2d 197, 199 (2006); Rose v. United
Equitable Ins. Co., 2001 ND 154, ,r 10, 632 N.W.2d 429,
434; State ex rel. Turner v. Houk, 112 Ohio St.3d 561, 562,
2007-0hio-814, ,r 5, 862 N.E.2d 104, 105 {per curiam);
Moneypenney v. Dawson, 2006 OK 53, ,r 2, 141 P.3d 549,
551; Gagnon v. State, 570 A.2d 656, 659 (R. I. 1990);
Os/oond v. Farrier, 2003 SD 28, ,r 4, 659 N. W.2d 20, 22
{per curiam); Smith v. Lincoln Brass Works, Inc., 712
S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tenn. 1986); Association of Haystack
Property Owners v. Sprague, 145 Vt. 443, 446, 494 A.2d
122, 124 (1985); In re Coday, 156 Wash.2d 485,497, 130
P.3d 809, 815 (2006) (en bane); Haines v. Hampshire Cty.
Comm'n, 216 W.Va. 499,502,607 S.E.2d 828,831 (2004);
Warren v. Hart, 747 P.2d 5ll, 512 (Wyo. 1987); see also
Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1082-1083 (Del.
200 I) (permitting dismissal only "where the court
determines with reasonable certainty that the plaintiff could
prevail on no set of facts that may be inferred from the
well-pleaded allegations in the com-plaint" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Canel v. Topinka, 212 Ill.2d
311, 318, 818 N.E.2d 311, 317 (2004) (replacing "appears
beyond doubt" in the Conley formulation with "is clearly
apparent"); In re Young, 522 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ind. 1988)
(per curiam) (replacing "appears beyond doubt" with
"appears to a certainty"); Barkema v. Williams Pipeline Co.,
666 N.W.2d 612, 614 (Iowa 2003) (holding that a motion to
dismiss should be sustained "only when there exists no
conceivable set of facts entitling the non-moving party to
relief'); Pioneer Village v. Bullitt Cty., 104 S. W.3d 757,
759 (Ky. 2003) (holding that judgment on the pleadings
should be granted "if it appears beyond doubt that the
nonmoving party cannot prove any set of facts that would

entitle him/her to relief'); Corley v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 470
Mich. 274, 277, 681 N.W.2d 342, 345 (2004) (per curiam)
(holding that a motion for judgment on the pleadings should
be granted only " 'if no factual development could possibly
justify recovery' "); Oberkramer v. Ellisville, 706 S.W.2d
440, 441 (Mo. 1986) (en bane) (omitting the words "beyond
doubt" from the Conley formulation); Colman v. Utah State
Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990) (holding that a
motion to dismiss is appropriate "only if it clearly appears
that [the plaintiff) can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim"); NRC Management Servs. Corp.v. First Va.
Bank-Southwest, 63 Va Cir. 68, 70 (2003) ("The Virginia
standard is identical [to the Conley formulation], though the
Supreme Court of Virginia may not have used the same
words to describe it").
[6]The majority is correct to say that what the Federal
Rules require is a " 'showing' " of entitlement to relief. Ante,
at 555, n. 3. Whether and to what extent that "showing"
requires allegations of fact will depend on the particulars of
the claim. For example, had the amended complaint in this
case alleged only parallel conduct, it would not have made
the required "showing." See supra, at 570-571. Similarly,
had the pleadings contained only an allegation of
agreement, without specifying the nature or object of that
agreement, they would have been susceptible to the charge
that they did not provide sufficient notice that the
defendants may answer intelligently. Omissions of that sort
instance the type of "bareness" with which the Federal
Rules are concerned. A plaintiff's inability to persuade a
district court that the allegations actually included in her
complaint are "plausible" is an altogether different kind of
failing, and one that should not be fatal at the pleading
stage.
[7]See also 5 Wright & Miller § 1202, at 89-90
("[P]leadings under the rules simply may be a general
summary of the party's position that is sufficient to advise
the other party of the event being sued upon, to provide
some guidance in a subsequent proceeding as to what was
decided for purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel,
and to indicate whether the case should be tried to the court
or to a jury. No more is demanded of the pleadings than
this; indeed, history shows that no more can be performed
successfully by the pleadings" (footnotes omitted)).
[8]0ur decision in DuraPharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,
544 U.S. 336 (2005), is not to the contrary. There, the
plaintiffs failed adequately to allege loss causation, a
required element in a private securities fraud action.
Because it alleged nothing more than that the prices of the
securities the plaintiffs purchased were artificially inflated,
the Dura complaint failed to "provide the defendants with
notice of what the relevant economic loss might be or of
what the causal connection might be between that loss and
the [alleged] misrepresentation." Id., at 347. Here, the

failure the majority identifies is not a failure of
notice-which "notice pleading" rightly condemns-but rather
a failure to satisfy the Court that the agreement alleged
might plausibly have occurred. That being a question not of
notice but of proof it should not be answered without first
hearing from the defendants (as apart from their lawyers).
Similarly, in Associated Gen. Contractors ojCal., Inc. v.
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983), in which we also found
an antitrust complaint wanting, the problem was not that the
injuries the plaintiffs alleged failed to satisfy some
threshold of plausibility, but rather that the injuries as
alleged were not "the type that the antitrust statute was
intended to forestall." Id., at 540; see id., at 526 ("As the
case comes to us, we must assume that the Union can prove
the facts alleged in its amended complaint. It is not,
however, proper to assume that the Union can prove facts
that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated
the antitrust laws in ways that have not been alleged").
[9]The Court suggests that the allegation of an agreement,
even if credited, might not give the notice required by Rule
8 because it lacks specificity. Ante, at 565, n. IO. The
remedy for an allegation lacking sufficient specificity to
provide adequate notice is, of course, a Rule 12(e) motion
for a more definite statement. See Swierkiewicz v.
SoremaN. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). Petitioners made
no such motion and indeed have conceded that "[o]ur
problem with the current complaint is not a lack of
specificity, it's quite specific." Tr. of Oral Arg. 14. Thus, the
fact that "the pleadings mentioned no specific time, place,
or per-sons involved in the alleged conspiracies," ante, at
565, n. l 0, is, for our purposes, academic.
[lO]The Court describes my reference to the allegation that
the defendants belong to various trade associations as
"playfully" suggesting that the defendants conspired to
restrain trade. Ante, at 567, n. 12. Quite the contrary: an
allegation that competitors meet on a regular basis, like the
allegations of parallel conduct, is consistent with-though
not sufficient to prove-the plaintiffs' entirely serious and
unequivocal allegation that the defendants entered into an
unlawful agreement. Indeed, if it were true that the
plaintiffs "rest their §1 claim on descriptions of parallel
conduct and not on any independent allegation of actual
agreement among the ILECs," ante, at 564, there would
have been no purpose in including a reference to the trade
association meetings in the amended complaint.
[11 )It is ironic that the Court seeks to justify its decision to
draw factual inferences in the defendants' favor at the
pleading stage by citing to a rule of evidence, ante, at 568,
n. 13. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 20l(b), a judicially
noticed fact "must be one not subject to reasonable dispute
in that it is either (I) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and

ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned." Whether Notebaert's
statements constitute evidence of a conspiracy is hardly
beyond reasonable dispute.
[12]The Court worries that a defendant seeking to respond
to this "conclusory" allegation "would have little idea where
to begin." Ante, at 565, n. l 0. A defendant could, of course,
begin by either denying or admit-ting the charge.
[I3]The potential for "sprawling, costly, and hugely
time-consuming" discovery, ante, at 560, n. 6, is no reason
to throw the baby out with the bathwater. The Court vastly
underestimates a district court's case-management arsenal.
Before discovery even begins, the court may grant a
defendant's Rule 12(e) motion; Rule 7(a) permits a trial
court to order a plaintiff to reply to a defendant's answer,
see Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998); and
Rule 23 requires "rigorous analysis" to ensure that class
certification is appropriate, General Telephone Co. of
Southwest v. Falcon. 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982); see In re
Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation, 471 F.3d 24
(CA2 2006) (holding that a district court may not certify a
class without ruling that each Rule 23 requirement is met,
even if a requirement overlaps with a merits issue). Rule 16
invests a trial judge with the power, backed by sanctions, to
regulate pretrial proceedings via conferences and
scheduling orders, at which the parties may discuss, inter
alia, "the elimination of frivolous claims or defenses," Rule
16(c )( 1); "the necessity or desirability of amendments to the
pleadings," Rule 16(c)(2); "the control and scheduling of
discovery," Rule 16(c)(6); and "the need for adopting
special procedures for managing potentially difficult or
protracted actions that may involve complex issues,
multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof
problems," Rule 16(c)(12). Subsequently, Rule 26 confers
broad discretion to control the combination of
interrogatories, requests for admissions, production
requests, and depositions permitted in a given case; the
sequence in which such discovery devices may be
deployed; and the limitations imposed upon them. See 523
U.S. at 598-599. Indeed, Rule 26(c) specifically permits a
court to take actions "to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense" by, for example, disallowing a particular
discovery request, setting appropriate terms and conditions,
or limiting its scope.
In short, the Federal Rules contemplate that pretrial
matters will be settled through a flexible process of give and
take, of proffers, stipulations, and stonewalls, not by having
trial judges screen allegations for their plausibility vel non
without requiring an answer from the defendant. See
Societeinternationale pour Participations Industrielles et
Commerciales, S. A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 206 (1958)
("Rule 34 is sufficiently flexible to be adapted to the

exigencies of particular litigation"). And should it become
apparent over the course of litigation that a plaintiffs :filings
bespeak an in terrorem suit, the district court has at its call
its own in terrorem device, in the form of a wide array of
Rule 11 sanctions. See Rules l l(b), (c) (authorizing
sanctions if a suit is presented "for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation"); see Business Guides, Inc.
v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S.
533 (1991) (holding that Rule 11 applies to a represented
party who signs a pleading, motion, or other papers, as well
as to attorneys); Atkins v. Fischer, 232 F. R. D. 116, 126
(DC 2005) ("As possible sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, the
court has an arsenal of options at its disposal").
[14]Given his "background in antitrust law," ante, at 560,
n. 6, Judge Easterbrook has recognized that the most
effective solution to discovery abuse lies in the legislative
and rulemaking arenas. He has suggested that the remedy
for the ills he complains of requires a revolution in the rules
of civil procedure:
"Perhaps a system in which judges pare away issues and
focus on investigation is too radical to contemplate in this
country-although it prevailed here before 1938, when the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted. The change
could not be accomplished without abandoning notice
pleading, increasing the number of judicial officers, and
giving them more authority .... If we are to rule out
judge-directed discovery, however, we must be prepared to
pay the piper. Part of the price is the high cost of
unnecessary discovery-impositional and otherwise."
Discovery as Abuse, 69 B. U. L. Rev. 635,645 (1989).
[15]It would be quite wrong, of course, to assume that
dismissal of an antitrust case after discovery is costless to
plaintiffs. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(d)(l) ("[C]osts other
than attorneys' fees shall be allowed as of course to the
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs").
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of California, George H. Wu, District
Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:08-cv-00508-GW-SH.
Before: STEPHEN S. TROTT and WILLIAM A.
FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and CHARLES R BREYER,
District Judge.[*]
Opinion by Judge WILLIAM A. FLETCHER; Dissent by
Judge TROTT.
ORDER
The opinion filed on February 11, 2011, and published at
633 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir.2011 ), is withdrawn and replaced by
the attached opinion.

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Dion Starr brings a § 1983 action for damages
resulting from a violent attack he allegedly suffered while
he was an inmate in the Los Angeles County Jail. The
district court dismissed Starr's supervisory liability claim
for deliberate indifference against Sheriff Leroy Baca in his
individual capacity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
l 2(b )(6). Because we hold that Starr has adequately stated a
claim, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. Background
Starr's Third Amended Complaint alleges that on or about
January 27, 2006, he was in custody in the Los Angeles
County Jail. A group of inmates gathered at his cell door
and threatened to inflict physical harm on him. He yelled
for the deputies guarding the jail to come to his aid. Instead
of protecting him, a deputy opened Starr's cell gate in order
to allow the group of inmates to enter. The inmates entered
the cell and repeatedly stabbed Starr and his cellmate with
knife-like objects. They stabbed Starr twenty-three times
while Starr screamed for help and protection. After the
attacking inmates left the cell, several deputies went to
Starr. Starr lay on the floor of his cell, seriously injured,
bleeding and moaning in pain. One deputy yelled at him, "
nigger lay down." While repeatedly yelling " shut up
nigger," the deputy then kicked his face, nose, and body
numerous times, causing pain, bleeding and a nose fracture.
Other deputies stood by and watched. The deputy who
kicked Starr subsequently interfered with his ability to
obtain medical treatment for his injuries. Starr continues to
suffer from and receive treatment for his injuries.
Starr sued Sheriff Baca as well as the deputies directly
involved in the attack. His claims against the deputies are
not at issue in this appeal. In his claim against Sheriff Baca,
Starr alleges unconstitutional conditions of confinement in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. He
alleges that Sheriff Baca is liable in his individual capacity
because he knew or should have known about the dangers
in
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The petitions for rehearing and for rehearing en bane, filed
February 25, 2011, are hereby denied as moot.
No new petitions for rehearing or petitions for rehearing en
bane shall be accepted in this case. However, any member
of this court may make a sua sponte en bane call
challenging the opinion filed today.

the Los Angeles County Jail, and that he was deliberately
indifferent to those dangers.
After giving Starr several chances to plead his claim
against Sheriff Baca, the district court dismissed the claim
with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court held

when there is no reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs can
construct a claim from the events related in the complaint"
)[.]
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Id at 558, 127 S.Ct 1955. The Court wrote, further, "
Probably, then, it is only by taking care to require
allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that
we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of
discovery in cases with no ' reasonably founded hope that
the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence' to
support a § l claim. Dura, 544 U.S. at 347, 125 S.Ct.
1627." Id. at 559-60, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (some internal
quotation marks omitted).

Finally, in Iqbal, plaintiff Iqbal, a Muslim American man,
brought a Bivens action alleging deliberate discrimination
by Attorney General Ashcroft and F.B.I. Director Mueller.
Applying Rule 8(a), the Court held that the allegations in
Iqbal's complaint were insufficient. In the Court's view,
some of Iqbal's allegations were " bare assertions" not
entitled to the presumption of truth, and the remaining
allegations, even assumed to be true, did not plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.
The Court first identified allegations not entitled to the
presumption of truth. Iqbal's complaint alleged that
defendants " ' knew of, condoned, and willfully and
maliciously agreed to subject [him]' to harsh conditions of
confinement ' as a matter of policy, solely on account of
[his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no
legitimate penological interest.'" Id. at 1951 (alterations in
original). The complaint alleged, further, that " Ashcroft
was the ' principal architect' of this invidious policy, ... and
that Mueller was ' instrumental' in adopting and executing
it[.]" Id. The Court held that these " bare assertions" "
amount[ ed] to nothing more than a ' formulaic recitation of
the elements' " of the constitutional claim. Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Their "
conclusory nature ... disentitle[d] them to the presumption
oftruth." Id.
The Court then determined whether the remaining
allegations, assumed to be true, " plausibly suggest[ed] an
entitlement to relief." Id. The complaint alleged that the two
defendants had caused the arrest and detention of "
thousands of Arab Muslim men ... as part of [the
government's] investigation of the events of September 11."
Id. It alleged that the defendants had " purposefully
designat[ed] detainees ' of high interest' because of their
race, religion, or national origin." Id The Court held that,
assuming these facts to be true, they did not plausibly
suggest Iqbal's entitlement to relief based on purposeful
racial or religious discrimination because there was an " '
obvious alternative explanation' " for these facts. Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567, 127 S.Ct. 1955). In the
Court's view, the obvious alternative explanation was that
the " September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab
Muslim hijackers who counted themselves members in
good standing of al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist
group." Id. " It should come as no surprise that a legitimate
policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain
individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks
would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab
Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy was to
target neither Arabs nor Muslims. On the facts respondent
alleges the arrests Mueller oversaw were likely lawful and
justified by his nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens
who were illegally present in the United States and who had
potential connections to those who committed terrorist
acts." Id The Court concluded that this alternative
explanation was so likely to be true that, as between the two
explanations, Iqbal's explanation was not plausible: " [T]he
purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent asks us to
infer ... is not a plausible conclusion. " Id. at 1951-52
(emphasis added).
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In two cases decided during roughly the same period, the
Court appears to have applied the original, more lenient
version of Rule 8(a). In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534
U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002), the Second
Circuit had dismissed plaintiff's employment discrimination
case for failure to plead facts establishing a prima facie case
of discrimination. The Supreme Court reversed, writing:
[P]etitioner's complaint easily satisfies the requirements of
Rule 8(a) because it gives respondent fair notice of the basis
for petitioner's claims. Petitioner alleged that he had been
terminated on account of his national origin in violation of
Title VII and on account of his age in violation of the
ADEA. His complaint detailed the events leading to his
termination, provided relevant dates, and included the ages
and nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons
involved in his termination. These allegations give
respondent fair notice of what petitioner's claims are and the
grounds upon which they rest....
Respondent argues that allowing lawsuits based on
conclusory allegations of discrimination to go forward will
burden the courts and encourage disgruntled employees to
bring unsubstantiated suits. Whatever the practical merits
of this argument, the Federal Rules do not contain a
heightened
pleading
standard
for
employment
discrimination suits .... Rule 8(a) establishes a pleading
standard without regard to whether a claim will succeed on
the merits. " Indeed it may appear on the face of the
pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but
that is not the test." Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236 [94 S.Ct.
1683].

Id. at 514-15, 122 S.Ct. 992 (emphasis added) (some
citations omitted).

In Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167
L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam), the Tenth Circuit had
dismissed an Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim for failure to satisfy Rule 8(a). Plaintiff,
an inmate in a Colorado state prison, had " alleged that a
liver condition resulting from hepatitis C required a
treatment program that officials had commenced but then
wrongfully terminated, with life-threatening consequences."
Id. at 89-90, 127 S.Ct. 2197. The Tenth Circuit deemed the
allegations of the complaint II conclusory" and dismissed on
the pleadings. Id. at 90, 127 S.Ct. 2197. The Court
emphatically disagreed: 11 The holding departs in so stark a
manner from the pleading standard mandated by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that we grant review." Id. The
Court wrote, " [The complaint] alleged this medication was
withheld ' shortly after' petitioner had commenced a
treatment program that would take one year, that he was '
still in need of treatment for this disease,' and that the prison
officials were in the meantime refusing to provide
treatment. This alone was enough to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2)."
Id. at 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197 (citations omitted).
The juxtaposition of Swierkiewicz and Erickson, on the one
hand, and Dura, Twombly, and Iqbal, on the other, is
perplexing. Even though the Court stated in all five cases
that it was applying Rule 8(a), it is hard to avoid the
conclusion that, in fact, the Court applied a higher pleading
standard in Dura, Twombly and Iqbal. The Court in Dura
and Twombly appeared concerned that in some complex
commercial cases the usual lenient pleading standard under
Rule 8(a) gave too much settlement leverage to plaintiffs.
That is, if a non-specific complaint was enough to survive a
motion to dismiss, plaintiffs would be able to extract
undeservedly high
settlements
from
deep-pocket
companies. In Iqbal, by contrast, the Court was concerned
that the usual lenient standard under Rule 8(a) would
provide
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too little protection for high-level executive branch
officials who allegedly engaged in misconduct in the
aftermath of September II, 2001. To the extent that we
perceive a difference in the application of Rule 8(a) in the
two groups of cases, it is difficult to know in cases that
come before us whether we should apply the more lenient
or the more demanding standard.
But whatever the difference between these cases, we can at
least state the following two principles common to all of
them. First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth,
allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply
recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain

sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice
and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.
Second, the factual allegations that are taken as true must
plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not
unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the
expense of discovery and continued litigation.
3. Evaluation of Starr's Complaint
Viewed in the light of all of the Supreme Court's recent
cases, we hold that the allegations of Starr's complaint
satisfy the standard of Rule 8(a). We do not so hold merely
because Starr's complaint, like the complaint in Erickson,
alleges deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Rather, we so hold because his
complaint complies with the two principles just stated.
First, Starr's complaint makes detailed factual allegations
that go well beyond reciting the elements of a claim of
deliberate indifference. These allegations are neither " bald"
nor " conclusory,'' and hence are entitled to the presumption
of truth. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct at 1951. Starr specifically alleges
numerous incidents in which inmates in Los Angeles
County jails have been killed or injured because of the
culpable actions of the subordinates of Sheriff Baca. The
complaint specifically alleges that Sheriff Baca was given
notice of all of these incidents. It specifically alleges, in
addition, that Sheriff Baca was given notice, in several
reports, of systematic problems in the county jails under his
supervision that have resulted in these deaths and injuries.
Finally, it alleges that Sheriff Baca did not take action to
protect inmates under his care despite the dangers, created
by the actions of his subordinates, of which he had been
made aware. These incidents are sufficiently detailed to
give notice to Sheriff Baca of the nature of Starr's claim
against him and to give him a fair opportunity to defend
against it. They are far from the " bare assertion" in Iqbal
that defendants subjected Iqbal to harsh conditions of
confinement " solely on account" of his " religion, race,
and/or national origin." Id
Second, the factual allegations in Starr's complaint
plausibly suggest that Sheriff Baca acquiesced in the
unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates, and was
thereby deliberately indifferent to the danger posed to Starr.
There is no " obvious alternative explanation,'' within the
meaning of Iqbal, for why Sheriff Baca took no action to
stop his subordinates' repeated violations of prisoners'
constitutional rights despite being repeatedly confronted
with those violations, such that the alternative explanation
requires us to conclude that Starr's explanation " is not a
plausible conclusion." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951, 1952. If
there are two alternative explanations, one advanced by
defendant and the other advanced by plaintiff, both of
which are plausible, plaintiff's complaint survives a motion
to dismiss under Rule l2(b)(6). Plaintiff's complaint may be

dismissed only when defendant's plausible alternative
explanation is so convincing that plaintiff's explanation is
im plausible. The standard at this stage of the litigation is
not that

the plaintiff's civil rights. Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d
1193, 1194 (9th Cir.1998). Otherwise, the action fails for
failure to state a viable claim. Id. Even if Judge Fletcher is
correct that " supervisory liability" survives Iqbal, a
plaintiff must still allege facts to get into court.
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plaintiff's explanation must be true or even probable. The
factual allegations of the complaint need only " plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief." Id at I 951. As the Court
wrote in Twombly, Rule 8(a) " does not impose a
probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply
calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence" to support the allegations.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (emphasis
added). Starr's complaint satisfies that standard.
Conclusion
We hold that the Supreme Court's decision in Iqbal did not
alter the substantive requirements for supervisory liability
claims in an unconstitutional conditions of confinement
case under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments where
deliberate indifference is alleged. We further hold that Starr
has sufficiently alleged under Rule 8(a) a supervisory
liability claim of deliberate indifference against Sheriff
Baca We therefore reverse the district court's dismissal of
Starr's claim against Sheriff Baca and remand for further
proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TROIT, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:
I respect my experienced colleagues' evaluation of Starr's
final complaint, but my view of it is different. In the main,
his complaint has all the hallmarks of an attempted end run
around the prohibition against using the vicarious liability
doctrine of respondeat superior to get at the boss.
Judge Fletcher accurately describes what Starr must allege
to support an actionable claim of individual supervisory
liability for deliberate indifference, but I respectfully
disagree that Starr's complaint measures up to that standard.
Yes, we have held that " acquiescence or culpable
indifference" may suffice to show that a supervisor "
personally played a role in the alleged constitutional
violations," Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1149
(9th Cir.2005); but simply alleging generally that the
Sheriff is " answerable for the prisoner's safe-keeping"
doesn't cut it. Id. Plaintiffs complaint does nothing more
than allege raw legal conclusions with insufficient facts to
support them. Starr's complaint runs afoul of our Circuit's
rule that to establish a claim for individual supervisory
liability, a plaintiff must allege facts, not simply
conclusions; and those facts must show that the individual
sued was personally involved in the alleged deprivation of

Here, I pause for a moment to underscore and to highlight
a critical aspect of the causation aspect of this issue that too
often is lost in the undertow of the jailhouse activities of
which the plaintiff complains: this part of Starr's case is a
claim not under Monell for an actionable governmental
policy or custom or practice, but a claim for individual
responsibility- not agency or department or political unit
responsibility, but individual responsibility. It follows as
night the day that the individual under scrutiny must have
personally engaged in identifiably actionable behavior, even
with respect to a claim of deliberate indifference. As Judge
Wu correctly explained,
A supervisor may be liable if there exists either" (1) his or
her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation,
or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the
supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional
violation."
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... As the Ninth Circuit explained in Redman v. County of
San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446-47 (9th Cir.1991):

This latter liability is not a form of vicarious liability.
Rather, it is direct liability. Under direct liability, plaintiff
must show the supervisor breached a duty to plaintiff which
was the proximate cause of the injury. The Jaw clearly
allows actions against supervisors under section 1983 as
long as a sufficient causal connection is present and the
plaintiff was deprived under color of law of a federally
secured right. " The requisite causal connection can be
established ... by setting in motion a series of acts by others
which the actor knows or reasonably should know would
cause others to inflict the constitutional injury." Johnson v.
Dufjj;, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir.1978).
We are evaluating Starr's revised third amended complaint.
The district court gave him multiple opportunities factually
to amend to articulate the Sheriffs personal involvement in
this matter. In particular, the court requested on November
6, 2006, that Starr " state precisely the basis for the claims
as to defendant L. Baca in the [anticipated] revised third
amended complaint." In response, Starr alleged only more
conclusions and vague and insufficient allegations that the
Sheriff (1)" knew or reasonably could have known," (2) "
knew or reasonably should have known," and (3) was "
aware or should have become aware" of the jail conditions
of which Starr complains. He sums up his boilerplate
allegations with a statement that the Sheriff is liable

because he had either " personal knowledge or constructive
knowledge" of all these conditions. Alleging that the Sheriff
" could " have known, " should " have known, and " should
" have become aware is tantamount to admitting that Starr
had no facts to support his allegations. The test that governs
this case consists of two words, not one. Indifference is not
enough. For indifference to be actionable, it must be
deliberate. Starr's conclusory allegations amount to no more
than formulaic flak fired into the sky in an attempt to bring
down the squadron leader.
When we cease to look at the Los Angeles Sheriffs
Department (LASD) as an abstraction and look at the
reality, we see good reasons for requiring facts before
permitting lawsuits against the Sheriff himself: the agency
is gigantic. The LASO is the largest Sheriffs Department in
the world. It covers 3,171 square miles, 2,557,754 residents,
and by contract 42 of the 88 incorporated cities in Los
Angeles County. The Department employs 8,400 law
enforcement officers and 7,600 civilians and is responsible
for 48 courthouses and 23 substations. The Men's Central
Jail alone houses a revolving population of 5,000 inmates.
In addition, the Department operates the Twin Towers
Correctional Facility, the Mira Loma Detention Facility, the
Pitchess Detention Center, and the North County
Correctional Center. Persons charged with or convicted of
crimes are in over one hundred different locations. The
layers of administration and management between what
happens in a jail are many and they are complex. To infer
that specific incidents which occur in a jail are necessarily
known by the Sheriff is to engage in fallacious logic.
This complexity does not absolve the Department of
responsibility for respecting the constitutional rights and
general well-being of its charges, but it does show how
inappropriate it is to sue the Sheriff individually unless in
terms of causation the Sheriff can be personally tied to the
actionable behavior at issue. Just being a disappointing or
even an insufficiently engaged public servant is not enough.
Those

a failure to supervise it can't be just a general failure of
supervision. It has to be something that is specific. That's
what I want.
Earlier in the same hearing, Starr's counsel said this, which
is equally indicative of no facts, just " theory:"
MR. PAZ: Your Honor, let me give you an analogy, Your
Honor. All I can do is put it on the record and try to explain
to the court the theory.
It's no different than if we had the head of a hospital, and a
surgeon five floors down below is killing people on a
regular basis. If the head of the hospital doesn't act, then
they will be liable.
Another concession appeared when counsel said, " We're
still at the pleading stage where we are just saying do we
have a right to go to Mr. Baca and do discovery and try to
prove our case." Counsel's statement here collides with
what the Supreme Court said in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009): "Rule 8 ...
does not unlock the doors for a plaintiff armed with nothing
more than conclusions." Id at 1949-50.
Sadly, bad things routinely happen in the best of jails. The
same is true of hospitals, armies, churches, nursing homes,
synagogues, boy scout troops, and legislatures. To attach
personal legal liability to the leaders of these organizations,
however, requires much more than, ' Well, she must have
known and must have been deliberately indifferent, because
after all, it happened on her watch.'
Accordingly, although we review this issue de novo,
agree with Judge Wu's end-of-the-process conclusion:
The TAC [Third Amended Complaint], as compared to
previous pleadings, adds no new allegations which
adequately identifies [sic] the precise nature of Baca's
misfeasance or nonfeasance or which establishes a
sufficient causal link between Baca's actions or inaction and
the alleged violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights.
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issues are for the ballot box and the County Board of
Supervisors, not the courts.
Judge Wu was clear and correct in his articulation of the
complaint's deficiencies:
What you need to do is state precisely what it is that you
are claiming other than he's the general supervisor of the
jail facility, and therefore, he can be sued individually if
anything bad happens, because bad things have happened in
the past at the jail. It has to be something more than that to
give rise to a claim. That's what I want. I want you to state
what precisely it is that he supposedly did wrong, and if it's

Nor does Plaintiffs opposition memorandum point to any
language in the TAC which demonstrates such a causal
connection. Plaintiff does not allege that Baca himself
directly participated in any way in the January 27, 2006
incident or that he was involved in any review or
investigation of it. Likewise, Plaintiff has not cited to any
specific policy implemented by Baca which was the "
moving force [in] the constitutional violation." Plaintiff
simply argues that he " has amply satisfied the second '
causal connection' prong by alleging facts which put Baca
on notice of ongoing unconstitutional conduct of his
subordinates. " However, the mere fact that Baca may have
known about prior incidents [that] allegedly occurred in the
jail does not show that Baca has implemented a policy that

is tantamount to a repudiation of constitutional rights.
Judge Fletcher's Opinion, with all respect, is difficult to
reconcile with Iqbal. I extract portions of the Iqbal Opinion
to illustrate my point:
The allegations against petitioners are the only ones
relevant here. The complaint
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contends that petitioners designated respondent a person of
high interest on account of his race, religion, or national
origin, in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments
to the Constitution. The complaint alleges that " the [FBI],
under the direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and
detained thousands of Arab Muslim men ... as part of its
investigation of the events of September 11." It further
alleges that " [t]he policy of holding post-September-I Ith
detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement
until they were ' cleared' by the FBI was approved by
Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in
the weeks after September 11, 2001." Lastly, the complaint
posits that petitioners " each knew of, condoned, and
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject" respondent to
harsh conditions of confinement " as a matter of policy,
solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national
origin and for no legitimate penological interest." The
pleading names Ashcroft as the " principal architect" of the
policy, and identifies Mueller as " instrumental in [its]
adoption, promulgation, and implementation."
Id. at 1944 (internal citations omitted) (alterations and
omissions in original).

Respondent [Iqbal] ... argues that, under a theory of "
supervisory liability," petitioners can be liable for "
knowledge and acquiescence in their subordinates' use of
discriminatory criteria to make classification decisions
among detainees." That is to say, respondent believes a
supervisor's mere knowledge of his subordinate's
discriminatory purpose amounts to the supervisor's
violating the Constitution. We reject this argument.
Respondent's conception of " supervisory liability" is
inconsistent with his accurate stipulation that petitioners
may not be held accountable for the misdeeds of their
agents. In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action- where masters
do not answer for the torts of their servants- the term "
supervisory liability" is a misnomer. Absent vicarious
liability, each Government official, his or her title
notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own
misconduct. In the context of determining whether there is a
violation of [a] clearly established right to overcome
qualified immunity, purpose rather than knowledge is
required to imposeBivensliability on the subordinate for
unconstitutional discriminations; the same holds true for an

official charged with violations arising from his or her
superintendent responsibilities.
Id. at 1949 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).

Two working principles underlie our decision in [ Bell
Atlantic Corp. v.] Twombly [550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955,
167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ]. First, the tenet that a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint
is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Thread-bare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct.
1955 (Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we
must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as
true, we " are not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation " (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Rule 8 marks a notable and
generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading
regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim
for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
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draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But
where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint
"that the pleader
has alleged- but it has not" show[n]"
is entitled to relief." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).
Id. at 1949-50 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)
(second alteration in original).

We begin our analysis by identifying the allegations in the
complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
Respondent pleads that petitioners " knew of, condoned,
and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [him]" to
harsh conditions of confinement " as a matter of policy,
solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national
origin and for no legitimate penological interest." The
complaint alleges that Ashcroft was the " principal
architect" of this invidious policy, and that Mueller was "
instrumental" in adopting and executing it. These bare
assertions, much like the pleading of conspiracy in
Twombly, amount to nothing more than a " formulaic
recitation of the elements" of a constitutional
discrimination claim, namely, that petitioners adopted a
policy " ' because of,' not merely ' in spite of,' its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group." As such, the allegations
are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true. To be
clear, we do not reject these bald allegations on the ground
that they are unrealistic or nonsensical. We do not so

characterize them any more than the Court in Twombly
rejected the plaintiffs' express allegation of a " ' contract,
combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry,' "
because it thought that claim too chimerical to be
maintained. It is the conclusory nature of respondent's
allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature,
that disentitles them to the presumption of truth.
Id. at 1951 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)
(alterations in original).

Although Iqbal puts considerable meat on this wise rule's
bones, it is not new. In 1988, for example, we said in Taylor
v. List, a failed lawsuit against Nevada's Attorney General
and the Director of the Nevada State Prison alleging their "
knowledge of and failure to prevent the alleged
constitutional violations by their subordinates," the
following:
Liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of
personal participation by the defendant. A supervisor is
only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates
if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or
knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.
880 F.2d 1040, 1043, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (emphasis
added) (internal citation omitted).

The days of pleading conclusions without factual support
accompanied by the wishful hope of finding something
juicy during discovery are over. Wisely, we have moved up
judgment day to the complaint stage rather than bog down
the courts and parties with pre-summary judgment combat.
This conclusion, of course, does not leave Starr without
redress. He may sue the Sheriff in his official capacity,
which is the same as suing the County of Los Angeles and
the Sheriffs Department, and he may pursue his lawsuit on
the ground of official policy or longstanding custom and
practice- but he may not sue the Sheriff individually just
because he is the Sheriff. SeePembaur v. City of Cincinnati.
475 U.S. 469, 478, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986);
Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 623 F.3d 945, 973
(9th Cir.2010). The district court clearly understands this
distinction:
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In other words, any time anything goes wrong of any sort
Baca gets blamed and he can be individually liable as
opposed to being liable [in his official capacity] as the agent
of the county. I can understand that claim. There is no
problem with that one, but you are suing him on an
individual basis.
Given the amount of time and effort already devoted to
trying to get the Sheriff into this case, I seriously doubt any

additional facts will come forward. Thus, the next step is
summary judgment. So be it.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Notes:
[*] The Honorable Charles R. Breyer, United States
District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting
by designation.

APPENDIXF

GOULD, Circuit Judge.
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Steve Harris and Dennis F. Ramos (collectively, "
Plaintiffs") sued Amgen, Inc. ("Amgen") and several
Amgen directors and officers, alleging that the defendants
breached their fiduciary duties under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") in their
operation of two ERISA retirement plans. The district court
dismissed Harris's claims on the ground that he lacked
standing as an ERISA plan " participant" because he had
withdrawn all of his assets from his plan. It also dismissed
Ramos's claims, reasoning that although Ramos had
standing, he did not allege any claims against defendants
who were fiduciaries under the plan. The district court then
denied Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint.
We reverse the dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint. We hold
that Harris has standing as an ERISA plan participant to
seek relief under ERISA § 502(a)(2), codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ I l32(a)(2), despite having withdrawn all of his assets
from his plan. We also conclude that the district court
improperly denied Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint
to add more factual allegations where necessary and to
identify proper fiduciaries of the Plaintiffs' ERISA plans.

Argued and Submitted May 8, 2009.
Page 729
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Page 730
Francis M. Gregorek, Betsy C. Manifold, Rachele R.
Rickert, and Mark C. Rifkin (argued), Wolf Haldenstein
Adler Freeman & Herz LLP, San Diego, CA, and Thomas
J. McKenna, Gainey & McKenna, New York, NY, for the
plaintiffs-appellants.
Steven O. Kramer, John Nadolenco, Mack Anderson,
Robert P. Davis (argued), and Michele L. Odorizzi, Mayer
Brown
LLP,
Los
Angeles,
CA,
for
the
defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of California, Philip S. Gutierrez, District
Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:07-cv-05442-PSG-PLA
Page 731
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and RONALD M. GOULD, Circuit Judges.
OPINION

Amgen is a publicly traded biotechnology company that
operates
Amgen
Manufacturing,
Ltd.
("Amgen
Manufacturing") as a wholly owned subsidiary. Employees
of Amgen are entitled to participate in the Amgen
Retirement and Savings Plan (the " Amgen Plan"), and
Amgen Manufacturing employees may participate in the
Retirement and Savings Plan for Amgen Manufacturing,
Ltd. (the " Manufacturing Plan"). Each Plan is a " defined
contribution plan," defined as " a pension plan which
provides for an individual account for each participant and
for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the
participant's account." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34).[l]
Amgen is a " named fiduciary" only of the Amgen Plan,[2]
and Amgen Manufacturing is a named fiduciary only of the
Manufacturing Plan. The Amgen Plan allows the Amgen
Board of Directors (the " Board") to delegate management
and administration of the Plan to a" Fiduciary Committee."
During the time relevant to this appeal, fiduciary
responsibilities for both Plans were delegated to the
Fiduciary Committee.
Steve Harris worked at Amgen until January 2007 and
participated in the Amgen Plan. His Amgen Plan holdings
sometimes included Amgen stock. Harris withdrew his
assets from his Amgen Plan account in July 2007. Dennis F.

Ramos worked at Amgen Manufacturing until March 2007,
participating in the Manufacturing Plan. His Manufacturing
Plan holdings also sometimes included Amgen Stock.
Ramos still has assets in the Manufacturing Plan.
In August 2007 Harris and Ramos filed a class action
complaint (the " Complaint"), alleging that during a
22-month class period
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the defendants breached their fiduciary duties by allowing
the Plans to purchase and hold Amgen stock while knowing
that the stock price was artificially inflated because of
improper off-label drug marketing and sales. The Complaint
asserts that the Amgen stock price declined significantly
once the off-label activity became public, and Harris and
Ramos claim that the defendants are liable for the resulting
losses suffered by the class members. The Complaint
sought relief under ERISA § 502(a)(2) ("Section
502(a)(2)"), codified at 29 U.S.C. § l 132(a)(2), which
authorizes a suit by a plan participant " for appropriate
relief' against a plan fiduciary for breach of fiduciary duty.
The Complaint names as defendants Amgen, Amgen's
chief financial officer, and nine Amgen Board members
(\;Uiit:Nti vcly,
D'3f.::ndauts").
1-"Jcithcr
.l\...T,.gen
Manufacturing nor the Fiduciary Committee is named as a
defendant. However, the Complaint does assert claims
against a " Retirement Benefits Committee of the Board of
Directors of Amgen," which it claims has fiduciary
responsibilities over both Plans.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
("Rule") 12(bXl), and for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(bX6). The district court granted the motion and
dismissed with prejudice all of Harris's claims, concluding
that Harris did not have statutory standing as a "
participant" in the Amgen Plan because he had already
cashed out of his Plan account. The district court
determined that Ramos had standing because he still had
assets in the Manufacturing Plan, but it dismissed with
prejudice all of Ramos's claims on the ground that neither
Amgen, the alleged retirement committee, nor the named
defendants were fiduciaries of the Manufacturing Plan.
The district court also denied Plaintiffs' request for leave to
amend their Complaint. The district court reasoned that
Harris could not cure his lack of standing through
amendment and that Ramos did not " have a viable claim
against the named defendants." The district court expressly
made " no determination as to whether Plaintiffs have a
viable claim against Amgen Manufacturing or the members
of the Fiduciary Committee." Harris and Ramos appeal the
dismissal of their claims and the denial of leave to amend.

II
A
We first consider whether the district court properly
determined that Harris lacked standing under Section
502(a)(2) because he had withdrawn his assets from the
Amgen Plan. We review questions of standing under
ERISA de nova.Stewart v. Thorpe Holding Co. Profit
Sharing Plan, 207 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir.2000).[3]
" To establish standing to sue under ERISA, [plaintiffs]
must show that they are plan ' participants.' " Poore v.
Simpson Paper Co., 566 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir.2009).
Plaintiffs seek relief under Section 502(a)(2), which grants
standing to a plan participant to bring an action against a
defendant who breaches a fiduciary duty
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with respect to that plan. See 29 U.S.C. § l 132(a)(2). An
ERISA plan participant is " any employee or former
employee of an employer ... who is or may become eligible
to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit
plan which covers employees of such employer.... " 29
U.S.C. § 1002(7). This definition encompasses " former
employees who have ... a colorable claim to vested
benefits.'' Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S.
101, 117, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989) (internal
quotation omitted). " In contrast, former employees do not
have standing if a successful suit would result in a damage
award that was not for benefits due under the plan.'' Vaughn
v. Bay Envtl. Mgmt., Inc., 567 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th
Cir.2009) (citing Kuntz v. Reese, 785 F.2d 1410, 1411 (9th
Cir.1986) (per curiam)).
The district court relied on Kuntz in concluding that Harris
was not a " participant" in the Amgen Plan. In Kuntz, we
held that a plaintiff who alleges that a former employer
misrepresented the benefits due under a defined benefit
ERISA plan does not have standing if that plaintiff already
received all benefits that were due before filing suit and
seeks only a damage award. Kuntz, 785 F.2d at 141 l. The
district court reasoned that because Harris had cashed out of
the Amgen Plan, any recovery he receives would be a
damage recovery, and he would not have prevailed in a "
suit for benefits," Firestone, 489 U.S. at 117, 109 S.Ct. 948,
because" a damage claim is not a plan benefit." Kuntz, 785
F.2d at 141 l.
When it dismissed Harris's claims, the district court did not
have the benefit of the reasoning and holding in our
subsequent decision in Vaughn, in which we distinguished
Kuntz and held that " former employees who have received
a full distribution of their account balances under a defined
contribution pension plan have standing as plan participants
under ERISA to recover losses occasioned by a breach of

fiduciary duty that allegedly reduced the amount of their
benefits." Vaughn, 567 F.3d at 1030. In Vaughn the plaintiff
sued fiduciaries of his employer's defined contribution
ERISA plans, alleging that the fiduciaries breached their
fiduciary duties with respect to the plans when they did not
take certain actions despite knowing the plans would be
terminated. The plaintiff claimed that " he has not received
all of the benefits due to him under the Plans .... because his
accounts contained less than they would have if the
fiduciaries had not breached their duty of prudent
investment" Id. at 1026.
The district court in Vaughn had granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss based on Kuntz, but on the appeal we
distinguished Kuntz because there the plaintiffs had "
conceded that they had received all of the benefits due to
them under the plan [and] alleged only that they would not
have participated in the plan but-for the defendant's
misrepresentations about the amount of benefits they would
receive." Id. We held in Vaughn that " [b]ecause [the
plaintiff] alleges that he did not receive everything that was
due to him under the Plan, he has standing, even under
Kuntz. " Id. We also noted that every other circuit to have
considered this issue has held that a defined contribution
plan plaintiff has ERISA standing. Seeid. at 1023 & n. 1
(citing cases).
Despite the marked similarity between this case and
Vaughn, Defendants contend that we should distinguish
Vaughn on two grounds. First, Defendants argue that
Vaughn is not controlling because there the employer
terminated the ERISA plans, but here Harris voluntarily
withdrew his assets from the still existing Amgen Plan.
However, our reasoning in Vaughn does not turn on a
distinction

decided Vaughn precedent, must be reversed. Harris had
standing to complain about his retirement benefits plan.
Second, at oral argument, Defendants conceded that Harris
was a participant in the Amgen Plan, but for the first time
argued that Harris should have statutory standing only
under ERISA § 502(a)(l)(B) ("Section 502(a)(l)(B)"), and
not Section 502(a)(2).[4] Defendants rely on Chief Justice
Roberts's concurrence in LaRue v. DeWoljf Boberg &
Assocs., Inc.,_ U.S._, 128 S.Ct. 1020, 169 L.Ed.2d 847
(2008). In LaRue the Supreme Court held that an ERISA
plan participant may recover monetary losses to his or her
individual plan account due to an alleged fiduciary breach.
Id. at l 026. In his concurrence, which was joined only by
Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Roberts said that " [i]t is at
least arguable that a claim of this nature properly lies only
under§ 502(a)(l)(B) ofERISA," id, and he concluded that
" other courts in other cases remain free to consider what
we have not-what effect the availability of relief under §
502(a)(l)(B) may have on a plan participant's ability to
proceed under § 502(a)(2)," id at I 028. Defendants argue
that because Harris could bring a claim under Section
502(a)(l)(B), he lacks standing to bring a claim under
Section 502(a)(2).
We reject Defendants' attempt to create a distinction on
standing between two similar ERISA causes of action.
Although Defendants are correct that in Vaughn a Section
502(a)(IXB) remedy was unavailable,[5] nothing in Vaughn
indicates that its decision depended on the unavailability of
this remedy. Also, at least two circuits that have analyzed
whether a distinction on standing exists between Sections
502(a)(l)(B) and 502(a)(2) have concluded that " [t]his
dichotomy is untenable." Evans v. Akers, 534 F.3d 65,
72-73 (1st Cir.2008) ("The chief difference between an
action brought
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between employer termination and voluntary withdrawal.
Also, other circuits have granted plaintiffs ERISA standing
to pursue breach of fiduciary duty claims even when the
plaintiffs had voluntarily cashed out of their ERISA plans.
See, e.g.,Jn re Mutual Funds Inv. Litig., 529 F.3d 207, 210
(4th Cir.2008); Harzewski v. Guidant Corp., 489 F.3d 799,
804 (7th Cir.2007). When employees withdraw their funds
from a benefit plan, but claim that they would have had
more to withdraw absent breach of fiduciary duty by those
managing the plan, it is not difficult to see a common sense
loss of benefits in their plan caused by the alleged fiduciary
breach. Relying on Vaughn, which we conclude is not
distinguishable in any material way, we hold that
employees who cash out of a defined contribution ERISA
plan are still " participants" in that plan, as defined by 29
U.S.C. § 1002(7), regardless of whether they withdrew their
assets voluntarily. Thus the district court's conclusion on
standing, reached without the benefit of our subsequently

under § 502(a)(l)(B) and § 502(a)(2) is the proper
defendant, not the proper plaintiff ... Bringing the suit under
§ 502(a)(2) does not change the underlying nature of the
plaintiffs' claim as one for benefits." (quotation and citation
omitted)); Graden v. Conexant Sys. Inc., 4% F.3d 291, 301
(3d Cir.2007) (stating that even when plaintiffs " could
demand a full benefit payment from the plan itself under §
I 132(a)(l)(B) .... for most plaintiffs the sensible route is to
use § I 132(a)(2) to get the money in the first instance from
a solvent party liable to make good on the loss, not from the
plan itself'). We agree with the reasoning of the First and
Third Circuits, and we join them in holding that an ERISA
plan participant who no longer has assets in the plan has
statutory standing to assert fiduciary duty claims under
Section 502(a)(2), even when relief is also available under
Section 502(a)(l)(B).

B
Defendants next argue that even if Harris has statutory
standing, we still must dismiss his claims for lack of
standing under Article III of the United States Constitution
because Harris has not sustained an injury that is
redressable by a favorable decision of this court. SeeLujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130,
119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding that Article III standing
requires that " it must be ' likely,' as opposed to merely '
speculative,' that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision" (quotation omitted)). Defendants contend that any
benefit to Harris is " merely speculative" because any
recovery from Harris's suit would go to the Amgen Plan,
and plan administrators have discretion in allocating plan
assets. SeePaulsen v. CNF Inc., 559 F.3d 1061, 1073 (9th
Cir.2009) ("The Supreme Court has held that recovery for a
violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1109 for breach of fiduciary duty
inures to the benefit of the plan as a whole, and not to an
individual beneficiary." (citing Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140-42, 105 S.Ct. 3085, 87 L.Ed.2d
96 (1985))).
Defendants are not the first ERISA defendants to make this
redressability argument, and to our knowledge their asserted
reasoning has been rejected by every circuit to consider the
issue with respect to defined contribution plans. SeeEvans,
534 F.3d at 74-75 ("[1lhe [ERISA] plaintiffs' allegation of
fiduciary mismanagement ... identifies a concrete injury that
is redressable by a court and falls within the scope of
Article Ill standing."); Mutual Funds, 529 F.3d at 210
("[B]ecause the plans at issue are defined contribution
plans, rather than defined benefit plans, we reject the
defendants' argument that the plaintiffs' injuries are not
redressable and therefore that they lack Article Ill
standing."); Harzewski, 489 F.3d at 803 ("Obviously the
named plaintiffs have[Article III] standing to sue ... because
if they win they will obtain a tangible benefit."). With a
favorable ruling, a defined contribution plan plaintiff
alleging breach of fiduciary duty claims under Section
502(a)(2) can gain redress by" su[ing] for an adjustment in
the benefits designed to give him what he would have
received had the formula been honored,• Harzewski, 489
F.3d at 804-05.
Our previous decisions dismissing ERISA suits for lack of
redressability involved fundamentally different facts.
Paulsen concerned a Section 502(a)(2) suit on a defined
benefit plan, but " the redressability problem that arises in
defined benefit plans does not exist with respect to defined
contribution plans" because in defined contribution plans a
successful suit leads to restoration of individual accounts.
Mutual Funds, 529 F.3d at 218; see also
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Vaughn, 561 F.3d at 1028 n. 9 ("[P]recedent from cases
involving defined benefit plans is not automatically
applicable in cases involving defined contribution plans."
(citing LaRue, 128 S.Ct. at 1025)). Also, in Paulsen the
plaintiffs' ERISA plan was " distress terminated" and had
fallen under the management of the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC") acting as a trustee.
Paulsen, 559 F.3d at 1066. We noted that the PBGC was
controlled by a " complex priority scheme" in paying
benefits, and it was under no obligation to pay the plaintiffs
any money above a statutory minimum. Id. at 1073.
In Glanton ex rel. ALCOA Prescription Drug Plan v.
AdvancePCS Inc., 465 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir.2006), the
plaintiffs, who were prescription drug plan participants,
claimed that their success in an ERISA lawsuit regarding
drug costs would cause the plan administrators to lower
co-payment or contribution amounts. Id at 1125. The link
between the plaintiffs' claims and possible recovery in
Glanton was more attenuated than are Harris's claims here,
because the Glanton plaintiffs relied not directly on
fiduciary recovery but on the assumption that the
defendants would voluntarily change co-payment
requirements. Seeid.
We agree with the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits that
there is no lack of redressability merely because a plaintiff's
recovery under Section 502(a)(2) might first go to the
defined contribution plan rather than directly to the
plaintiff. We hold that a plaintiff who has cashed out of a
defined contribution ERISA plan has standing under Article
III to assert Section 502(a)(2) claims relating to that plan.
In summary, we reject Defendants' arguments that Harris
lacks either statutory or constitutional standing. We follow
our precedent in Vaughn and hold that a former employee
who has voluntarily withdrawn his or her assets from a
defined contribution ERISA plan has statutory standing as a
" participant" of that plan. That employee has standing to
assert claims for breach of fiduciary duty under section
502(a)(2) of ERISA even if claims under Section §
502(a)(l)(B) are also available. We also hold that Section
502(a)(2) claims on a defined contribution plan to recover
losses occasioned by a breach of fiduciary duty are
redressable and meet the constitutional standing
requirements of Article III. Accordingly, we reverse the
district court's dismissal of Harris's claims on standing
grounds.
C
Both plaintiffs challenge the district court's decision to
deny them leave to amend their Complaint. Plaintiffs seek
through amendment to cure any defects in their allegations
against the individual defendants,[6] and properly to name
the misidentified
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fiduciaries of the Amgen and Manufacturing Plans.
Dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is "
clear" that " the complaint could not be saved by any
amendment." Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 692
(9th Cir.2001) (quotation omitted); see alsoChappel v. Lab.
Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 726 (9th Cir.2000) (holding
that the district court abused its discretion in denying an
ERISA plaintiff leave to amend because " amendment
would allow [the plaintifl] to state a legally cognizable
claim for breach of fiduciary duty"). We agree with
Plaintiffs that the district court erred by not granting leave
to amend.
We do not believe that it can be fairly said that the
Complaint cannot be saved by amendment. The district
court denied Harris leave to amend because it had
determined that Harris lacked standing and thus could not
allege a valid claim. Because we have held that Harris has
statutory and constitutional standing, we also conclude that
Harris should be allowed to amend his claims in the
Complaint to challenge the proper defendants and to present
any viable claim. Both plaintiffs also should be allowed to
amend their claims against the individual defendants
because it is not " clear" that Plaintiffs cannot save their
Complaint by adding sufficient factual allegations
supporting their claims that the individual defendants were
fiduciaries of the Amgen or Manufacturing Plans. Lee, 250
F.3d at 692.
Plaintiffs' remaining claims were dismissed because they
misidentified the proper fiduciary defendants. Although
Plaintiffs did not name the Fiduciary Committee as a
defendant, they did name a Retirement Benefits Committee,
which they thought served the same fiduciary functions.
Also, Plaintiffs identified Amgen as the named fiduciary of
the Manufacturing Plan, when in fact Amgen
Manufacturing is the named fiduciary of that plan. In both
cases, Plaintiffs would have sued the proper fiduciary but
for a misidentification of the correct defendant, and their
claims against Amgen Manufacturing and the Fiduciary
Committee can be saved by amendment. SeeBawles v.
Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 758-59 (9th Cir.1999) (reversing
denial of leave to amend when the defendant to be added by
the amendment " knew or should have known that, but for
the mistaken identification, she would be a proper party
defendant in the action").
We conclude that Plaintiffs are entitled by law to amend
their Complaint to assert claims against the proper
fiduciaries of the Amgen and Manufacturing Plans. A sound
theory of pleading should normally permit at least one
amendment of a complex ERlSA complaint that has failed
to state a claim where, as here, the Plaintiffs might be
expected to have less than complete information about the

defendants' organization and ERISA responsibilities, where
there is no meaningful evidence of bad faith on the part of
the plaintiffs, and where there is no significant prejudice to
the defendants. We reverse the district court's denial of
leave to amend.

III
Fiduciaries of an ERlSA defined contribution plan who
breach their fiduciary duty might cause employees to
receive fewer benefits from their plans than they would
have received absent the breach. This is true even if the
employees later withdraw their assets from the plan. We
conclude that former employees who have voluntarily
withdrawn assets from their ERlSA defined contribution
plans have
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statutory and Article III standing to assert fiduciary claims
against Plan fiduciaries under ERlSA § 502(a)(2),
regardless of whether a separate remedy is available under
ERISA § 502(a)(l)(B). We also conclude that any defects in
Plaintiffs' Section 502(a)(2) Complaint possibly can be
cured through amendment. We reverse the district court's
dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint, and we remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.

Notes:
[I] A defined contribution plan is distinct from a" defined
benefit plan," which, with exceptions not relevant here, "
means a pension plan other than an individual account
plan." 29 U.S.C. § !002(35).
[2] A named fiduciary is " a fiduciary who is named in the
plan instrument" or by an authorized employer or employee
organization. 29 U.S.C. § I I 02(a)(2).
[3] Although the district court dismissed Harris's claims
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a dismissal for lack
of statutory standing is properly viewed as a dismissal for
failure to state a claim. SeeVaughn v. Bay Envtl. Mgmt.,
Inc., 567 F.3d 1021, !024 (9th Cir.2009). However, "
[b]ecause we review dismissals under both Rule 12(b)(l)
and Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, the district court's error [in
characterization] does not affect the result in this case." Id.
(citation omitted).
[4] Section 502(a)(I )(B) allows a plan participant " to
recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan." 29
U.S.C. § I 132(a)(l)(B). By contrast, Section 502(a)(2)
encompasses claims based on breach of fiduciary duty and

allows for the more expansive recovery of " appropriate
relief:" including disgorgement of profits and equitable
remedies. See 29 U.S.C. § § l 132(a)(2), 1109.
[5] In Vaughn, the ERISA plans at issue " no longer
exist[ed] and the allegedly imprudent investments were the
result of actions by the trustees and investment advisors, not
the plan administrator. As a result, Vaughn could not have
brought an action under§ 502(a)(l)(B) because the proper
defendants could not have been named under that
subsection." Vaughn, 567 F.3d at 1029.
[6] The district court determined that the Complaint made
insufficient factual allegations that the individual
defendants were fiduciaries of Ramos's ERISA plan.
SeePegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 226, 120 S.Ct 2143,
147 L.Ed.2d 164 (2000) ("In every case charging breach of
ERISA fiduciary duty, then, the threshold question is ...
whether [the defendant] was acting as a fiduciary (that is,
was performing a fiduciary function) when taking the action
subject to complaint."). We agree with the district court that
the Complaint does not contain factual allegations against
the individual defendants sufficient " to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d
929 (2007); id. (stating that to survive a motion to dismiss,
a plaintiff must provide " more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do"); see alsoAshcroft v. Iqbal. _ U.S. _,
129 S.Ct. 1937, 1953, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (holding that
the pleading requirements stated in Twombly apply to " all
civil actions").
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Habib SADID, an individual, Plaintiff,
v.

IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, Arthur Vailas, Richard
Jacobsen, and John/Jane Does I through X, whose true
identities are presently unknown, Defendants.

No. 4:ll-CV-103-BLW.
United States District Court, D. Idaho.
August 10, 2011

32, 37. In September 2008, Mr. Sadid initiated a state court
action against ISU for declining to appoint him as Civil
Engineering Department Chair, despite a faculty vote in his
favor. Id. at ,r ,r 21-23, 30. Mr. Sadid engaged Defendant
Jacobsen in a " private discussion at a public venue" on
April 9, 2009, Id. at Intro. ,r, for which he was issued a
letter ofreprimand by Defendant Jacobsen. Id. at ,r 40. At a
College of Education faculty meeting on April 21, 2009,
Mr. Sadid " engaged in the discussions during the meeting
where he felt he had input" and allegedly " was very direct,
very professional and not intimidated by others during this
discourse." Id. at 47. As a result of his behavior in this
meeting, Defendant Jacobsen issued a Notice of
Contemplated Action to Mr. Sadid, stating his intent to
recommend terminating Mr. Sadid because of his "
continued pattern of behavior" at ISU. Id. at 50-51. Finally,
Mr. Sadid " received a letter of reprimand in regard to
purchases made," from ISU Provost, Gary Olson, dated July
2, 2009. Id. at ,r 53.
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Ronaldo Arthur Coulter, Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law
Group, PLLC, Eagle, ID, for Plaintiff.
John A. Bailey, Jr., Carol Tippi Volyn, Racine Olson Nye
Budge & Bailey, Pocatello, ID, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
B. LYNN WINMILL, Chief Judge.
INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
(Dkt. 8) and Plaintiffs Motion to Strike (Dkt. 11 ). For the
reasons explained below, the Court will grant Defendants'
motion in part and deny it in part, and deny Plaintiffs
motion to strike.[!]
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Habib Sadid, a tenured associate professor in
Idaho State University's (" ISU" ) Civil Engineering
Department, was terminated by ISU through its president,
Defendant Arthur Vailas, based upon a recommendation by
Defendant Richard Jacobsen, Dean of the ISU's College of
Engineering. Comp/. at ,r ,r 60, 77, Dkt. l.
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Mr. Sadid has alleged that a number of events and
circumstances culminated in his termination. First, Mr.
Sadid publicly criticized ISU on various matters which he
alleges are of public concern. Id at ,r ,r 15, 17, 19, 24-25,

On July 17, 2009, Mr. Sadid and his counsel met with
Defendant Jacobsen and ISU's counsel, allowing Mr. Sadid
"to present [mitigating] evidence or information" on his "
pattern of behavior." Id at ,r ,r 52, 56. Allegedly, the focus
of this meeting was Mr. Sadid's behavior at the April 21
College of Engineering meeting. Id. at ,r 58. On August 3,
2009, Defendant Jacobsen recommended terminating Mr.
Sadid for his behavior on April 9 and 21; "unprofessional
behavior in past academic years" that adversely affected
ISU, its fundraising efforts and " staff and administrator [
sic J that had left ISU" ; " [c]reating a hostile work
environment ... which caused some faculty to leave and
others to consider leaving ISU," " [n]on-conformance with
purchasing policies" ; and " [c]onsistent disruptive
behavior." Id. at ,r 61. Mr. Sadid alleges that the only
ground for termination he was aware of was for his
behavior on April 9 and 21, id. at 160, though it is clear he
was also aware of the purchasing issues prior to the July 17
conference. Id. at ,r 53. The next day, Defendant Vailas
notified Mr. Sadid that he was being recommended for
termination. Id. at 62.

Mr. Sadid submitted a Notice of Grievance on August 18,
2009. Id at ,r 63. ISU held a grievance hearing for Mr.
Sadid, and he alleges that " during the hearing process, ISU
raised issues in support of [his] termination that were never
a part of the [Notice of Contemplated Action] issued to
[him] and of which [he] never received notice." Id. at 65-66.
Based on the hearing, ISU's Faculty Appeals Board found "
insufficient evidence" warranting termination. Id. at 67. The
4 to 1 majority was particularly concerned by what it
termed a " lack of due process." Id. at 68. ISU's Faculty
Senate- though not related or privy to the hearing- also

pay any judgment obtained against it, the judgment creditor
must bring his action in [Idaho Supreme Court] based upon
such judgment, and ask for a recommendatory judgment to
the Legislature." Moscow Hardware Co. v. Regents of Univ.
of Idaho, l 9 Idaho 420, 113 P. 731 (1911 ).[5] Finally, ISU
is more like the Stoner and Regents entities than the
Beentjes entity because its largest source of funds is still the
state. Presentation to: The Joint Finance-Appropriations
Committee, slide 10.
Moving to the second Mitchell factor, ISU serves the
central government because it establishes and maintains "
the intelligence of the people," crucial to " [t]he stability of
a republican form of government." Idaho Const. Art. IX, §
1. See alsoRounds v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 166
F.3d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir.1999).
Third, ISU is " a body politic and corporate, with its own
seal and having power to sue and be sued in its own name."
LC. § 33-3003. However, the United States Supreme
Court's decision in College Savings Bank calls into question
the prudence of giving any serious weight to this factor.
Although discussing waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity, it noted that an otherwise immune state agency
does not " consent to suit in federal court merely by stating
its intention to ' sue and be sued.' " College Savings Bank,
527 U.S. at 669, 119 S.Ct. 2219.
Fourth, although ISU has been given the power " [t]o
acquire by purchase, gift or the exercise of the right of
eminent domain and hold and dispose of real or personal
property or rights or interests therein," LC. § 33-3804, "
[a]ll rights and title to property, real or personal, belonging
to or vested in the Idaho State University are ... vested in its
board of trustees and their successors." LC. § 33-3005.
Finally, ISU's corporate status is that of " a body politic
and corporate and a separate and independent legal entity."
LC. § 33-3803. However, in the same breath the State "
further confirm[s] [ISU] as a governmental instrumentality
for the dissemination of knowledge and learning." Id.
Although ISU is an entity that experiences a certain
amount of autonomy deriving from its ability to generate
non-state revenues and its designation as an " independent
legal entity," the balance of the Mitchell factors demonstrate
that it is an arm of the State of Idaho. As in Ferguson, this
Court finds that ISU is immune from suit in federal court,
particularly because of the " ' impact' on the State treasury"
a judgment against it would have. Ferguson, 647 F.Supp. at
192.
B. ISU Has Not Waived Its Immunity
A state consents to a suit, or waives its Eleventh
Amendment immunity, by (l) " voluntarily invok[ing] our
jurisdiction"
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or (2) " mak[ing] a clear declaration that it intends to
submit itself to our jurisdiction.'' College Savings Bank, 527
U.S. at 676, 119 S.Ct. 2219 (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
First," [a] state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity
if it ' unequivocally evidence [s its] intention to subject
itself to the jurisdiction of the federal court.' " Johnson v.
Rancho Santiago Commty. College Dist., 623 F.3d 1011,
1021 (9th Cir.2010)(quoting Hill v. Blind Indus. & Svcs. of
Md., 179 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir.1999)). Waiver occurred in
Hill " when the state did not raise the defense until the
opening day of trial, after it had filed two motions to
dismiss and an answer that did not assert the defense,
consented to have a magistrate judge try the case, conducted
discovery, moved to compel discovery and for sanctions,
participated in a pre-trial conference, and filed trial
materials.'' Johnson, 623 F.3d at 1021-1022 (discussing
Hill, 179 F.3d at 758); see alsoin re Bliemeister, 296 F.3d
858, 862 (9th Cir.2002) (the state waived sovereign
immunity when it filed a limited response, an answer, and a
motion for summary judgment; attended an oral hearing and
argued the merits; and heard the court announce its
preliminary leanings, all without raising the sovereign
immunity defense). The defendant in Johnson similarly
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by " litigat[ing]
the suit on its merits, participat[ing] in discovery, and
fil[ing] a motion to dismiss and a summary judgment
motion without pressing a sovereign immunity defense,"
even though it " baldly asserted" the defense in its answer.
Johnson, 623 F.3d at 1022.
ISU has only submitted this motion and disputed Mr.
Sadid's motion to strike its reply. Such is insufficient to
constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Second, as discussed above, " a State does not consent to
suit in federal court merely by consenting to suit in the
courts of its own creation." College Savings Bank, 527 U.S.
at 676 (internal citations omitted). " Nor does it consent to
suit in federal court merely by stating its intention to ' sue
and be sued,' or even by authorizing suits against it' in any
court of competent jurisdiction.' " Id (internal quotations
and citations omitted). Accordingly, ISU's statutory
authorization to " sue and be sued," I.C. § 33-3003, is
insufficient to constitute a conscious waiver.
C. Federal Law Has Not Abrogated ISU's Immunity
Finally, ISU's Eleventh Amendment immunity has not
been abrogated by congressional authorization. " We cannot
conclude that § 1983 was intended to disregard the
well-established immunity of a State from being sued
without its consent." Will v. Mich. Dept. ofState Police, 491

U.S. 58, 67, 109 S.Ct 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989).
2. Defendants Vailas and Jacobsen
A. Official Capacity

Mr. Sadid has brought suit against Defendants V ailas and
Jacobsen in their official capacities in all counts of his
lawsuit. " [S]uits against state officials in their official
capacity are no different from suits against the state itself."
Krainski v. Nevada, 616 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir.2010)
(citing Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989)). There
is, however, " [a] narrow exception ... ' where the relief
sought is prospective in nature and is based on an ongoing
violation of the plaintiffs federal constitutional or statutory
rights.'" Id. at 967-968 (quoting Central Reserve Life of N.
Am. Ins. Co. v. Struve, 852 F.2d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir.1988))
(emphasis in original). Under this exception- termed the

The claims against ISU and against Defendants Vailas and
Jacobsen in their official capacities cannot be cured and are
therefore dismissed with prejudice. All other counts against
Defendants Vailas and Jacobsen in their individual
capacities remain.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
I. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dk:t. 8) is GRANTED
IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. All counts against ISU
and against Defendants Vailas and Jacobsen in their official
capacities are dismissed. All charges against Defendants
Vailas and Jacobsen in their individual capacities remain.

2. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike (Dk:t. I l) is DENIED as
moot.
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Ex Parte Young doctrine [6]- " official-capacity actions

for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the
State." Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n. IO, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (internal
quotations omitted).
" In determining whether Ex Parte Young is applicable ...
the relevant inquiry is only whether [Plaintift] has alleged
an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks prospective
relief." Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Vaughn, 509
F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir.2007). The " court need only
conduct a straightforward inquiry." Verizon Md., Inc. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645, 122 S.Ct.
1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002) (internal quotations omitted).

Mr. Sadid is seeking monetary damages, reinstatement,
attorney fees and costs and removal of negative statements
in his personnel file. Comp!. at 36, Dk:t. 1. But he has not
alleged an ongoing violation of federal law, and these
remedies are all retrospective. Accordingly, Defendants
Vailas and Jacobsen are immune from suit in their official
capacities under the Eleventh Amendment.
B. Individual Capacity

Mr. Sadid has also sued Defendants Vailas and Jacobsen in
their individual capacities. Although Defendants seek
dismissal of Mr. Sadid's Complaint in its entirety, the only
asserted basis for dismissal is Eleventh Amendment
immunity. However, Eleventh Amendment immunity does
not apply to claims brought against defendants in their
individual capacities. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss
Mr. Sadid's claims against Defendants Vailas and Jacobsen
in their individual capacities will be denied.
CONCLUSION

Notes:
[l] Plaintiff moved to strike Defendants' Reply for
exceeding the ten-page limit. Dk:t. I l . The Court
subsequently granted Defendants' Motion (Dk:t. 12) to
Exceed the page limit Dk:t. 17. For that reason, and because
the Court did not consider the excess pages in its decision
here, Plaintiffs motion to strike will be denied as moot.
[2] The Court has some concern about the continued
vitality of the liberal amendment policy adopted in Harris
v. Amgen, based as it is on language in Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957),
suggesting that " a complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim.... " Given Twombly and Iqbal' s rejection of the
liberal pleading standards adopted by Conley, a question
arises whether the liberal amendment policy of Harris v.
Amgen still exists. Nevertheless, the Circuit has continued
to apply the liberal amendment policy even after dismissing
claims for violating Iqbal and Twombly.SeeMarket Trading,
Inc. v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 388 Fed.Appx. 707 (9th
Cir.2010) (not for publication). Accordingly, the Court will
continue to employ the liberal amendment policy.
[3] These factors were first addressed by the Ninth Circuit
in Mitchell v. Los Angeles Comm. Coll. Dist., 861 F.2d 198
(9th Cir.1988).
[4] Though Stoner was a suit brought under 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a), it hinged on whether the state agencies being sued
were a" person" under§ 3729. 502 F.3d at 1121. Because"
Eleventh Amendment case law should guide [the]
determination of whether an entity is a state agency and
thus not a ' person' for purposes of§ 3729," id, its analysis

is still pertinent here.
[5] The University of Idaho's Board of Regents and ISU's
Board of Trustees are the same: the Idaho State Board of
Education, and the Idaho State Board of Education has the
same general responsibilities over both institutions. LC. §§
33-2802, 33-3003. Accordingly, Moscow Hardware also
establishes the State of Idaho's legal liability for ISU's
debts.
[6] The United States Supreme Court first conducted the
analysis in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52
L.Ed. 714 (1908).
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magistrate's judgment dismissing the Lanham Act claim and
dismissing without prejudice the pendent state claims.
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Appellant, Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc., ("Cook") is a
California law firm engaged primarily in commercial and
consumer debt collection in Northern California Lawrence
H. Cassidy, appellee, is chief executive officer of appellee,
Northern California Collection Service ("NCC"), a
California corporation that provides debt collection services
for its clients.
Giving rise to this suit was an advertisement placed by
NCC in McCords Daily Notification Sheet, a San Francisco
publication that provides credit information to subscribers.
The advertisement stated:
DO YOU PAY FOR AN AITORNEY TO DO YOUR
COLLECTION WORK? And pay. And pay. And pay!
Were you quoted a really low "collection fee" only to find
that "costs" are eating you alive? Do you find that you are
doing all the "leg work" for your lawyer? Then call
us--we're the low cost commercial collection experts.
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California.
Before WALLACE, PREGERSON and ALARCON,
Circuit Judges.
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PERCURIAM:
Appellant Cook, Perkiss & Liehe appeals the decision of a
United States Magistrate acting pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec.
636(c) granting appellees' motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim for false advertising under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. l 125(a). We agree with the
magistrate that Cook's complaint does not state a claim for
relief under the Lanham Act because, as a matter oflaw, the
alleged misrepresentations contained in the appellees'
advertisement are merely "puffery." We therefore affirm the

Cook filed a complaint in the United States District Court,
Northern District of California, on April 29, 1988 and an
amended complaint on May 16, 1988, alleging five causes
of action with regard to the advertisement. The first is a
false advertising claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act (the "Act"), 15 U.S.C. Sec. l 125(a). The remaining
claims are state and common law causes of action for unfair
competition, libel, defamation, and disparagement.
The parties consented to proceed before a U.S. Magistrate
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(c). On August 2, 1988,
Magistrate Claudia Wilken granted, without leave to
amend, NCC's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under the Lanham Act. She then declined to exercise
jurisdiction over the pendent state claims in the absence of a
cognizable claim under the Lanham Act, and dismissed
them without prejudice. A judgment was entered by
Magistrate Wilken on September 9, 1988.

1) in its .. . advertisements, defendant made false
statements offact about its own product; [l l]

Magistrate Wilken found that false advertising under
section 43(a) of the Act is limited to false representations
with respect to a defendant's own product and services, so
that to the extent NCC's advertisement made false
representations about Cook's or collection attorneys'
services, rather than its own, such representations are not
actionable under the Lanham Act. Cook does not contest
this legal finding on appeal. [l]

2) those advertisements actually deceived or have the
tendency to deceive a substantial segment of their audience;
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4) defendant caused its falsely advertised goods to enter
interstate commerce; and

Magistrate Wilken granted the motion to dismiss because
she found that the alleged implied misrepresentations
concerning NCC's own services (that NCC's fees are lower
than those of any attorney and that NCC performs the same
services as attorneys at a better or more competitive price)
were not actionable under the Act because they constituted
mere "puffery" rather than factual claims upon which a
reasonable consumer would rely.
Cook contends that the dismissal was improper. It argues
that its complaint sufficiently stated each element of a false
advertising claim under the Lanham Act, and that the
district court improperly made a factual determination in
holding that the advertisement was puffery and therefore
not actionable. Cook also asserts that it could have added
other federal claims which would have saved the pendent
claims from dismissal and that the district court therefore
abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint without
leave to amend.
DISCUSSION
I. Dismissal For Failure to State a Claim

A. Standard of Review
We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6). Guillory v. County of Orange, 731 F.2d 1379,
1381 (9th Cir.1984). We must accept material allegations in
the complaint as true and construe them in the light most
favorable to the appellant, Cook. Ascon Properties, Inc. v.
Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir.1989). We
may affirm the district court's dismissal "only if it is clear
that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that
could be proved consistent with the allegations." Id.
(quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104
S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984)).
B. Analysis
On appeal, the parties agree on the elements that must be
alleged in order to state a false advertising claim under
section 43(a) of the Act. These elements were set out in Ski!
Corp. v. Rockwell Int'! Corp., 375 F.Supp. 777, 783
(N.D.111.1974):

3) such deception is material, in that it is likely to
influence the purchasing decision;

5) plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as the result
of the foregoing either by direct diversion of sales from
itself to defendant, or by lessening of the good will which
its products enjoy with the buying public.
Id. (footnote omitted). [2] See also Oil Heat Inst. of
Oregon v. Northwest Natural Gas, 708 F.Supp. 1118, 1121
(D.Or.1988).
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The controversy in this case centers around elements one
and two. NCC makes one overt statement about its own
services in its advertisement: "[W]e're the low cost
commercial collection experts." However, a false
advertising cause of action under the Act is not limited to
literal falsehoods; it extends to false representations made
by implication or innuendo. In American Home Products
Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160 (2d Cir.1978),
the Second Circuit stated:
That Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act encompasses more
than literal falsehoods cannot be questioned. Were it
otherwise, clever use of innuendo, indirect intimations, and
ambiguous suggestions could shield the advertisement from
scrutiny precisely when protection against such
sophisticated deception is most needed.
Id. at 165 (citations omitted). See also U-Haul Int1, Inc. v.
Jartran, Inc., 522 F.Supp. 1238, 1247 (D.Ariz.1981), afl'd,
681 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir.1982); cf. American Home Products
Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 695 F.2d 681, 687 (3d
Cir.1982).
Therefore, Cook may allege--and we are willing to accept
as true for the purposes of this appeal--that the
advertisement as a whole can be read as implying that NCC
offers the same collection services as lawyers at a lower or
more competitive price. The dispositive issue, however, is
whether this alleged misrepresentation is merely "puffery,"
as the lower court found, and thus not actionable under the
act, or whether it is a statement of fact which has the
tendency to deceive the reader.
Cook does not refute the contention that puffing

immunizes an advertisement from liability under the
Lanham Act. Indeed, there is much support for this
contention. See Stiffel Co. v. Westwood Lighting Group,
658 F.Supp. I 103, 1115 (D.N.J.1987); Toro Co. v. Textron,
Inc., 499 F.Supp. 241, 253 n. 23 (D.Del.1980);
Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., 242
F.Supp. 302, 308-09 (N.D.Ill.1%5). Cook argues, however,
that whether a statement in an advertisement constitutes
"puffing" is a question of fact that may not be determined
by a court in a 12(b)(6) motion. Cook contends that it
should have been allowed to introduce evidence showing
that these misrepresentations could have misled the public.

It is well-established that questions of fact cannot be
resolved or determined on a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rennie &
Laughlin, Inc. v. Chzysler Corp., 242 F.2d 208, 212 (9th
Cir.1957). It is also well-established that a court must
accept material allegations as true and construe them in the
light most favorable to the appellant. Ascon, 866 F.2d at
Il52.
Here, we are willing to accept as true Cook's allegation
that the advertisement implies that NCC offers the same
collection services as lawyers at a lower price. However, we
still may determine as a matter of law whether this alleged
misrepresentation is a statement of fact, actionable under
the Lanham Act, or mere puffezy. District courts often
resolve whether a statement is puffezy when considering a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) and we can think of no sound reason
why they should not do so. See Cohen v. Prudential-Bache
Sec., Inc., 713 F.Supp. 653, 658 (S.D.N.Y.1989)
(considering whether a securities broker's statement
constituted puffing in determining whether to grant a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for securities
fraud); Metzner v. D.H. Blair & Co., 689 F.Supp. 262,
263-64 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (dismissing a count alleging that
brokerage firm's representatives made untrue satements of
material facts because the alleged statements were "merely
puffezy" and therefore not actionable under the securities
laws); Radio Today, Inc. v. Westwood One, Inc., 684
F.Supp. 68, 74 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (considering whether
alleged misrepresentations were puffezy in determining
whether a complaint stated a cause of action for false
advertising under the Lanham Act); Testing Systems, Inc. v.

found to be puffezy in Metro Mobile Cts, Inc. v. Newvector
Communications, Inc., 643 F.Supp. 1289 (D.Ariz.1986)
rev'd without opinion, 803 F.2d 724 (9th Cir.1986). [3] The
district court in Metro Mobile stated that: " 'Puffing' has
been described by most courts as involving outrageous
generalized statements, not making specific claims, that are
so exaggerated as to preclude reliance by consumers." Id. at
1292. It found the following statement to be puffery, and
therefore not actionable under Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act: "We ask you: Would you prefer to do business with the
phone company with the best technology, lower rates, and
better customer service?" Id. at 1293. Magistrate Wilken
found NCC's advertisement to be similar to this
advertisement in that they both imply lower rates and better
services than those of a competitor. She stated that "Here,
the implication of the advertisement is an exaggerated claim
that defendants' costs are lower than any competing
attorney's. It is beyond the realm of reason to assert, as
plaintiffs do, that a reasonable consumer would interpret
this as a factual claim upon which he or she could rely."
We agree with the district court that any implication that
can be drawn from NCC's advertisement regarding NCC's
lower costs and superiority over collection attorneys
constitutes puffezy and is not actionable as false advertising
under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
In the FTC context, we have recognized puffezy in
advertising to be "claims [which] are either vague or highly
subjective." Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 741 F.2d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir.1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1084, 105 S.Ct. 1843, 85 L.Ed.2d 143
(1985). The common theme that seems to run through cases
considering puffery in a variety of contexts is that consumer
reliance will be induced by specific rather than general
assertions. "[A]dvertising which merely states in general
terms that one product is superior is not actionable."
Smith-Victor, 242 F.Supp. at 308.
"However,
misdescriptions of specific or absolute characteristics of a
product are actionable." Stiffel, 658 F.Supp. at 1115. In
Smith-Victor, an advertiser's statement that its lamps were
"far brighter than any lamp ever before offered for home
movies" was ruled puffery. However, when the advertiser
quantified numerically the alleged superior brightness with
statements such as "35,000 candle power and IO-hour life,"
the court found a potential Lanham Act claim. 242 F.Supp.
at 308-09.
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Magnaflux
Corp.,
251
F.Supp.
286,
288-89
(E.D.Penn.1966) (considering whether statements were
"puffs" in determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim for trade libel or disparagement).
In determining that NCC's advertisement was not
actionable, Magistrate Wilken compared it to a statement

Here, the alleged misrepresentations in NCC's
advertisement are merely general in nature. The statement
that "we're the low cost commercial collection experts" and
any implication that NCC has comparable services to
attorneys at lower rates are general assertions of superiority
rather than factual misrepresentations. The advertisement
does not contain the kind of detailed or specific factual
assertions that are necessazy to state a false advertising

cause of action under the Act. We agree with Magistrate
Wilken that "it is beyond the realm of reason to assert ...
that a reasonable consumer would interpret this as a factual
claim upon which he or she could rely."

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d
218 (1966). Therefore, the district court's action in this
regard was proper.
AFFIRMED.

II. Denial of Leave to Amend
Cook argues that the district court improperly denied its
motion for leave to amend its complaint. NCC contends that
Cook never made a motion to amend. In its reply brief,
Cook points out that it requested leave to amend in its brief
in opposition to the motion to dismiss.
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We have held that in dismissals for failure to state a claim,
a district court should grant leave to amend even if no
request to amend the pleading was made, unless it
determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by
the allegation of other facts. Bonanno v. Thomas, 309 F.2d
320,322 (9th Cir.1962) (citing Sidebotham v. Robison, 216
F.2d 816, 826 (9th Cir.1954); see also Erlich v. Glasner,
352 F.2d 119, 122 (9th Cir.1965). Therefore, it is of no
consequence that Cook did not file a formal motion,
accompanied by a proposed amendment, requesting leave to
amend.
Here, it is apparent that the district court determined that
the pleading could not be cured by the allegation of other
facts. Because it found that the advertisement was not a
factual representation and therefore not actionable, no
amendment would have been able to cure this defect.
Cook also contends that it should have been granted leave
to amend to add other federal claims so that its pendent
state claims, which it asserts are now time barred, would not
have been dismissed. In the lower court proceedings on the
motion, however, Cook did not indicate in any way that it
had other federal claims to bring when the court solicited
arguments from the attorneys on the issue of dismissing the
pendent claims. In addition, the federal causes of action that
Cook lists in its reply brief that it contends could have been
added to save the pleading are either incomprehensible or
futile. Therefore, the district court's decision to grant the
motion without leave to amend was proper.
III. Dismissal of Pendent State Law Claims
The lower court dismissed without prejudice Cook's
pendent state claims. When federal claims are dismissed
before trial, the question whether pendent state claims
should still be entertained is within the discretion of the
district court. Schultz v. Sundberg, 759 F.2d 714, 718 (9th
Cir.1985). We have held that the proper exercise of
discretion is to dismiss the pendent state claims as well.
Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d
646, 651 (9th Cir.1984) (citing United Mine Workers v.

Notes:
[l]At the time of the magistrate's decision, section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1125(a), applied only to
misrepresentations about a defendants' own products or
services. See U-Haul Int'!, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 681 F.2d
1159, 1160-62 (9th Cir.1982) ("False statements offact in a
defendant's advertising concerning his product fit
comfortably within the language of section 43(a).");
Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1406
(9th Cir.1988) ("Section 43( a) ... reaches false advertising
about the goods or services of the advertiser."). Section
43(a) then provided:
(a) Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in
connection with any goods or services, or any container or
containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any
false decription or representation, including words or other
symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same,
and shall cause such goods or services to enter into
commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the
falsity of such designation of origin or description or
representation cause or procure the same to be transported
or used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be
transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by any
person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as
that of origin or in the region in which said locality is
situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is
likely to be damaged by the use of any such false
description or representation.
[15]U.S.C. Sec. 1125(a) (1982).
This section was amended, effective November 16, 1989,
and now encompasses statements made by a defendant
about "his or her or another person's products." See
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub.L. 100-667,
Sec. 132, 102 Stat. 3946 (1988), 15 U.S.C. Sec. l 125(a)
( 1988) (emphasis added).
At no point during this appeal has appellant argued that the
amended version of the Act should be applied to this appeal
or that the district court erred in its legal conclusion that the
alleged misrepresentions concerning Cook's or collection
attorneys' services are not actionable. Therefore, we decline
to address either of these issues. See International Union of
Bricklayers & Allied Craftsman Local Union No. 20,
AFL-CIO v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th
Cir.1985).

[2]We note that under the newly amended version of
section 43(a), the first element would also include
statements about another person's products. See supra, at
243.
[3]In Metro Mobile the district court granted preliminary
injunctive relief to ban the defendants' advertisements (it
found defendants' other advertisements to be misleading
and not puffery) and we reversed without opinion.

APPENDIX I
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150 Wu.App. 491 (Wash.App. Div. 1 2009)
208 P.3d 1126

In the Matter of the GUARDIANSHIP OF Louise
Laverne WELLS, an incapacitated person.
Care Planning Associates, Guardian for the Estate of
Louise L. Wells, Respondent,

then litigation when Wells and one of her daughters filed an
action to quiet title against the claimed interests of Dirk
Mayberry, his spouse, and one of his corporate entities,
Response Capital Mortgage, Inc. (collectively referred to as
Mayberry). Mayberry claimed a 50 percent interest in the
home. During the litigation, Wells was determined to be
incapacitated and guardians of her estate and person were
appointed.[!] Wells moved out of the family home to live
with the guardians of her person. Following the
establishment of the guardianship, the guardian of the
estate, its counsel, and counsel for Wells engaged in
settlement negotiations with Mayberry. A settlement was
reached and an agreement

v.
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Dirk Mayberry, Start Corporation of America and
Response Capital Mortgage, Inc., Appellants.
No. 60801-1-1.

drafted. Its execution was contingent on approval by the
court, and the agreement was not considered fully executed
until such approval was obtained. The agreement provided
shall be
that upon execution, the quiet title action
dismissed with prejudice in accordance with Civil Rule 41.
The court approved the agreement, authorizing the guardian
to take all actions necessary to carry out its provisions. The
agreement allowed Wells' adult children who lived in the
home to reside there as tenants for an additional 90 days, so
long as they paid rent and all utilities. Response Capital
Mortgage, Inc. (Response Capital), and Start Corporation of
America (Start Corp.) were not to be responsible for repairs
or maintenance of the home.
II
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PERCURIAM.
[150 Wn.App. 494] ,r I In guardianship proceedings, the
superior court has broad and exclusive jurisdiction over the
administration of the estate of an incapacitated individual.
In hearing such matters, the court also has the authority to
impose sanctions for civil contempt to coerce a party's
compliance with a judgment or order. We have reviewed
the record and affirm the trial court in all respects and
award attorney fees on appeal.
FACTS

,r 2 Louise Laverne Wells, her adult children, and others,
claimed various ownership interests in the family home in
Seattle. Title to the home was the subject of dispute and

11

,r 3 The agreement also set forth that Wells would receive
funds within 60 days of its approval and a remaining
balance to be paid into a Medicaid Pooled Trust for her
benefit.[2] Mayberry, Response Capital, Start Corp., and
Elizabeth Wilson [3] executed a [208 P.3d 1129]
promissory note and deed of trust securing the note in favor
of Wells and her attorney in the amount of$54,83I.27, due
and payable April 29, 2007. In addition to its provision for
interest, the promissory note also included a section
providing for attorney fees and costs.[4] In return, all claims
to the property were deeded to Response Capital and Start
Corp.

,r 4 Wells did not receive funds by the due date. Pursuant
to the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA),
chapter 11.96A RCW, the guardian petitioned for and
obtained [150 Wn.App. 496] a citation directing Response
Capital and Dick and Jane Doe Mayberry to appear Before
the court to show cause why their obligations under the
agreement had not been met.[5]
,r 5 The scheduled hearing was continued a number of
times at the request of counsel for Mayberry, with the

eventual hearing set for October 5, 2007. [6] The day
Before this hearing, Mayberry appeared unannounced at the
office of counsel for the guardian requesting another
continuance. He claimed the adult children of Wells caused
considerable damage to the family home after the
agreement was approved. The guardian did not agree to a
continuance.
,i 6 At the October 5 hearing, Mayberry did not dispute his
breach of the agreements or provide a written response to
the petition, but raised the claim of alleged damage to the
home by Wells' adult children. Mayberry testified under
oath that the sale of the house that was to provide the funds
for distribution to Wells had occurred. He produced copies
of two cashier's checks made out to Wells, but admitted he
did not have the original checks. After review of these
copies, the commissioner set the hearing over until 3:00
p.m. and instructed Mayberry to prepare a written response
to the petition, set forth any claims about the damage to the
house, and bring the originals of the cashier's checks to the
court. The court specifically stated to counsel:
Your client is not going to scam this Court with " I don't
have possession of the checks." ... He's invited to bring the
checks to
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Court as I've advised him, and I told him we would discuss
what's going to happen. I'll hear from you by a written
presentation from him as to what his issues are, but if I don't
see those checks at 3:00, counsel, I will be issuing a citation
for his arrest and incarceration until the checks are
produced. Very clear. All right?
,i 7 At the 3 :00 p.m. hearing, counsel for Mayberry
appeared, but Mayberry did not. Mayberry failed to provide
a written response or produce the original cashier's checks
as ordered by the court. Counsel for the guardian requested
judgment against Mayberry, authority to foreclose on the
home property, and authority to intervene in any bankruptcy
action if necessary. Counsel for the guardian asked the court
to amend the judgment to include Start Corp., the entity that
owned the house sold to provide the (208 P .3d 1130) funds
due, as well as being a party to the settlement agreement.
,i 8 The commissioner granted the relief sought in the
petition for citation. Then, acting on its own motion, the
court imposed sanctions on Mayberry, Start Corp. and
Response Capital, totaling $100 a day, to begin
immediately, until the judgments were satisfied. The court
entered judgment of $9,000 to secure payment of the
sanction. At the end of 90 days, if the judgment was not yet
satisfied, the guardian could seek renewal of the sanction
and extend it. The sanction was to be lifted once the
judgment was paid.[7]

,i 9 The comm1ss10ner found that Mayberry and his
corporate entities were attempting to avoid paying the
money due under the agreement. After Mayberry's earlier
testimony, the commissioner gave little credence to
Mayberry's damage claim but told him to make his
argument at the afternoon hearing, which he did not do.[8]
[150 Wn.App. 498) ,i 10 The commissioner fully explained
to counsel for Mayberry that if the original cashier's checks
were proffered to the court, it would rescind the order and
quash the bench warrant. The commissioner reiterated that
the court was required to act as a " super guardian" to
protect the disabled citizens of the state who are subject to
the jurisdiction of the court. The commissioner encouraged
counsel for the guardian to consider a number of additional
options to persuade Mayberry to pay off the judgment. [9]
,i 11 On October 18, 2007, counsel for the guardian and
Mayberry appeared to present the judgment underlying the
sanctions imposed and additional relief suggested by the
court. The commissioner inquired how counsel for the
guardian was planning to proceed, as the commissioner was
concerned about the cost to the parties, including Mayberry.
Counsel for Mayberry stated, " I can't say I'm absolutely
sure, but I'm somewhat sure that my client is willing to pay
like $35,000 now towards this judgment, which would then
leave 20-some-odd thousand or so owning." Counsel also
said he could understand that the guardian might have some
difficulty with that, given the history of the case. The
commissioner told counsel that when Mayberry deposited
that amount of money with the court and provided title
reports on other properties, over which he clearly had
ownership or control, and for which he could sign a note
and deed of trust, then the court might be willing to proceed
with the plan. The court indicated that the transaction would
have to be handled by a title company so there would be no
question of any interim transfers of the property used. And
Mayberry would have to pay for all the expenses due to
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the delay. Additionally, the commissioner indicated he
would be willing to reduce the sanctions and simply charge
Mayberry for attorney fees that he caused counsel for the
guardian to incur, so long as at least $35,000 was paid from
a local bank, not a foreign bank, and other security for the
guardianship was in place. [10]

,i 12 The commissioner signed the order imposing further
relief and judgment against Mayberry, Response Capital
and Start Corp. The court also issued an order authorizing
the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of [208 P.3d 1131]
Mayberry, which included the steps he needed to take to
gain release following arrest.
,i 13 Mayberry, Response Capital and Start Corp. moved to

revise the October 18 order and judgment. Before action
was taken on these motions, Mayberry filed a notice of
appeal. Thereafter, this court granted permission for the
superior court to hear the motion to revise. On December
13, 2007, the superior court granted Start Corp.'s motion to
revise and ordered that only the judgment entered against
Start Corp. was vacated. The appeal follows.[11]
DECISION

1 14 Mayberry first argues the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement and to
determine liability. The question of subject matter
jurisdiction is a question oflaw that we review de novo.[12]
Subject matter jurisdiction is " the authority of the court to
hear and determine the class of actions to which the case
belongs." [13] Because Washington courts are courts of
general
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jurisdiction, they lack subject matter jurisdiction only in
compelling circumstances.

1 15 Mayberry claims the court sitting in guardianship
proceedings did not have jurisdiction because the
underlying action was one of quiet title. Mayberry is
incorrect. The court was not being asked to determine title,
but was presented with a controversy relating to property of
the estate being held by the appellants.
'If 16 TEDRA mandates using nonjudicial resolution in
trust and estate cases, but permits judicial resolution if other
methods are unsuccessful.[14] Under TEDRA, " [t]he
superior court of every county has original subject matter
jurisdiction over the probate of wills and the administration
of estates of incapacitated, missing, and deceased
individuals in all instances." [15] The guardian filed a
petition invoking TEDRA, which gives superior courts
broad and exclusive jurisdiction over the estates of
incapacitated individuals. Here Mayberry and Response
Capital were served with process and were parties to the
settlement agreement with others, including the guardian of
the estate of Wells, and thus the court had subject matter
jurisdiction.

'If 17 In any event, Mayberry and Response Capital failed
to preserve this defense as they did not initially assert the
claim in a responsive pleading or by timely motion. CR
12(b ); 12(h)(l )(B).

1 18 Next, Mayberry argues the commissioner improperly
entered an order imposing sanctions against him and his
corporate entities because there was no requisite finding by
the court that he had the current means to satisfy the
judgment to permit the court to impose sanctions for civil
contempt. (16]

[150 Wn.App. 501] 1 19 RCW 7.21.020 provides the
authority to impose sanctions for contempt.[17] Sanctions
for civil contempt are remedial, i.e., intended to coerce a
party's compliance with a judgment or order while at the
same time [208 P.3d 1132] permitting the contemnor to
avoid the sanction by doing something to purge the
contempt.[18] Where a remedial sanction has been
imposed, the contemnor effectively " ' carries the keys of
his prison in his own pocket.' " [19]

1 20 Here, Mayberry does not dispute that he failed to
comply with the court's judgment. He claims for the first
time on appeal that the court failed to enter the requisite
finding that he had the current ability to comply with the
order of civil contempt. While the court did not enter
specific numbered findings regarding Mayberry's ability to
currently comply with the sanction, review of the transcript
of the hearing and the order imposing contempt reveals that
Mayberry, under oath, represented to the court that he had
the ability to pay and never argued that he did not. The
court specifically acknowledged Mayberry's testimony that
he obtained cashier's checks to satisfy the amounts due.
Mayberry was directed to bring those checks to the court.
The court imposed sanctions only after Mayberry failed to
appear, respond to the petition, or produce the original
cashier's checks. In summary, the evidence was undisputed
that Mayberry had the current ability to comply with the
terms of the order and judgment. Under the circumstances,
the court's order recognizing Mayberry's ability to pay was
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a sufficient determination to support the court's order of
contempt.

1 21 This case is distinguishable from those cases where
there was no evidence of a current ability to pay the order or
judgment. Mayberry had the burden to show he was unable
to comply with the trial court's order.[20] Given his
testimony, he could not meet this burden.
1 22 Whether contempt is warranted is a matter within the
court's discretion.[21] The court's order will not be
disturbed unless the court abused its discretion.[22]
Discretion is abused if its exercise was manifestly
unreasonable or was based on untenable grounds. [23] The
court did not abuse its discretion.
1 23 Mayberry next contends the commissioner displayed
bias toward him and violated the appearance of fairness
doctrine. He claims the commissioner made a number of
statements throughout the course of the proceedings
showing animosity toward him and that those statements
alone indicate a lack of fairness. In addition to the
statements, Mayberry contends the commissioner's
imposition of sanctions and the order for a bench warrant

also showed the court's bias and unfairness. Given the
nature of the statements and orders, Mayberry asserts that
the orders should be reversed and any further proceedings
should occur in front of a different judge or commissioner.
We disagree.

,r

24 " ' Under the appearance of fairness doctrine, a
judicial proceeding is valid only if a reasonably prudent and
disinterested observer would conclude that all parties
obtained a fair, impartial, and neutral hearing.'" [24]
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Evidence of a judge or commissioner's actual or potential
bias is required Before the appearance of fairness doctrine
will be applied.[25] A party claiming bias or prejudice must
support the claim.[26]
[208 p .3d 1133] 'I[ 25 The record reveals that the guardian
sought to bring Mayberry and others Before the
guardianship court in order to obtain direction and authority
to procure payment of the funds owed under the settlement
agreement. Mayberry filed no written response but appeared
at the initial hearing. During the hearing, while under oath,
he admitted breaching the settlement agreement, the
subsequent agreement with the guardian for payment of the
amounts owed in exchange for a continuance, and further
admitted he had the cashier's checks to satisfy the
outstanding obligation to Wells. When Mayberry raised an
issue regarding alleged damage to the house, the
commissioner afforded him the opportunity to do so.
Mayberry willfully disobeyed by failing to appear, file a
written response, make the additional claims, or produce the
cashier's checks. Our review of the record reveals that the
comments and actions of the commissioner show
understandable frustration with Mayberry and his corporate
entities, but do not rise to a level of bias or violation of an
appearance of fairness.

,r 26 The guardian seeks attorney fees and costs on appeal.
Reasonable attorney fees are recoverable on appeal if
allowed by statute, rule, or contract, and the request is made
pursuant to RAP 18.l(a).[27] The claim for fees is based on
the attorney fees and costs paragraph of the promissory note
executed by the appellants. Fees and costs on appeal are
hereby granted in an amount to be set by a commissioner of
this court upon compliance with RAP 18.1.
[150 Wn.App. 504] ,i 27 Citing RAP 18.9(c), the guardian
seeks dismissal of the appeal, arguing the appeal is
frivolous. An appeal is deemed frivolous if, considering the
entire record, no debatable issues are presented upon which
reasonable minds might differ and it is so devoid of merit
that there is no reasonable possibility of reversal. [28] While
there is little merit to Mayberry's claims on appeal, we do
not find it to be entirely frivolous.

,i 28 Affirmed.

Notes:
[l] Care Planning Associates was appointed Guardian of
the Estate of Louise L. Wells; Horace and Gloria Wells
were appointed as Guardian of the Person of Louise L.
Wells.
[2] Additional amounts were due to the Wells children,
payable initially and at later dates. Funds paid later were to
be used to fund a family trust.
[3] Elizabeth T. Wilson was a successor in the interest of
Carolyn Wells, the daughter of Louise Wells. Eventually
Wilson's interest was transferred to Start Corp.
[4] Paragraph 10 of the promissory note provided:
Maker shall pay all costs incurred by Holder in collecting
sums due under this Note after a default, including
reasonable attorneys' fees, whether or not suit is brought. If
Maker or Holder sues to enforce this Note or obtain a
declaration of its rights hereunder, the prevailing party in
any such proceeding shall be entitled to recover its
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the
proceeding (including those incurred in any bankruptcy
proceeding or appeal) from the non-prevailing party.
[ 5] Specifically the citation directed Response Capital and
Mr. and Mrs. Mayberry to appear and show cause why they
should not be found to have breached a portion of the
settlement agreement, why judgment should not be entered
against them for the breach, why the guardian should not be
authorized to file a /is pendens on any real property owned
by any of them, why the guardian should not be authorized
to foreclose on the real property that was the subject of the
settlement agreement, why the guardian should not be
authorized to intervene on behalf of Wells in any
bankruptcy action commenced by either of them, and why
they should not be directed to pay fees and costs.
[6] After negotiation, Mayberry entered into an agreement
providing that the funds owed to Wells, including additional
fees and costs to the attorney and guardian, would be paid
through an escrow account following the sale of a home
owned by Mayberry or one of his corporate entities.
Thereafter, counsel for the guardian agreed to continue the
hearing until October 5, 2007.
[7] Start Corp. signed the settlement agreement. However,
it was never served with process on the petition for citation.
The guardian argued that Start Corp. was part of Mayberry's
enterprises and sought to have Start Corp. added to the
judgment. The commissioner agreed and included Start

Corp. in the judgment
[8] While the commissioner believed that damage may
have occurred, the court noted that the property was titled in
the name of Mayberry and his corporate entities for a long
time, and if Mayberry and the entities did not bother to evict
the tenants who damaged property, the problem was not
likely one for Wells.
[9] These suggestions included the possible foreclosure of
the deed of trust, calling the elder fraud division of the
Seattle and Tacoma police departments and/or the King
County Prosecutor, checking SCOMIS for other litigation
to alert counsel, preparing a letter of complaint to the Office
of the Attorney General to encourage it to enter a cease and
desist order for any ofMayberry's corporations, and further,
checking to see if Mayberry was a principal with the escrow
company that failed to properly pay off the judgment, as
well as looking for any interrelationship between other
businesses involved.

[!OJ The record does not disclose that any of these
suggestions actually occurred.
[I I] Appellant's argument about the judgment against, or
the sanctions imposed on, appellant Start Corp. is moot.
The judgment against Start Corp. was vacated by order of
the superior court over six months Before the filing of the
appellant's brief.
[12] Somers v. Snohomish County, 105 Wash.App. 937,
941, 21 P.3d 1165 (2001); In re Marriage a/Thurston, 92
Wash.App. 494, 497, 963 P.2d 947 (1998), review denied,
137 Wash.2d 1023, 980 P.2d 1282 (1999).
[13] In re Adoption of Buehl, 87 Wash.2d 649, 655, 555
P.2d 1334 (1976).
[14] RCW I l.96A.OIO.
[15] RCW 1l.96A.040(1).
[16] We recognize that the case of Britannia Holdings Ltd.
v. Greer sets forth that the " exercise of the contempt power
is appropriate only when ' the court finds that the person has
failed or refused to perform an act that is yet within the
person's power to perform.' " 127 Wash.App. 926, 933-34,
113 P.3d 1041 (2005) (emphasis omitted) (quoting RCW
7.21.030(2)), review denied, 156 Wash.2d 1032, 134 P.3d
232 (2006). The court stated that there is a threshold
requirement of a finding of current ability to perform the act
previously ordered.
[17] " A judge or commissioner of the supreme court, the
court of appeals, or the superior court, a judge of a court of
limited jurisdiction, and a commissioner of a court of
limited jurisdiction may impose a sanction for contempt of

court under this chapter.'' RCW 7.21.020.
[18] RCW 7.21.030.
[19] Int'/ Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell,
512 U.S. 821,828, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gompers v.
Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,442, 31 S.Ct. 492,
55 L.Ed. 797 (1911)).
[20] SeeMoreman v. Butcher, 126 Wash.2d 36, 40, 891
P.2d 725 (1995) (The law presumes that one is capable of
performing the actions required by the court and the
inability to comply with a court's order is an affirmative
defense.).
[21] Id.
[22] In the Matter of the Pers. Restraint of King, 110
Wash.2d 793, 798, 756 P.2d 1303 (1988).
[23] Moreman, 126 Wash.2d at 40, 891 P.2d 725.
[24] State v. Bilal, 77 Wash.App. 720, 722, 893 P.2d 674
(quoting State v. Ladenburg, 67 Wash.App. 749, 754-55,
840 P.2d 228 (l 992), abrogated on other grounds byState v.
Finch, 137 Wash.2d 792, 975 P.2d 967 (1999)), review
denied, 127 Wash.2d 1013, 902 P.2d 163 (1995).
[25] State v. Post, 118 Wash.2d 596, 618-19 & n. 9. 826
P.2d 172,837 P.2d 599 (1992).
[26] Bilal, 77 Wash.App. at 722, 893 P.2d 674.
[27] Malted Mousse, Inc. v. Steinmetz, 150 Wash.2d 518,
535, 79 P.3d 1154 (2003).
[28] Goad v. Hambridge, 85 Wash.App. 98, l 05, 931 P.2d
200, review denied, 132 Wash.2d 1010, 940 P.2d 654
(1997).

